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论文编号：	13663
作者编号：	2320200550
上传时间：	2022/12/5 18:08:09
中文题目：	S国有投融资平台公司治理优化研究
英文题目：	Research on the Optimization of Company Governance of National Investment and Financing Platform S
指导老师：	郝臣
中文关键字：	平台公司;公司治理;国企改革;债务风险
英文关键字：	Platform company;Corporate governance;State-owned enterprises reform;Debt risks
中文摘要：	自1994年中央与地方实施分税制改革以后，各地方纷纷成立投融资平台公司。在政府背书下，这些平台公司获得了金融机构持续、大量的资金支持。但是该类公司因其非市场化属性，盈利往往较差，且对投融资的节奏和匹配没有很好的平衡。在国企改革和债务风险管控的双重要求下，平台类公司如何寻突破、求发展成为了一个重要的研究课题，而这其中尤其关键的就是要通过公司治理的优化来从体制、机制上建立起持续、健康发展的基础。 本文以S国有投融资平台公司这一典型的地方平台企业为例，经过对大量真实的数据资料与信息的收集、整理，总结出了企业的治理架构、内部治理制度等。再结合现代企业治理相关理论，分析S公司在公司治理层面存在的主要问题：第一，企业因所有者缺位、预算软约束、多目标冲突等出现的内部人控制问题；第二，表现在董事会缺位、监事会虚设、党委会人员和职责与其它治理机构高度重合上的治理结构缺陷问题；第三，企业因决策机制低效、激励机制非市场化、监督机制缺少问责体系而导致的治理机制低效问题。进一步的，针对各方面问题提出解决方案：针对所有者缺位，提出包括分类混改子公司、债权人参与治理、规范国资委职权的股东治理优化方案；针对治理结构缺陷，提出健全董事会治理、改组监事会成员、落实党委会作用等三点优化方案；针对治理机制低效，提出从提高决策效率、强调市场化激励、建立监督问责闭环三个角度入手的治理机制优化方案。 本文的结论是：要在系统性与协调性相统一、盈利性与政策性相平衡、短期利益与长远利益相协调的原则下，针对平台公司的特点制定一套公司治理优化方案。通过让市场化的因子进入到平台公司，建立起一套现代化的公司治理体系，提升S平台公司治理的效率性和科学性，助力公司通过现金流的逐步改善化解债务风险。也希望未来看到更多结合特定类型公司特点开展的具有更高实践指导意义的治理研究。
英文摘要：	Since the implementation of the tax sharing reform between the central and local governments in 1994, various local governments have set up investment and financing platform companies by means of financial allocation, land and equity asset injection. With the endorsement of the government, these platform companies have received sustained and substantial financial support from financial institutions with their good credit expectations and strong assets and resources. However, such platform companies tend to have poor profitability due to their non-marketization properties, and there is not a good balance in the rhythm and matching of investment and financing. Under the dual requirements of state-owned enterprise reform and debt risk management and control, it has become an important research topic for platform companies to seek breakthrough and development, and the key is to establish a foundation for sustainable and healthy development through the optimization of corporate governance system and mechanism. Based on S such a typical state-owned investment and financing platform company as an example, through a large number of real data and information collection, sorting, teasing out the company's governance structure and governance mechanism, combining the modern corporate governance related theory, comparison of Chinese listed corporate governance index evaluation index system, found the problem of the corporate governance level in three aspects: One is the problem of insider control caused by the absence of owner, soft budget constraint and multi-objective conflict. Second, the defects of governance structure are manifested in the absence of the board of directors, the absence of the board of supervisors, and the highly coincidence of the Party committee personnel and responsibilities with other governance institutions. Third, inefficiency of governance mechanism is caused by low efficiency of decision-making mechanism, non-marketization of incentive mechanism and lack of accountability system of supervision mechanism. Further, it proposes solutions to the problems in various aspects: for the absence of owners, it proposes the optimization of shareholder governance, including the classification and mixed reform of subsidiaries, the participation of creditors in governance, and standardizing the functions and powers of SASAC; Aiming at the defects of the governance structure, the paper puts forward a three-point optimization plan to improve the governance of the board of directors, reorganize the members of the Board of supervisors and give play to the role of the Party committee. Aiming at the inefficiency of governance mechanism, this paper puts forward the optimization of governance mechanism from three perspectives: improving decision-making efficiency, emphasizing market-oriented incentives, and attaching importance to supervision and accountability. The conclusion of this paper is that a set of corporate governance optimization scheme should be formulated according to the characteristics of platform companies under the principle of unification of systematism and coordination, balance between profitability and policy, and coordination between short-term interests and long-term interests. When it is difficult for platform companies to carry out mixed reform, marketization factors can be brought into the governance of platform companies through the mixed reform of subsidiaries, the participation of creditors, SASAC, discipline inspection and supervision organizations and other external forces. Through such a set of governance optimization scheme, improve the efficiency and scientificness of corporate governance of S platform, promote the company's transformation to the market, and help to gradually improve the operating cash flow and resolve the debt risk.
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