联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	13979
作者编号：	2120213293
上传时间：	2023/6/7 11:29:52
中文题目：	高管股权激励、创新投资与企业长期绩效研究
英文题目：	A study on Executive Equity Incentives, Innovation Investment, and Corporate Long-term Performance
指导老师：	程新生教授
中文关键字：	股票期权；限制性股票；创新投资；创新投资效率；长期绩效
英文关键字：	stock option; Restricted stock; Innovation investment; Innovation investment efficiency; Long-term performance
中文摘要：	创新是国家经济增长和技术进步的重要源泉。过去十年，我国在科技创新方面取得了长足进步，但转型升级和自主创新方面仍面临挑战。另一方面，企业在日趋激烈的市场竞争中，也需要通过创新来获得长期竞争优势，提高生存能力、市场份额、品牌形象和利润水平。因此，在我国实施创新驱动发展战略、培育创新型企业的背景下，研究创新绩效的驱动因素以及其对企业的长期绩效的影响具有重要意义。目前国内研究对高管股票期权激励和限制性股票激励两种股权激励方式的异质性对创新和企业绩效影响的关注较少。因此，本文试图填补这一不足，并为相关政策制定提供参考。 本文以2008—2021年中国A股上市公司为样本，考察了高管股票期权激励和限制性股票激励对企业长期绩效和创新行为的影响。本文采用三个创新指标来评价企业的创新行为：创新投资的强度（以创新投资额除以企业资产衡量）、创新投资的收益（主要以发明专利以及实用新型专利申请数之和衡量）和企业的创新投资配置效率（使用数据包络分析法（DEA），将研发人员数和创新投入额作为输入指标，将发明专利申请数作为输出指标，按公司进行计算）。在此基础上，本文继续探讨了两种股权激励对企业长期绩效的影响机制，包括创新投入强度与创新投资配置效率对长期绩效的作用，以及创新投资配置效率对两种股权激励与财务绩效关系的中介作用，旨在深入、全面地探索股权激励对企业创新与长期绩效的作用机制。 本文通过理论分析和实证验证得到以下的结论：（1）股票期权和限制性股票均能够提升企业的长期绩效；（2）股票期权和限制性股票都能够促进创新投资强度，但股票期权的促进作用更强；（3）股票期权在提高创新投资效率（包括创新投资收益和资源配置效率）方面的表现总体强于限制性股票；（4）单纯地增加企业创新投资强度并不能很好地提高企业长期绩效表现，提升创新投资配置效率才是提升企业长期绩效表现的关键（5）高管股权激励能够促进企业更有效地分配创新投资资源，从而提升企业的竞争力，即企业创新投资效率在股权激励和企业长期绩效表现的关系中起到了中介作用。在这个过程中，高管期权激励的作用更为显著。本文发现，两种股权激励并非替代品而是互补品，企业应根据自身需求进行选择。 本文比较了限制性股票和股票期权两种股权激励方式对管理者风险承担行为的不同激励效果，并探究了它们影响企业创新投资和效率的内在机制。研究采用创新投入强度和创新投资效率两个指标来评价企业创新能力，并将效率进一步细分为收益效率和资源配置效率两个方面。此外，本文还研究了股权激励对企业创新投入、创新绩效和长期绩效之间关系的影响机制，弥补了以往文献对三者相互作用研究较少和多数只分析一期财务绩效的局限，探讨了不同类型的股权激励对高管决策风险偏好的影响。本文为企业设计有效的创新政策和股权激励机制提供了理论支持和参考，并丰富了企业创新投资效率影响因素文献。
英文摘要：	Innovation investment constitutes a crucial driver of national economic growth and technological advancement. While China has made significant strides in scientific and technological innovation over the past decade, it is still facing challenges in transformation, upgrading, and independent innovation. In addition, as market competition intensifies, companies must secure long-term competitive advantages through innovation, bolstering their viability, market share, brand image, and profitability. Considering the implementation of China's innovation-driven development strategy and the cultivation of innovative enterprises, it becomes crucial to examine the factors that drive innovation performance and its long-term impact on businesses. Currently, there is a dearth of research in the domestic sphere regarding the influence of executive stock option incentives and restricted stock incentives on innovation and firm performance. This study seeks to address this gap,offering insights for relevant policy making. This study explores the effects of stock option and restricted stock incentives on Chinese A-share listed companies' innovation behavior from 2008 to 2021. It employs three innovation indicators: innovation investment intensity, innovation investment returns (primarily measured by the total number of invention and utility model patent applications), and innovation investment allocation efficiency (measured using DEA, with R&D personnel and innovation input as input indicators, and invention patent applications as output indicators). The research examines the mechanisms linking two types of equity incentives to long-term corporate performance, including the mediating role of innovation allocation efficiency. Theoretical and empirical assessments yield these conclusions: (1) Both stock options and restricted stock can improve the long-term performance of enterprises; (2) Stock options and restricted stocks bolster innovation investment intensity; however, stock options stimulate high-risk, high-return projects; (3) Stock options surpass restricted stocks in enhancing innovation investment efficiency, encompassing returns and resource allocation; (4) Merely increasing investment intensity does not improve long-term performance, but enhancing allocation efficiency does; (5) Executive equity incentives facilitate effective resource allocation, thereby improving competitiveness; innovation investment efficiency mediates the relationship between equity incentives and long-term performance, with stock options being particularly significant. This study suggests that equity incentives are complementary rather than substitutive. Firms should choose suitable incentives based on their specific needs: This study examines the distinct incentive effects of restricted stock and stock options on managerial risk-taking behavior, delving into the underlying mechanisms influencing innovation investment and efficiency. Employing two indicators—innovation investment intensity and efficiency—to assess corporate innovation capabilities, the research further dissects efficiency into revenue and resource allocation aspects. This investigation not only addresses existing literature gaps in comprehensive evaluation of innovation investment efficiency but also explores the influence of equity incentives on the interrelationship among innovation investment, performance, and long-term outcomes, compensating for the paucity of prior research examining these interactions. By offering theoretical backing and guidance for devising effective innovation policies and equity incentive mechanisms, this paper enriches the body of knowledge on determinants of enterprise innovation investment efficiency.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)