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论文编号：	14016
作者编号：	2120213332
上传时间：	2023/6/7 18:54:13
中文题目：	非国有股东治理对国有企业投资效率的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the influence of non-state shareholder governance on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises
指导老师：	周建教授
中文关键字：	国有企业；非国有股东；股权治理；高层治理；投资效率
英文关键字：	State-owned Enterprises; Non-state-owned Shareholders; Equity Governance; High-level Governance; Investment Efficiency
中文摘要：	国有企业是国民经济发展的重要支柱，对维护人民生活稳定与社会经济有序运行具有深远意义。然而国有企业由于内部治理机制不完善和承担着多重社会政治目标，存在经营效率低下和普遍的非效率投资问题。推进国有企业混合所有制改革是目前全面深化国企改革的重点。因此，深入探究非国有股东治理对国有企业投资效率的影响具有重要的理论价值与现实意义。 本文从非国有股东持股比例与委派董事直接参与国企经营决策两方面，研究了非国有股东治理对国企投资效率的影响及其机制。通过梳理和总结信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、资源依赖理论以及国内外学者的相关研究，并在此基础上进行理论分析和演绎，研究选取2008-2021年沪深A股国有上市公司作为研究样本，从股权治理和高层治理两个方面探究非国有股东对国有企业投资效率的影响。其次，从地区市场化水平、行业竞争属性的外部治理环境以及国企行政层级、管理层权力的内部治理环境，考察了不同情境下非国有股东治理的异质性影响。此外还进一步区分了非国有股东治理对过度投资和投资不足的影响，以及非国有股东超额委派董事对国企投资效率的影响。 研究结果表明：（1）非国有股东参与国企治理有利于提升国有企业投资效率。（2）在市场化水平较低地区的国企、垄断性行业国企、地方国企、管理层权力小的国企中，非国有股东治理对投资效率的提升作用更为明显。（3）进一步研究发现：非国有股东治理对缓解投资不足的影响不显著，而对抑制过度投资有显著作用。此外，非国有股东超额委派董事比例越高，越有利于提升国有企业投资效率。本文不仅丰富了非国有股东治理的影响因素和经济后果研究，同时也为推进国企深化改革中提升非国有股东治理作用提出了政策指导。
英文摘要：	State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important pillars of national economic development and have profound significance in maintaining the stability of people's lives and the orderly operation of the social economy. However, SOEs suffer from operational inefficiency and widespread inefficient investment due to their imperfect internal governance mechanisms and multiple socio-political objectives. Promoting mixed ownership reform of SOEs is currently the focus of comprehensive deepening of SOE reform. Therefore, it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to explore in depth the impact of non-state shareholder governance on the investment efficiency of SOEs. This paper investigates the impact of non-state shareholder governance on SOEs' investment efficiency and its mechanism from two aspects: the shareholding ratio of non-state shareholders and the direct participation of appointed directors in SOEs' business decisions. By combing and summarizing information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory, resource dependence theory and relevant studies by domestic and foreign scholars, and conducting theoretical analysis and deduction on this basis, the study selects the state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2008-2021 as the research sample, and explores the influence of non-state-owned shareholders on the investment efficiency of SOEs from two aspects of equity governance and high-level governance. Second, the heterogeneous effects of non-state shareholders' governance in different contexts are examined in terms of the external governance environment in terms of regional marketization level and industry competitive attributes as well as the internal governance environment in terms of administrative hierarchy and management power of SOEs. The effects of non-state shareholder governance on overinvestment and underinvestment, and the effects of over-appointed directors by non-state shareholders on SOEs' investment efficiency are also further distinguished. The findings indicate that (1) the participation of non-state shareholders in SOE governance is conducive to enhancing SOE investment efficiency. (2) The effect of non-state shareholder governance on investment efficiency is more pronounced among SOEs in regions with low marketization, SOEs in monopolistic industries, local SOEs, and SOEs with low management power. (3) Further study finds that the effect of non-state shareholder governance on alleviating underinvestment is insignificant, while it has a significant effect on curbing overinvestment. In addition, the higher the proportion of over-appointed directors by non-state shareholders, the more beneficial it is to enhance the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. This paper not only enriches the study of the influencing factors and economic consequences of non-state shareholder governance, but also suggests policy guidelines for promoting the role of non-state shareholder governance in the deepening reform of SOEs.
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