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论文编号：	13927
作者编号：	1120191034
上传时间：	2023/6/6 16:47:15
中文题目：	环保激励政策下双寡头企业环保质量及产量决策研究
英文题目：	Research on Environmental Quality and Quantity Decisions in a Duopoly under Environmental Incentive Policies
指导老师：	方磊
中文关键字：	环保激励政策，环保质量，产量，双寡头竞争，社会福利
英文关键字：	Environmental incentive policies, Environmental quality, Quantity, Duopoly Competition, Social welfare
中文摘要：	随着环境污染和气候变化的加剧，消费者表现出越来越强的环保意识，在购买产品时更偏好那些碳足迹较低的绿色产品。消费者对产品环保质量的支付意愿驱动着企业从事降低 产品碳排放的绿色研发活动。然而，绿色产品开发过程需要高额的研发支出，对于那些研发能力较弱的企业来说更是难以负担。此外，由于企业环保努力本身的信任属性，消费者可能对企业付出的环保努力持怀疑态度，这进一步抑制了企业从事碳减排和绿色产品研发的动力。因此，在现实实践中，为了鼓励和引导企业积极从事碳减排和绿色产品开发，政府出台了各项环保激励政策，如我国政府为新能源汽车提供绿色补贴，制定针对汽车尾气排放的“国六”标准，为符合节能减排标准的产品提供“中国环境保护产品” (China's Environmental Protection Product, CEPP)标签认证等。 基于上述现实背景，本论文综合运用文献研究、博弈论、最优化理论和数值仿真等方法，研究了不同环保激励政策下具有不对称绿色研发成本的寡头企业的环保质量及产量决策问题，分析了环保政策对企业、消费者和环境的影响，进而探究了在不同行业和市场动态下，使社会福利最大化的最优环保政策。 首先，考虑绿色补贴政策下对称双寡头的环保质量及产量决策。通过构建政府、寡头企业和消费者之间的博弈模型，分析政府补贴对企业均衡决策及利润、消费者剩余和总环境破坏的影响。结果表明，补贴政策总是有利于消费者，但可能会对企业和环境产生负面的影响。当市场竞争较为激烈且消费者的环保支付意愿较高时，补贴可能会诱导企业过度投资于绿色创新并过量生产，从而导致均衡利润的下降。对于产品排放强度很高的污染性行业，补贴诱导行业过量生产的负面效应将超过产品环保质量提高的正面效应，从而导致环境恶化。此外，从社会福利的角度求解出政府最优的补贴水平，并分析它如何受行业和市场动态所影响。 其次，考虑绿色补贴政策下具有不对称绿色研发成本的双寡头企业的环保质量及产量决策。结果表明，在成本不对称的竞争场景下，补贴总是提高行业的均衡总产量并使消费者受益，但可能会降低高成本企业的利润并导致行业总的碳排放量增加，这进一步验证了在对称寡头竞争场景下的结论。此外，补贴会扩大不对称企业在环保质量、产量和利润方面的差距，尤其是当市场竞争本身就很激烈时。分析表明，当在位企业相比于潜在进入企业具有更高效的绿色研发技术时，补贴政策的实施将扩大企业之间的差距，从而可能提高弱势初创企业的市场进入壁垒。此外，从社会福利的角度，政府最优的补贴水平随着企业间的成本不对称程度单调递减。 再者，考虑最低环保质量标准政策下具有不对称绿色研发成本的双寡头企业的环保质量及产量决策，分析该规制政策对企业利润、消费者剩余和总环境破坏的影响。结果表明，更严格的质量标准会缩小不对称双寡头企业在环保质量、产量和利润上的差距，提高行业总产量并使消费者获益。然而，当消费者的环保支付意愿较强并且双寡头企业之间的成本差距较大时，更严格的质量标准可能会降低市场上产品的平均环保质量水平，并导致行业总的碳排放量增加。因此，不恰当的产品环保质量标准可能会抑制行业的绿色创新，并对环境产生负面的影响。 最后，进一步考虑企业环保努力的信任属性，引入由非政府组织或政府运营的第三方环保认证作为可信的信息披露机制，以增强消费者对企业环保努力的信任。研究不同认证标准下不对称寡头的环保努力及产量决策，分析环保认证对企业、消费者和环境的影响。结果表明，环保认证的存在可以提高消费者福利和改善环境，但可能会伤害行业中的部分或所有企业（导致囚徒困境）。有趣的是，只要市场竞争不太激烈，行业内的高效率企业可能受益于其竞争对手减排效率的提高。在政府强制性认证的场景下，我们也表明企业可能更愿意选择一个相对强大的对手，而不是一个弱的竞争对手。以上分析为行业内竞争企业之间（免费）共享环保专利技术的行为提供了理论依据。 本文分别研究了不同环保激励政策下寡头竞争企业的环保质量（努力）及产量决策，首先考虑最常见的奖励性政策——绿色补贴（正向激励），然后考虑政府的强制性规制政策——最低环保质量标准（负向激励），最后进一步考虑企业环保努力的信任属性，引入自愿或强制性环保认证以增强消费者对企业环保努力的信任（正向/负向激励）。本文丰富和拓展了可持续运营管理领域的有关理论研究，为竞争企业做出最优的运营决策提供了管理启示，为政府选择和制定合理的环保政策提供了决策参考。
英文摘要：	With the aggravation of environmental pollution and climate change,consumers are becoming more and more environmentally conscious and they prefer to buy green products with lower carbon footprint. Consumers' willingness to pay for environmental quality of products drives firms to engage in green R&D activities to reduce the carbon emissions of their products. However, investing in green product development requires massive R&D spending, especially for those firms with weak R&D capacity.In addition, due to the credence attribute of environmental efforts, consumers may be skeptical of firms' environmental efforts, which further discourages firms to engage in emission reduction activities and green product development. Therefore, in real practice, governments have introduced various environmental incentive policies to encourage and guide firms to actively engage in emission reduction and green product development. For example, the Chinese government provides green subsidies for new energy vehicles, formulates the China 6 standard for automobile exhaust emissions, and provides "China's Environmental Protection Product (CEEP)" label certification for products that meet energy saving and emission reduction standards. Based on the above background, this dissertation comprehensively uses literature research, game theory, optimization theory and numerical simulation methods to study the problem of environmental quality and quantity decisions, in an oligopoly with asymmetric green R&D costs under different environmental incentive policies, analyze the impact of these policies on competing firms, consumers and the environment, and then explore the optimal environmental policy to maximize social welfare under different industry and market dynamics. Firstly, we examine the environmental quality and quantity decisions in a symmetric duopoly under green subsidy policy. By developing a game-theoretic model among the government, duopoly firms and consumers, we analyze the impact of government subsidies on firms' equilibrium decisions and profits, consumer surplus and total environmental damage. The results show that subsidies always benefit the consumers, but may have a negative impact on firms and the environment. When market competition is fierce and consumers' green awareness is high, subsidies may induce firms to over-invest in green innovation and produce more quantities, thereby reducing firm profits. For polluting industries with high emission intensity, the negative effect of subsidies inducing more production dominates the positive one of improving the environmental quality of products, resulting in environmental degradation. Furthermore, we solve the optimal level of government subsidies to maximize social welfare and analyze how it is affected by the relevant industry and market dynamics. Secondly, environmental quality and quantity decisions in a duopoly with asymmetric green R&D costs under the green subsidy policy are considered. The results show that in an asymmetric duopoly setting, subsidies always improve total production in the industry, benefit the consumers, but may reduce the profits of the high-cost firm and increase total carbon emissions in the industry, which further verifies the main results in the symmetric duopoly setting. In addition, we find that subsidies can widen the gap in environmental quality, quantity and profits between asymmetric duopoly firms, especially when market competition is already intense. Our analysis shows that when incumbent firms have more efficient green R&D technologies than potential entrants, the implementation of subsidy policy will widen the gap between firms and thus may increase market entry barriers for disadvantaged start-ups. In addition, from the perspective of social welfare, the optimal level of government subsidies decreases with the degree of cost asymmetry between firms. Thirdly, environmental quality and quantity decisions in a duopoly with asymmetric green R&D costs under minimum environmental quality standard (MEQS) are considered, and we analyze the impact of this regulatory policy on firm profits, consumer surplus and total environmental damage. The results show that a stricter quality standard will narrow the gap between asymmetric firms, increase total production in the industry and benefit consumers. However, when consumers' green willingness to pay is high and the cost gap between duopoly firms is wide, a stricter quality standard may reduce the average environmental quality of products on the market and lead to higher total emissions in the industry. Therefore, improper MEQS policy may inhibit green innovation and have a negative impact on the environment. Finally, further considering the credence attribute of firms' environmental efforts, we introduce third-party environmental certification operated by an NGO or the government as a credible information disclosure mechanism to enhance consumers' trust in corporate environmental efforts. We examine asymmetric oligopoly firms' environmental efforts and quantity decisions under different certification standards and analyze the impact on firms, consumers and the environment. The results show that the existence of environmental certification can improve consumer welfare and benefit the environment, but may harm some or all firms in the industry (leading to Prisoner's dilemma). Interestingly, as long as the market is not too competitive, more efficient firms in the industry may benefit from the increased abatement efficiency of their competitors. Under mandatory certification operated by the government, we also find that a firm may prefer to have a strong rival rather than a weak one. The above analysis provides a rationale for the (free) sharing of environmental technology patents among competing firms in the industry. This dissertation studies duopoly firms' environmental quality (effort) and quantity decisions under different environmental incentive policies. Firstly, we consider the most common policy measure-- green subsidies (positive incentive), then consider the government's regulatory policy -- minimum environmental quality standard (negative incentive), and finally, we further consider the credence attribute of firms' environmental efforts and thus introduce voluntary or mandatory third-party environmental certification to enhance consumer trust in firms' environmental efforts (positive/negative incentives). This dissertation enriches and expands the relevant theoretical research in the field of sustainable operations, provides managerial implications for competing firms to make optimal operational decisions, and provides decision reference for the government to choose and develop reasonable environmental policies.
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