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论文编号：	14052
作者编号：	2120213290
上传时间：	2023/6/8 9:50:37
中文题目：	控股股东股权质押与企业ESG表现
英文题目：	Controlling Shareholder''s Share Pledging and Corporate ESG Performance
指导老师：	王志红
中文关键字：	控股股东股权质押;企业 ESG 表现;产权性质;机构投资者;媒体关注
英文关键字：	Controlling Shareholder''s Share Pledging; Corporate ESG Performance; Nature of Property Rights; Institutional Investors；Media Attention
中文摘要：	随着可持续发展政策和“双碳”目标的推进，企业 ESG 表现越来越受到投资者的关注，和传统的财务指标相比，ESG 更注重企业在环境、社会以及公司治理三方面的协调发展，提升企业 ESG 表现是实现高质量发展的途径，但目前在此方面企业普遍存在意愿不足和能力欠缺的问题。企业中的控股股东能凭借其在企业中的地位和表决权对企业决策施加影响，当其进行股权质押后，现金流权和控制权分离程度加大，加大了大股东掏空、进行私人利益攫取的动机，同时面临着因股价下行导致的平仓风险，容易产生短视心理，选择提升短期财务绩效而非长期价值，改善企业 ESG 表现意愿不强。另外大部分股权质押所得资金未流入上市公司，企业资金状况反而由于大股东侵占等行为恶化，用于提升 ESG 表现的资源减少。 本文在对已有文献进行梳理和总结的基础上，结合委托代理理论、控制权私利理论、信号传递理论和利益相关者理论，选取我国沪深 A 股上市公司为样本，探究了控股股东股权质押与企业 ESG 表现之间的关系，并探讨了产权性质、机构投资者、媒体关注以及质押新规对二者关系的影响。根据本文的实证结果，得出以下结论：（1）控股股东股权质押会降低企业 ESG 表现，质押比例越高，企业 ESG 表现越差，且控股股东股权质押对环境（E）、社会责任（S）和公司治理（G）三方面的表现均会产生负面影响；（2）相比于国有企业，非国有企业控股股东股权质押与企业 ESG 表现的负向关系更显著；（3）机构投资者持股可以缓解控股股东股权质押对企业 ESG 表现的负面影响；（4）媒体关注可以缓解控股股东股权质押对企业 ESG 表现的负面影响；（5）质押新规的发布可以缓解控股股东股权质押对企业 ESG 表现的负面影响。 本文的研究丰富了控股股东股权质押经济后果以及企业 ESG 表现影响因素的研究，同时有助于企业更好地约束控股股东股权质押后的行为、提升 ESG 表现，实现可持续发展；有助于政府进一步加强对股权质押的监管、积极引导企业改善 ESG 表现，同时也有助于引导投资者加强对股权质押后风险的关注、谨慎投资、由短期逐利性投资转向长期价值投资。
英文摘要：	With the development of sustainable development policy and “Double carbon” target, corporate ESG performance has been paid more and more attention by investors.Compared with traditional financial indicators, ESG pays more attention to the coordinated development of enterprises in the three aspects of environment, society, and corporate governance. Improving corporate ESG performance is a way to achieve high-quality development. However, currently, enterprises generally have insufficient willingness and capacity in this regard. Controlling shareholders in an enterprise can exert influence on enterprise decision-making by virtue of their status and voting rights in the enterprise. When they pledge their equity, the degree of separation between cash flow rights and control rights increases, increasing the motivation of major shareholders to empty out and seize private interests. At the same time, they are faced with the risk of closing positions due to the downward trend of stock prices, which can easily develop short-sighted mentality and choose to improve short-term financial performance rather than long-term value, the willingness to improve corporate ESG performance is not strong. In addition, most of the funds obtained from equity pledge did not flow into the listed company, and instead, the company's financial situation deteriorated due to the encroachment of major shareholders, resulting in a decrease in resources used to improve ESG performance. Based on a review and summary of existing literature, combined with principalagent theory, private interest in control theory, signaling theory, and stakeholder theory, this article selects listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares as a sample to explore the relationship between controlling shareholder'sshare pledging and corporate ESG performance, and explores the impact of property rights, institutional investors ,media attention, and new pledge regulations on the relationship. Based onthe empirical results of this article, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) Controlling shareholder's share pledging will reduce corporate ESG performance. The higher the pledge ratio, the worse corporate ESG performance. Moreover, controlling shareholder's share pledging will have a negative impact on the performance of environmental (E), social (S), and governance (G) aspects; (2) Compared with stateowned enterprises, the negative relationship between controlling shareholder's share pledging and corporate ESG performance is more significant in non-state enterprises; (3) Institutional investors’shareholding can mitigate the negative impact of controlling shareholder's share pledging on corporate ESG performance; (4) Media attention can alleviate the negative impact of controlling shareholder's share pledging on corporate ESG performance; (5) The release of new pledge regulations can alleviate the negative impact of controlling shareholder's share pledging on corporate ESG performance. The research in this article enriches the research on the economic consequences of controlling shareholder's share pledging and the factors that affect the corporate ESG performance, and helps enterprises better constrain the behavior of controlling shareholder equity pledge, improve ESG performance, and achieve sustainable development. It is helpful for the government to further strengthen the supervision of equity pledge, actively guide enterprises to improve ESG performance, and also helps guide investors to strengthen their attention to the risks after equity pledge and invest prudently, and shift from short-term profit seeking investment to long-term value investment.
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