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论文编号：	13982
作者编号：	2120213297
上传时间：	2023/6/7 12:18:22
中文题目：	国家队持股对企业短贷长投行为的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of the National Team’s Shareholding on Short-Term Financing for Long-term Investments in Enterprises
指导老师：	梅丹
中文关键字：	国家队持股；短贷长投；投融资期限错配；融资约束
英文关键字：	National Team Shareholding; Short-Term Financing for Long-term Investments; Term mismatch；Financing Constraints
中文摘要：	投资期限和融资期限相匹配是公司金融的基本原则之一，短期资金投资于短期资产，长期资金投资于长期资产代表稳健的投融资模式。但在我国企业实践中，以短期贷款筹集的资金支撑长期投资项目的短贷长投现象却客观且普遍存在。由于短期贷款与项目投资期限的不匹配，在债务到期时企业往往无法收回足够的收益用于偿本付息，这会增加企业债券违约风险、造成非效率投资、加大企业的经营风险和破产风险，不利于企业的长期发展。因此，探讨如何降低企业的短贷长投水平对于企业长远发展、防范债务危机有重要意义。 2015年股灾出现“千股跌停”的现象，是我国证券行业历史上的重大事件。为平稳市场，一支由我国政府投资或组织建立的投资平台、资产管理计划组成的国家队机构投资者大举入市救市，在维护资本市场稳定、引导微观企业发展等方面都发挥了重要作用。国家队作为长期机构投资者，基于维护资本市场稳定的目的入市，具有其特殊性。国家队更关注企业长期价值的创造，其投资行为具有信号传递作用，可以优化企业的信息环境，缓解企业融资约束程度，进而弱化被迫进行短贷长投行为的动机，减少短贷长投这类不理性的投融资策略的发生。 基于此，本文运用2015-2021年中国A股上市公司的数据，研究国家队机构投资者持股对企业短贷长投行为的影响。研究发现，国家队持股可以显著降低企业的短贷长投水平，且国家队持股比例越多，其对于短贷长投水平的降低作用越显著；通过对于作用机制的研究发现，国家队持股通过缓解企业融资约束，进而降低企业短贷长投水平。进一步研究发现，当国家队持股的企业是非国有、中小规模企业、企业代理成本越高、信息不对称程度越强时，国家队持股对于短贷长投水平的抑制程度更大。
英文摘要：	Matching the term of investment and financing is one of the basic principles of corporate finance. Short-term financing for short-term investments and long-term financing for long-term investments are well-advised investment and financing strategies. However, in the practice of Chinese enterprises, the phenomenon of short-term financing for long-term investments is widespread. Short-term financing for long-term investments is a radical investment and financing model with mismatch of investment and financing terms. Due to the mismatch between short-term loans and long-term project investment, enterprises often cannot recover enough income to repay principal and interest when the debt matures, which increases the risk of corporate bond default and causes inefficient investment. As a result, for the long-term development of enterprises and prevent debt crises for the capital market, the operational risk and bankruptcy risk of the enterprise will increase. Therefore, it is of great significance to discuss how to reduce the amount of short-term financing for long-term investment. The 2015 stock crash was a major event in the history of China's securities industry, resulting in the phenomenon of "thousands of stocks falling to the limit". In order to stabilize the market, a national team of institutional investors organized by the Chinese government entered the market, who played an important role in maintaining the stability of the capital market and guiding the development of micro enterprises. The national team has its peculiarities as a special institutional investor. It enters the market for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the capital market, so its investment behavior has a signal transmission effect. This can optimize the information environment of enterprises, alleviate the degree of financing constraints of enterprises, and then weaken the motivation of enterprises to be forced to carry out short-term loans for long-term investment. Based on this, the dissertation uses the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2021. It is found that the shareholding of the national team can significantly reduce the degree of the short-term financing for long-term investment. And the more the shareholding ratio of the national team, the more significant the effect on the reduction. Through the study of the mechanism of action, it is found that the national team's shareholding alleviates the financing constraints of enterprises, and then reduces the motivation of enterprises to passively choose short-term financing for long-term investment behaviors. Further research found that when the enterprises held by the national team are non-state-owned, small and medium-sized enterprises, the higher the agency cost of enterprises and the stronger the degree of information asymmetry, the shareholding of the national team has a greater degree of reduction in short-term financing for long-term investments.
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