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论文编号：	13971
作者编号：	2120202834
上传时间：	2023/6/7 10:25:19
中文题目：	创业板注册制改革对IPO定价效率的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of GEM Registration System Reform on IPO Pricing Efficiency
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	注册制；IPO定价效率；投资者情绪；审计质量
英文关键字：	Registration system; IPO pricing efficiency; Investor sentiment; Audit quality
中文摘要：	中国证券市场从建立至今，经历多次制度改革，每一次的改革都在帮助促进其更加市场化。在此背景下，我国监管部门对于证券市场基础制度的构建给予高度重视，并尝试用各种方式提高证券市场的定价效率。随着2020年4月27日《创业板改革并试点注册制总体实施方案》的发布，我国创业板市场已经进入了一个全新的发展时期。2020年6月份，该方案开始实施，2020年8月24日，创业板注册制首批企业成功发行上市。创业板作为我国试行注册制的存量板块，在发行制度的方面更加强调市场定价，所以围绕创业板发行制度变化对于IPO定价效率的影响开展研究，不仅能够检验此次政策成果，而且能够针对缓解我国IPO定价相关的问题提供可行的建议，并且对于确定此项制度的改革是否能推广至整个股票市场都具有深远意义。 本文选取2009年10月30日至2022年12月31日期间在沪深主板及创业板IPO上市的公司作为研究样本，建立双重差分模型，研究创业板注册制改革对于 IPO 定价效率所产生的影响。本文发现，创业板实行注册制改革后， IPO 定价效率发生明显变化，会使得创业板IPO抑价率升高，即定价效率变低。此外，本文根据投资者情绪、审计质量将样本分组进行异质性分析，研究结果显示，随着投资者情绪的升高，IPO 抑价率也更高。同时，注册制改革对IPO定价效率的影响在高审计质量的公司中更加明显，伴随着审计质量的升高，IPO抑价率也有所升高，定价效率的下降更为明显。本文通过平行趋势检验、安慰剂检验、替换被解释变量衡量方法及改变样本容量等多种途径进行稳健性检验，进一步验证并支撑本文的结论。我国创业板开展制度改革，主要是为了促进资本市场的发展，但是根据本文的实证结果，目前注册制制度改革还未充分发挥作用，未起到有效提升IPO定价效率的作用，可能要等待更长的时间以验证。
英文摘要：	Since China's securities market’s establishment, it has undergone many institutional reforms, and each reform has helped promote its more market-oriented nature. In this context, China's regulatory authorities attach great importance to the construction of the basic system of the securities market, and try to improve the pricing efficiency of the securities market in various ways. With the release of the "Overall Implementation Plan for the Reform and Pilot Registration System of the Growth Enterprise Market" on April 27, 2020, the development of China's Growth Enterprise Market has entered a new development period. In June 2020, the plan began to be implemented, and on August 24, 2020, the first batch of enterprises under the GEM registration system were successfully issue. The GEM, as the stock sector of China's pilot registration system, places more emphasis on market pricing in terms of issuance systems. Therefore, conducting research around the impact of changes in the GEM issuance system on IPO pricing efficiency can not only test the policy results, but also provide a feasible basis for alleviating issues related to IPO pricing in China, And it has far-reaching significance for determining whether the reform of this system can be extended to the entire stock market. This article selects companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Main Board and the Growth Enterprise Board during the period from October 30, 2009 to December 31, 2022 as research samples, and establishes a dual difference model to study the impact of the registration system reform on IPO pricing efficiency. This article finds that after the implementation of the registration system reform on the Growth Enterprise Board, there are significant changes in IPO pricing efficiency, which will increase the IPO underpricing rate on the Growth Enterprise Board, that is, lower pricing efficiency. In addition, based on investor sentiment and audit quality, this paper conducts a heterogeneity analysis of the sample groups. The research results show that the higher the deviation degree of IPO PE ratio, the higher the IPO underpricing rate. At the same time, the impact of the registration system reform on IPO pricing efficiency is more evident in companies with high audit quality. With the improvement of audit quality, the IPO underpricing rate has also increased, and the decline in pricing efficiency is more evident. This article further validates and supports the conclusions of this article through multiple approaches such as parallel trend testing, placebo testing, replacing the measurement method of the explained variable, and changing the sample size. The main purpose of institutional reform in China's GEM is to promote the development of the capital market. However, according to the empirical results of this article, the current registration system reform has not helped improve the IPO pricing efficiency of the GEM, and the feasibility of the system may need to wait longer to be verified.
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