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论文编号:13955 
作者编号:2120213291 
上传时间:2023/6/6 22:31:00 
中文题目:投资者情绪、管理层持股与上市公司盈余管理研究 
英文题目:A Study on Investor Sentiment, Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management of Listed Companies 
指导老师:陆宇建 
中文关键字:投资者情绪;应计盈余管理;真实盈余管理;管理层持股;迎合理论 
英文关键字:Investor Sentiment; Accrual Earnings Management; Real Earnings Management; Management Stock Ownership; Catering Theory 
中文摘要: 群体性投资者情绪的大幅波动影响到证券定价的合理性,进而导致证券市场定价效率下降;公司的盈余管理行为改变了真实财务信息的披露,增加投资者获知企业实际经营状况的难度,进一步误导投资者做出错误的交易选择,两者一定程度上都会影响资本市场的有效性。近年来A股市场大起大落,体现出我国证券市场中非理性投资者情绪的显著存在且导致股票价格与内在价值偏离的程度较为严重,而公司出于维持较高业绩或股价等目标进行盈余管理的现象也屡见不鲜,而关于投资者情绪与盈余管理之间的关系近年来备受行为金融学与公司财务学领域关注,因此将投资者情绪与盈余管理纳入同一分析框架具有较强的理论意义与现实意义。 本文将迎合理论和委托代理理论作为主要理论依据,对投资者情绪影响盈余管理以及管理层持股在其中发挥的治理效应的问题进行研究,具体而言,本文选取2012-2021年沪深A股上市公司为样本,首先对投资者情绪影响应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两方面进行探究,接下来结合委托代理理论,关注管理层持股对投资者情绪与盈余管理关系的影响。经过实证分析,本文得出以下结论:随着投资者情绪的高涨,管理层偏好使用应计盈余管理来迎合投资者的乐观预期,但出于长远利益考虑管理层会更少地使用真实盈余管理;增加管理层持股作为调节变量进入模型后,经过实证研究发现管理层持股在投资者情绪与应计和真实盈余管理的关系中均起到了增强作用;经过进一步研究发现,企业规模大、管理层薪酬高的企业更倾向于迎合投资者情绪进行应计盈余管理;企业规模大、管理层薪酬高的企业投资者情绪与真实盈余管理之间的负相关关系更显著;管理层持股在投资者情绪与真实盈余管理关系中发挥的调节效应仅在小规模公司与低管理层薪酬公司中存在,而在投资者情绪与应计盈余管理关系中发挥的调节效应在不同规模和管理层薪酬公司中均存在;管理层会利用投资者情绪引发的应计盈余管理进而实现减持股份获取更高收益的目的;高涨期投资者情绪与应计和真实盈余管理呈正相关和负相关关系,低落期投资者情绪与应计和真实盈余管理呈不显著和负相关关系。 结合得到的实证结论,本文提出几项政策建议,包括提高投资者的理性程度、健全监管体制以及完善管理层股权激励制度等。  
英文摘要: Large fluctuations in group investor sentiment affect the rationality of securities pricing, which leads to a decline in the efficiency of securities market pricing; earnings management by companies changes the disclosure of true financial information, making it more difficult for investors to be informed of the actual operating conditions of the company and further misleading them to make wrong trading choices, both of which affect the effectiveness of the capital market. In recent years, the ups and downs of the A-share market reflect the significant presence of irrational investor sentiment in China's securities market and the serious deviation of stocks from their intrinsic value, while the phenomenon of earnings management by companies to maintain high performance or share prices is also common. The relationship between investor sentiment and earnings management has received much attention in the fields of behavioral finance and corporate finance in recent years. Therefore, it is of strong theoretical and practical significance to include investor sentiment and earnings management in the same analytical framework. The dissertation takes the catering theory and principal-agent theory as the main theoretical basis to investigate the influence of investor sentiment on earnings management and the governance effect of management shareholding in it. Specifically, the dissertation selects a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012-2021 and firstly explores both accrual and real earnings management as influenced by investor sentiment, and next focuses on the impact of management shareholding on the relationship between investor sentiment and earnings management in conjunction with principal-agent theory. After the empirical analysis, the empirical findings of the dissertation suggest that: with the rise of investor sentiment, managers prefer to use accrual earnings management to meet the optimistic expectations of investors, but for long-term benefits managers will use real earnings management less; after introducing management shareholding as a moderating variable, the empirical study finds that management shareholding plays an enhanced role in the relationship between investor sentiment and both accrued and real earnings management; After further study, it is found that firms with large size and high management compensation tend to cater to investor sentiment for accrual earnings management; the negative relationship between investor sentiment and real earnings management is more significant in firms with large size and high management compensation; the moderating effect of management shareholding in the relationship between investor sentiment and real earnings management is only found in large size firms and high management compensation firms, while the moderating effect in the relationship between investor sentiment and accrual earnings management exists in companies of different sizes and management compensation; managers will take advantage of accrual earnings management triggered by investor sentiment to reduce its shareholding in order to obtain higher returns;investor sentiment is positively and negatively correlated with accrual and real earnings management during periods of high sentiment, while is not significantly and negatively correlated with accrual and real earnings management during periods of low sentiment. Combining the obtained empirical findings, this dissertation proposes several policy recommendations, including improving the rationality of investors, improving the regulatory system, and improving the management equity incentive system.  
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