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论文编号：	13925
作者编号：	1120191060
上传时间：	2023/6/6 16:45:35
中文题目：	非家族股东治理对家族企业创新投入的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Non-family Shareholder Governance on Innovation Investment of Family Business
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	家族企业；非家族股东治理；创新投入；股东异质性；创新绩效
英文关键字：	Family Business; Non-family Shareholder Governance; Innovation Investment; Shareholder Heterogeneity; Innovation Performance
中文摘要：	创新是国家经济增长的驱动力和长期竞争优势的决定性因素。党的二十大报告指出，必须坚持创新是第一动力，深入实施创新驱动发展战略。企业是建设创新型国家的微观主体单位，其创新水平的提升能够实现企业成长与国家创新的协同发展。因此，如何激发企业主动提升自身创新水平对于创新强国的建设具有重大的理论与现实意义。综观众多企业类型，家族企业作为一种古老而又现代的重要组织形式，其在全球经济发展的过程中扮演着重要角色并发挥着关键作用。立足于中国情境，经过四十余年的改革开放，家族企业一直是中国保持经济高速增长不可或缺的力量，其在纳税贡献、缓解就业问题等方面表现突出。对于家族企业而言，追求基业长青是其最为重要的目标。由于创新对于提升家族企业核心竞争力、促进家族企业长远发展具有重要意义，因此创新战略的实施对于家族企业来说十分关键。 然而目前家族企业却普遍存在创新投入不足的现实问题，根据《中国家族企业健康指数报告》的相关数据，我国家族企业的创新投入强度明显低于民营非家族企业。对于家族企业而言，其创新投入水平落后于民营非家族企业的重要原因之一在于尚未积极引入以国有资本为代表的战略投资者来助力自身优化战略决策。虽然家族股东与非家族股东共存于家族企业内部的现象十分普遍，但控股家族担忧非家族股东会对自身的地位产生威胁，从而使得家族企业在引入外部非家族资本的积极性并不高涨。 事实上，非家族股东与家族股东并不总是“非此即彼”的关系，二者更可能是一种“协同治理”的关系。一方面，家族企业的家族属性决定了控股家族在家族企业中享有最高话语权，因而非家族股东并不会威胁企业的“家族”属性，反而会因其异质性特征为企业带来多元且具有价值的资源并缓解家族企业内部的分殊偏待现象。另一方面，非家族股东参与家族企业公司治理能够帮助家族企业建立现代企业制度，从而提升治理效率与绩效水平。因此，非家族股东如何通过参与家族企业治理从而助力家族企业提升创新投入水平是本研究关注的核心问题。 本研究基于社会情感财富理论、分殊偏待理论、委托代理理论以及管家理论，以2011至2020年中国家族上市公司作为研究样本，在界定非家族股东治理概念的基础上探索非家族股东治理对于家族企业创新投入的影响，同时明晰二者关系的边界条件与影响路径。与此同时，本研究结合股东异质性特征分别探讨了持股模式异质性与股权结构异质性对于家族企业创新投入的影响，并进一步关注了家族企业创新绩效的经济后果研究。依据上述研究思路进行实证检验，本研究得出以下结论： 第一，非家族股东治理能够提升家族企业的创新投入水平。一方面，从“创新能力”的影响路径来说，家族企业不仅应该具备合理配置内部资源的能力，还应该具备获取外部资源的能力；另一方面，从“创新意愿”的影响路径来说，控股家族的代理效率以及风险承担倾向是家族企业创新意愿的构成维度。因此，提升家族企业的创新能力与创新意愿是破解家族企业创新投入不足困境的关键。非家族股东治理不仅能够提升家族企业创新能力（促进内部资源合理配置和缓解外部融资约束），还能够提升家族企业创新意愿（降低企业代理成本和提升风险承担水平），从而助力家族企业创新投入水平的提升。与此同时，家族化方式、代际传承以及制度效率作为反映家族企业的企业属性、家族属性以及外部属性的情境因素能够在一定程度上优化非家族股东治理与家族企业创新投入之间的关系。 第二，非家族股东治理提升家族企业创新投入的一条影响路径在于非家族股东治理能够提升创新能力。一方面，非家族股东委派董事不仅能够为企业内部资源的分配和使用提供合理建议，还能够缓解家族企业内部的分殊偏待现象，激发自身参与企业经营决策的积极性，从而提升资源配置效率。另一方面，非家族股东治理不仅能够有效缓解信息不对称并拓宽外部资源的获取渠道，还能够通过缓解家族企业内部的分殊偏待现象从而为控股家族带来更多的外部资源，提高家族企业在融资环境中的议价能力，缓解融资约束问题。进一步地，作为反映内外部资源支撑的组织冗余与数字金融能够优化非家族股东治理与创新能力（资源配置与融资约束）之间的关系。 第三，非家族股东治理提升家族企业创新投入的另一条影响路径在于非家族股东治理能够提升创新意愿。一方面，非家族股东治理不仅能够监督与抵制控股家族的自利行为，从而保护自身利益，还能够在企业内部形成强有力的非家族股东代表并获得话语权，从而缓解代理冲突。另一方面，非家族股东治理不仅能够缓解控股家族的风险规避倾向并带来丰富的异质性资源，还能够主动平衡家族成员与非家族成员的利益以助力家族企业长远发展，从而提升家族企业风险承担水平。进一步地，作为反映内外部治理水平的生命周期与媒体关注能够优化非家族股东治理与创新意愿（代理成本与风险承担）之间的关系。 第四，非家族股东异质性能够进一步影响家族企业创新投入水平。从非家族股东持股模式异质性的视角来看，一方面，基于股权结构与董事会参与“对等逻辑”的研究发现，相较于股权分散与相对控股，在非家族股东策略持股的情境下，非家族股东委派董事能够更有效地提升家族企业创新投入水平；另一方面，基于股权结构与董事会参与“非对等逻辑”的研究发现，非家族股东超额委派董事显著提升了家族企业创新投入水平，并且非家族股东超额委派董事对家族企业创新投入的积极效应在非家族股东策略持股情境下更显著。从非家族股权结构异质性的视角来看，一方面，当家族股东和非家族股东的投票权不均衡时，家族企业创新投入水平会逐渐降低，但非家族股东类型能够缓解非家族股权非对称性对于家族企业创新投入的消极影响；另一方面，不同类型的非家族股东持股对于家族企业创新投入存在差异化影响，相较于民营股东与外资股东，国有股东与机构投资者能够更有效地提升家族企业创新投入水平。 第五，在家族企业创新投入增长的前提下，控股家族能够凭借家族企业特质来助力提升创新转化效率，从而实现家族企业创新绩效的增长。与此同时，非家族股东持股能够为家族企业带来丰富的外部资源，从而进一步强化家族企业创新投入对于创新绩效的积极影响。 本研究的主要贡献包括以下三点：第一，本研究结合我国大力实施混合所有制改革的现实背景，构建了非家族股东参与家族企业公司治理的具体研究框架，不仅为非家族股东如何参与家族企业公司治理提供了理论依据，也进一步丰富了家族企业产权结构与股东行为的研究内涵。第二，本研究关注非家族股东与家族股东积极互动产生的“协同治理”效应对家族企业创新投入决策的影响，不仅从非家族股东治理的角度为家族企业如何破解创新投入不足困境提供了新的理论解释，而且也针对重视非家族股东与家族股东互动关系研究的呼吁做出了积极回应。第三，本研究从持股模式异质性与股权结构异质性两个维度来探讨非家族股东异质性对于家族企业创新投入的影响，不仅丰富了股权结构与董事会参与交叉视角的相关文献，还拓展了股权非对称性与股东身份类别的相关研究，从而为股东异质性的研究提供了一定借鉴。
英文摘要：	Innovation is the driving force of the country’s economic growth and the decisive factor of its long-term competitive advantage. The 20th CPC Central Committee clearly point out that innovation must be the first driving force and the innovation-driven development strategy must be thoroughly implemented. Enterprises are the microscopic units of building an innovative country, and the improvement of their innovation level can realize the coordinated development of their own growth and national innovation. Therefore, how to motivate enterprises to improve their own innovation level has great theoretical and practical significance for the construction of a strong innovation country. Among many types of enterprises, family business, as an ancient and modern important organizational form, plays an important role and plays a key role in the process of global economic development. After more than 40 years of reform and opening-up in China, family business has been an indispensable force for China to maintain rapid economic growth, and it has made outstanding achievements in tax payment and alleviating employment problems. For family businesses, the pursuit of lasting foundation is the most important goal. As innovation is of great significance to enhance the core competitiveness and promote the long-term development of family businesses, the implementation of innovation strategy is crucial for family businesses. However, there is a practical problem of insufficient innovation investment in family businesses. According to the China Family Enterprise Health Index Report, the innovation investment intensity of family businesses in China is obviously lower than that of private enterprises. For family businesses, one of the important reasons why their innovation investment lags behind that of private enterprises is that they have not actively introduced strategic investors represented by state-owned capital to help them optimize their strategic decisions. Although it is very common for family shareholders and non-family shareholders to coexist in the family businesses, the controlling families are often worried that the entry of non-family shareholders can threaten its position, which will lead to the lack of enthusiasm for introducing external non-family capital into the family businesses. In fact, the relationship between the non-family shareholders and the family shareholders in the family business may not be collaborative. On the one hand, the characteristics of family businesses determine that the controlling families have the highest right to speak in the family businesses. Therefore, the entry of non-family shareholders cannot affect the family attribute of the enterprises, but can bring diversified and valuable resources to the enterprises and alleviate the phenomenon of bifurcation bias within the family businesses due to its heterogeneous characteristics. On the other hand, non-family shareholder governance can help family businesses to establish a modern enterprise system and realize modern transformation, thus improving governance efficiency and performance level. Therefore, how non-family shareholders participate in corporate governance to help family businesses improve the level of innovation investment is the core issue of this study. Based on principal-agency theory, stewardship theory, socioemotional wealth theory and bifurcation bias theory, this study takes China family listed companies from 2011 to 2020 as the research sample, explores the impact of non-family shareholder governance on family business innovation investment on the basis of defining the concept of non-family shareholder governance, and clarifies the boundary conditions and influencing mechanism. At the same time, this study explores the impact of ownership pattern heterogeneity and ownership structure heterogeneity on family businesses’ innovation investment, and further focuses on the economic consequences of family businesses’ innovation performance. This study draws the following conclusions: First, non-family shareholder governance can improve innovation investment of family businesses. On the one hand, from the perspective of “Innovation Ability”, family businesses should have strong ability to allocate internal resources rationally and acquire external resources. On the other hand, from the perspective of “Innovation Willingness”, the loss of agency efficiency and risk aversion of the controlling families all lead to the lack of innovation willingness of the family businesses. Therefore, it is the key to improve innovation investment of family businesses by solving the dilemma of their innovation ability and willingness. Non-family shareholder governance can not only enhance the innovation ability of family businesses (promoting rational allocation of internal resources and easing external financing constraints), but also enhance the innovation willingness of family businesses (reducing agency cost and increasing corporate risk-taking), thus helping to improve innovation investment of family businesses. At the same time, family style, intergenerational inheritance and institutional efficiency, as situational factors reflecting the enterprise attributes, family attributes and external attributes of family businesses, can optimize the relationship between non-family shareholder governance and innovation investment of family businesses. Second, one of the influencing mechanisms of non-family shareholder governance to enhance innovation investment of family businesses is that non-family shareholder governance can enhance the innovation ability. On the one hand, the directors appointed by non-family shareholders not only provide reasonable suggestions for the allocation and use of resources within the family businesses, but also alleviate the phenomenon of bifurcation bias within the family businesses, to stimulate their enthusiasm to participate in the business decisions, and thus to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. On the other hand, non-family shareholder governance can not only ease the information asymmetry between the enterprise and the external investors and broaden the access to external resources, but also bring more external resources to the controlling families by easing the bifurcation bias within the family businesses, improve the bargaining power of the family businesses in the financing environment, and thus ease the financing constraint problem. In addition, as a reflection of internal and external resources, organizational redundancy and digital finance can optimize the relationship between non-family shareholder governance and innovation ability (resource allocation and financing constraints). Third, the other influencing mechanism of non-family shareholder governance to enhance innovation investment of family businesses is that non-family shareholder governance can enhance the innovation willingness. On the one hand, non-family shareholder governance can not only supervise and resist the self-interest and opportunism of the controlling families to protect their own interests, but also form a strong representative of non-family shareholders within the enterprise and gain the rights to speak, thus alleviating the agency conflicts. On the other hand, non-family shareholder governance not only alleviates the risk aversion tendency of the controlling families and provide rich resource heterogeneity support, but also actively balances the interests of family members and non-family members to help the long-term development of the family businesses, thus improving the risk-taking level of the family businesses. In addition, life cycle and media attention, which reflect the level of internal and external governance, can optimize the relationship between non-family shareholder governance and innovation willingness (agency cost and risk-taking). Fourthly, the heterogeneity of non-family shareholders can further affect innovation investment of family businesses. From the perspective of the heterogeneity of non-family shareholders’ shareholding model, on the one hand, based on the “reciprocal logic” of ownership structure and board participation, it is found that when non-family shareholders hold shares strategically, the directors appointed by non-family shareholders can promote innovation investment of family businesses more effectively. On the other hand, based on the “non-reciprocal logic” of ownership structure and board participation, it is found that over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders can significantly improve innovation investment of family businesses, and the positive effect of over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders on innovation investment of family businesses is more significant in the situation of strategic shareholding by non-family shareholders. From the perspective of heterogeneity of non-family ownership structure, on the one hand, non-family ownership asymmetry can decrease innovation investment of family businesses, but the type of non-family shareholders can alleviate the negative impact of non-family ownership asymmetry on innovation investment of family businesses. On the other hand, different types of non-family shareholders have different influences on innovation investment of family businesses. Compared with private shareholders and foreign shareholders, state-owned shareholders and institutional shareholders can improve innovation investment of family businesses more effectively. Fifthly, under the situation of increasing innovation investment, the controlling families can rely on the influence of family business characteristics on the internal decision-making and resource allocation, thus stimulating the ability to contribute to innovation, thus helping the growth of family business innovation performance. At the same time, non-family shareholders can further bring abundant external resources, thus further helping the transformation of innovation input into innovation output and improving the transformation efficiency of innovation input. The main contributions of this research include the following three points: First, this study combines the realistic background of China’s vigorous implementation of mixed ownership reform, and constructs a specific research framework for non-family shareholders to participate in corporate governance of family businesses, which not only provides a theoretical basis for how non-family shareholders participate in corporate governance of family businesses, but also further enriches the research connotation of property rights structure and shareholder behavior of family businesses. Secondly, this study focuses on the impact of the synergistic governance effect generated by the positive interaction between non-family shareholders and family shareholders on the innovation investment decision of family businesses. It not only provides a new theoretical explanation for how the family businesses solve the dilemma of insufficient innovation investment from the perspective of non-family shareholder governance, but also makes a further positive response to the call for attention to the relationship between non-family shareholders and family shareholders. Thirdly, this study explores the impact of non-family shareholders’ heterogeneity on innovation investment of family businesses from two dimensions of ownership pattern heterogeneity and ownership structure heterogeneity, which not only enriches the relevant research from the cross perspective of ownership structure and board participation, but also expands the relevant research on ownership asymmetry and shareholders’ identity category, thus providing reference for the research on shareholders’ heterogeneity.
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