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论文编号：	13999
作者编号：	2120213344
上传时间：	2023/6/7 15:25:45
中文题目：	国企混改、董事会治理与创新投入
英文题目：	Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises, Board Governance and Innovation Investment
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	国企混改；创新投入；董事会治理；代理成本
英文关键字：	Mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises; Innovation investment; Board governance; Agency cost
中文摘要：	伴随着科技发展的日新月异以及高质量发展的更高要求，国有企业创新活动水平对国家整体创新能力具有重要影响。但由于产权性质等原因，国企创新提升欠佳，特别表现在创新投入的动力与意愿不足。在此背景下，混合所有制改革成为了其发展的重要突破口，且随着改革目标的不断明确，其现代企业制度建设、治理能力提升受到了更多重视，但基于治理视角对混改与企业创新投入关系的研究较为缺乏。 基于以上背景，本文提出如下研究问题：国企能否通过混改提升创新投入意愿与能力？董事会作为关键治理主体，在二者关系间起到了怎样的作用？此外，国企中突出的代理问题会对混改作用机制产生何种影响？本文在进行概念界定与相关研究综述的基础上，结合产权理论、委托代理理论、创新理论进行理论分析。研究选取沪深A股2014—2021年国有上市公司为研究对象，基于“混合股权”与“治理能力”的思路，聚焦混改对企业创新投入的影响与董事会治理在其中的中介作用，构建“混合所有制改革→董事会治理→企业创新”的逻辑链条，同时关注国有企业内部较为突出的代理问题，分析其在影响机制中的调节作用，构建被调节的中介效应模型，并进一步探讨了不同政府放权意愿水平下的影响差异。 实证分析结果表明：（1）混改程度的提高对国企创新投入水平提升产生积极影响。（2）董事会治理在国企混改与创新投入之间起到了中介作用，混改推动了董事会治理建设，进而对创新投入产生积极影响。（3）国企内部存在的代理成本在混合所有制改革与董事会治理之间起到正向调节作用，并进一步影响了董事会治理中介作用的发挥。（4）政府放权意愿提高可以加强混改对国企创新投入的影响，并增强董事会治理在其中的中介效应。在此基础上，本文就优化股权结构、推进董事会建设、完善公司治理机制、关注政府协调作用等方面为国企混改、创新发展提出建议。
英文摘要：	Along with the rapid development of science and technology and the higher requirements of high-quality development, the level of innovation activities of SOEs has an important impact on the overall innovation capability of the country. However, due to the nature of property rights and other reasons, SOEs' innovation is poorly promoted, especially in terms of insufficient motivation and willingness to invest in innovation. In this context, the mixed ownership reform has become an important breakthrough for their development, and with the continuous clarification of reform objectives, the construction of their modern enterprise system and the improvement of their governance capacity have received more attention, but there is a lack of research on the relationship between mixed reform and enterprise innovation investment based on the governance perspective. Based on the above background, this paper poses the following research question: Can SOEs improve their willingness and ability to invest in innovation through hybrid reform? What is the role of the board of directors, as a key governance body, in the relationship between the two? In addition, what is the impact of the prominent agency problem in SOEs on the mechanism of hybrid reform? Based on the conceptual definition and review of related studies, this paper combines property rights theory, principal-agent theory, and innovation theory for theoretical analysis. The study selects state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2014-2021 as the research object, and focuses on the impact of mixed reform on corporate innovation investment and the mediating role of board governance based on the idea of "mixed equity" and "governance capacity". We also focus on the agency problem within SOEs, analyze its moderating role in the influence mechanism, construct a mediating effect model, and further explore the impact of different levels of government decentralization. The results of the empirical analysis show that The results of the empirical analysis show that (1) the increase in the degree of hybridization has a positive impact on the increase in the level of innovation investment in SOEs. (2) Board governance plays a mediating role between SOEs' hybridization and innovation investment, and hybridization promotes the construction of board governance, which in turn has a positive impact on innovation investment. (3) Agency costs within SOEs play a positive moderating role between the mixed ownership reform and board governance, and further influence the intermediary role of board governance. (4) Increased willingness of the government to decentralize can strengthen the impact of mixed ownership reform on SOEs' innovation investment and enhance the mediating effect of board governance in it. On this basis, this paper makes suggestions for the mixed reform and innovative development of SOEs in terms of optimizing the shareholding structure, promoting the construction of the board of directors, improving the corporate governance mechanism, and focusing on the coordinating role of the government.
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