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论文编号：	13926
作者编号：	2120213296
上传时间：	2023/6/6 16:45:50
中文题目：	证监会随机现场检查能否降低上市公司盈余管理水平？
英文题目：	Can random on-site inspections restrain earnings management of listed companies?
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	现场检查；随机抽查；证券监管；盈余管理
英文关键字：	On-site inspection; Random inspection; Securities regulation; Earnings management
中文摘要：	2016年起，证监会要求地方证监局对辖区内的上市公司进行随机抽查现场检查，深入上市公司内部，通过现场走访、列席会议、查阅资料等方式，对上市公司的信息披露、公司治理、会计核算、财务管理等行为进行调查。证监会随机现场检查是对上市公司重要的事前监管手段，既可以通过随机抽查的形式对上市公司起到震慑作用，又能够通过深入检查发现上市公司的潜在问题。而在现场检查的内容中，公司会计核算、财务管理行为等都与公司的盈余管理有关，上市公司的盈余质量也一直是资本市场监管关注的重点。因此，本文研究证监会随机现场检查对于上市公司盈余管理水平的影响。 本文根据各地方证监局网站披露的公告，手工搜集2016-2020年随机抽查现场检查的上市公司名单。采用多时点双重差分模型，研究随机现场检查的对被抽查公司的直接影响，发现证监会随机现场检查可以有效地降低被抽查上市公司的盈余管理水平。在进一步分析中，本文还研究了不同机构持股比例、不同分析师跟踪人数以及不同会计师事务所审计的公司，受到证监会随机现场检查后的盈余管理改善效果，发现机构持股比例高、分析师跟踪人数少以及非四大会计师事务所审计的公司的盈余管理水平下降更明显。除此之外，本文还研究证监会随机现场检查对于被抽查上市公司同行业、同地区的其他上市公司的影响。研究发现，证监会随机现场检查可以显著降低与被抽查公司同一城市的上市公司的盈余管理水平，而对同一行业的上市公司盈余管理并无明显降低作用。在进一步分析中，本文还研究了地区市场化程度和法制环境给这种地区溢出效应带来的差异，发现市场化程度和法治化程度更低的地区，证监会随机现场检查的地区溢出效应更明显。 本文对证监会随机现场检查的监管效果提供了实证依据，证实证监会随机现场检查可以有效抑制上市公司的盈余管理行为，并且这种抑制作用具有同地区的溢出效应。有助于监管部门继续坚持对于上市公司的现场检查，并重点关注分析师跟踪较少、非四大会计师事务所审计的公司，更好地提升监管效能，推动资本市场平稳健康发展。
英文摘要：	Since 2016, the CSRC conducts random spot checks on listed companies within their jurisdiction, go deep into the listed companies, and investigate the information disclosure, corporate governance, accounting, financial management and other behaviors of listed companies through on-site visits, attending meetings as observers, and reviewing materials. The random on-site inspection is an important pre-supervision method for listed companies, which can not only deter listed companies in the form of random inspections, but also discover potential problems of listed companies through in-depth inspections. In the content of the on-site inspection, the company's accounting and financial management behaviors are all related to the company's earnings management, and the quality of the earnings of listed companies has always been the focus of capital market supervision. Therefore, this paper examines the impact of random on-site inspections on the earnings management level of listed companies. Based on the announcements disclosed on the websites of various local securities regulatory bureaus, this article manually collects the list of listed companies that randomly inspected on-site inspections from 2016 to 2020. Using the DID model, the direct impact of random on-site inspection on the random inspected companies is studied, and it is found that the random on-site inspection can effectively reduce the earnings management level of the randomly inspected listed companies. In addition, this paper also studies the improvement effect of earnings management after random on-site inspection by the CSRC for companies with the same institutional shareholding ratio, different analyst tracking numbers and different accounting firms, and finds that the improvement effect of earnings management in companies with high institutional shareholding ratio, low number of analyst tracking and non-Big Four accounting firms is more obvious. In addition, this paper also examines the impact of the random on-site inspection on other listed companies which are in the same industry or region as the inspected companies. It is found that the random on-site inspection can significantly reduce the earnings management level of listed companies in the same city as the companies being inspected, but there is no significant improvement in the earnings management of listed companies in the same industry. In further analysis, this paper studies the differences brought by the degree of regional marketization and the legal environment to this regional spillover effect, and finds that the regional spillover effect of random on-site inspection by the CSRC is more obvious in regions with a lower degree of marketization and rule of law. This paper provides an empirical basis for the regulatory effect of CSRC random on-site inspection, and confirms that the random on-site inspection can effectively inhibit the earnings management behavior of listed companies, and this inhibition effect has a spillover effect in the same region. It will help the regulatory authorities continue to adhere to on-site inspections of listed companies, and focus on companies with less analyst tracking and non-Big Four accounting firms, so as to better improve regulatory efficiency and promote the stable and healthy development of the capital market.
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