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论文编号:13939 
作者编号:1120191037 
上传时间:2023/6/6 18:17:43 
中文题目:绩效反馈对企业战略信息披露的影响研究 
英文题目:Research on the Influence of Performance Feedback on Corporate Strategic Information Disclosure 
指导老师:程新生 
中文关键字:绩效反馈;企业战略信息披露;增量信息;印象管理;经济后果 
英文关键字:Performance feedback; Corporate strategic information disclosure; Incremental information; Impression management; Economic consequence 
中文摘要:由企业行为理论可知,绩效反馈是实际绩效与期望绩效的客观差距,如果一家公司的绩效反馈为正,决策者将维持现状或轻微改变。反之,决策者将开展问题搜索、组织学习等响应行动。整体而言,相关研究普遍遵循“绩效反馈(起因)→组织响应(结果)”的研究范式,认为负面绩效反馈是问题搜索、战略变革等实质性响应的驱动性因素,并强调战略实施过程中实质性响应与组织情境的契合至关重要。近年来,学界聚焦绩效反馈如何驱动多元化响应并阐述了实质性响应与形式性响应的决策逻辑,指出实质性响应并非是负面绩效反馈的唯一回应,决策者可能提前利用语调管理、内容渲染等印象管理策略开展形式性响应。然而,现有研究尚未明晰绩效反馈对形式性响应的作用机制,企业行为理论的决策后果如何由问题搜索、战略变革等实质性响应拓展至战略信息披露等形式性响应,有待探究。 鉴于此,本文立足企业行为理论,结合自愿性信息披露理论以及印象管理理论,深入探究绩效反馈对企业信息披露的影响。首先,参考先前学者的分析思路,本文将研究视角聚焦于战略信息以探究绩效反馈如何驱动形式性响应。其次,本文融合增量信息与印象管理两大观点后构建绩效反馈影响企业战略信息披露的理论框架,并进一步细化印象管理的动机、类型以及策略,从而识别不同绩效反馈下企业战略信息披露的性质。再次,参考期望违反理论,本文系统分析绩效反馈对企业战略信息披露的作用机制并实证检验持续性绩效反馈、组织资源以及企业声誉等特定情境下二者的关系。最后,本文从资本市场、产品市场以及内部市场三个维度检验了不同绩效反馈下企业战略信息披露的经济后果,并据此提出针对性建议。 研究发现:第一,绩效反馈与企业战略信息披露显著负相关,绩劣企业(负面绩效反馈企业)进行更多的战略信息披露,绩优企业(正面绩效反馈企业)进行更少的战略信息披露。第二,不同绩效反馈下企业战略信息披露行为具有非对称性,绩劣企业较多的战略信息披露支持印象管理观,绩优企业较多的战略信息披露支持增量信息观。第三,经过替换指标、内生性检验以及样本处理等一系列稳健性检验,发现绩效反馈与企业战略信息披露的负向关系较为可靠。第四,持续性绩效负反馈、资源匮乏以及高声誉情境下,绩效反馈与企业战略信息披露之间的负向关系更加显著。第五,绩劣企业主要通过选择性披露、信息噪音、文本复杂以及自利性归因四种印象管理策略,实现“寻求包容、印象补偿”的总体目标。第六,不同绩效反馈下企业战略信息披露的经济后果各异。以资本市场为例,绩劣企业的印象管理行为卓有成效,绩优企业的增量信息行为无显著影响。以产品市场为例,绩劣企业的印象管理行为效果甚微,绩优企业的增量信息行为令人信服。以内部市场为例,绩劣企业的印象管理行为卓有成效,绩优企业的增量信息行为无显著影响。 通过文献梳理与规范分析,本文构建绩效反馈影响企业战略信息披露的理论框架,并运用Python文本分析与多元回归模型对其进行实证检验,最终得到稳健的研究结论。本文结构安排如下:第一章主要介绍研究背景、研究问题、研究内容以及研究意义。第二章主要进行理论回顾与文献综述。第三章系统阐述绩效反馈与企业战略信息披露的关联性和逻辑关系,综合增量信息、印象管理两种观点后形成绩效反馈与企业战略信息披露的研究假设,并进一步提出绩效反馈、企业战略信息披露及其性质识别的研究思路。第四章主要介绍研究设计、实证结果以及稳健性检验。第五章主要阐述绩效反馈对企业战略信息披露的作用机制,并探讨不同情境下企业印象管理行为的触发条件以及绩劣企业“组合拳”式的印象管理策略。第六章主要考察不同绩效反馈下企业战略信息披露的经济后果,并从资本市场、产品市场以及内部市场三个维度展开分析。第七章主要是研究结论与政策建议。 研究贡献如下:第一,本文拓展了企业行为理论的应用边界。先前研究聚焦绩效反馈与问题搜索、战略变革等实质性响应的关系,忽视印象管理、信息操纵等形式性响应。立足企业行为理论,本文系统阐述绩效反馈对企业战略信息披露的作用机理,从而拓展了企业行为理论的应用边界。第二,本文引入增量信息、印象管理两种观点后构建起绩效反馈与企业战略信息披露的竞争性分析框架。结合自愿性信息披露理论与印象管理理论,本文不但发现不同绩效反馈下企业战略信息披露行为具有非对称性,而且揭示绩劣企业“组合拳”式的印象管理策略。第三,本文从资本市场、产品市场及内部市场三个维度丰富了企业战略信息披露的经济后果。相关发现有助于市场主体辨析不同绩效反馈下企业战略信息披露的决策逻辑,从而制定出科学高效的投资、供销、竞合及激励决策。 
英文摘要:According to the behavior theory of firms, performance feedback is the objective gap between actual performance and expected goals. If a company's performance feedback is positive, the decision maker will maintain the status quo or make slight changes; otherwise, the company will carry out response behaviors such as problem searching and organizational learning. On the whole, relevant researches generally follow the research paradigm of "performance feedback (cause) → organizational response (result)", which believes that negative performance feedback is the driving factor of substantive response such as problem searching, and emphasizes that it is crucial for substantive response to fit with enterprise context in the process of strategy implementation. In recent years, the academic community has focused on the mechanism of performance feedback on diversified response and systematically elaborated the decision logic of substantive response and formal response, pointing out that substantive response is not the only response of negative performance feedback enterprises, and decision makers may use impression management strategies such as tone management and content rendering to carry out formal response in advance. However, the existing research has not yet clarified the internal mechanism of performance feedback and formal response. How the decision consequence of enterprise behavior theory expands from substantive response such as problem search and strategic change to formal response needs to be further explored. Based on the theory of behavior theory of firms, combined with the theory of voluntary information disclosure and impression management, this paper explores the logical relationship between performance feedback and information disclosure. First of all, with reference to the analytical ideas of previous scholars, this article focuses its research perspective on strategic information to explore how performance feedback drives formal responses. Secondly, this article combines the two perspectives of incremental information and impression management to construct a theoretical framework for the impact of performance feedback on corporate strategic information disclosure, and further refine the motivation, types, and strategies of impression management, in order to identify the nature of corporate strategic information disclosure under different performance feedback. Thirdly, referring to the expectation violation theory, this paper systematically analyzes the mechanism of performance feedback on corporate strategic information disclosure and empirically tests the specific situations of sustained performance feedback, organizational resources, and corporate reputation. Finally, this article examines the economic consequences of corporate strategic information disclosure under different performance feedback from three dimensions: capital market, product market, and internal market. The findings are as follows: First, performance feedback is significantly negatively correlated with strategic information disclosure of enterprises. Enterprises with negative performance feedback disclose more strategic information, while enterprises with positive performance feedback disclose less strategic information. Second, enterprises' strategic information disclosure behavior is asymmetrical under different performance feedback. More strategic information disclosure of negative performance feedback enterprises supports impression management view, while more strategic information disclosure of positive performance feedback enterprises supports incremental information view. Thirdly, through a series of robustness tests such as replacement indicators, endogenous testing, and sample processing, it is found that the negative relationship between performance feedback and corporate strategic information disclosure is relatively reliable. Fourthly, in the context of sustained negative performance feedback, resource scarcity, and high reputation, the negative relationship between performance feedback and corporate strategic information disclosure is more significant. Fifthly, negative performance feedback enterprises mainly build positive image through four impression management strategies, namely selective disclosure, information noise, text complexity manipulation and self-serving attribution, so as to achieve the overall goals of market tolerance and impression compensation. Sixth, the economic consequences of corporate strategic information disclosure vary under different performance feedback. Taking the capital market as an example, the impression management behavior of negative performance feedback enterprises is effective, but the incremental information behavior of positive performance feedback enterprises has no significant influence. Taking product market as an example, impression management behavior of negative performance feedback enterprises has little effect, while incremental information behavior of positive performance feedback enterprises is convincing. Taking the internal market as an example, the impression management behavior of negative performance feedback enterprises is effective, but the incremental information behavior of positive performance feedback enterprises has no significant influence. Through literature review and normative research, this paper builds a theoretical framework for the impact of performance feedback on corporate strategic information disclosure. On this basis, Python text analysis and multiple regression model are used for empirical test, and robust research conclusions are finally obtained. The structure of this paper is as follows: The first chapter mainly introduces the research background, research issues, research content, and research significance. The second chapter mainly carries out theoretical summarize and literature review. The third chapter systematically elaborates the two perspectives of incremental information and impression management, forming the research hypothesis of performance feedback and corporate strategic information disclosure, and further proposes research ideas on performance feedback, corporate strategic information disclosure, and their nature identification. The fourth chapter is mainly about the research design and empirical results of performance feedback and corporate strategic information disclosure. The fifth chapter mainly elaborates the mechanism of performance feedback on corporate strategic information disclosure, and explores the trigger motivation of corporate impression management in different situations, as well as the "combined punch" impression management strategy of negative performance feedback enterprises. The sixth chapter mainly studies the economic consequences of corporate strategic information disclosure under different performance feedback. The seventh Chapter is mainly about research conclusions and policy recommendations. The research contributions are as follows: First, this paper expands the application boundary of behavior theory of firms. Previous studies focused on the relationship between performance feedback and substantive responses, but ignored formal responses such as impression management and information manipulation. Based on behavior theory of firms, this paper systematically analyzes the influence mechanism of performance feedback on corporate strategic information disclosure, thus expanding the application boundary of behavior theory of firms. Secondly,This article introduces two perspectives: incremental information and impression management, and constructs a competitive analysis framework for performance feedback and corporate strategic information disclosure. Combining voluntary information disclosure theory and impression management theory, this paper not only finds asymmetric strategic information disclosure behavior of enterprises under different performance feedback, but also reveals the multiple motivations and manipulation strategies of impression management in negative performance feedback enterprises. Thirdly, this article enriches the economic consequences of corporate strategic information disclosure from three dimensions: capital market, product market, and internal market. The relevant findings are helpful for market entities to identify the disclosure logic of corporate strategic information, thereby formulating scientific and efficient investment, supply and marketing, competition and cooperation, and incentive decisions. 
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