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| 论文编号: | 1363 | |
| 作者编号: | 2005006 | |
| 上传时间: | 2010/4/22 9:43:22 | |
| 中文题目: | 中国民营上市公司股权结构治理问题研究 | |
| 英文题目: | Private Listed Companies | |
| 指导老师: | 李亚 | |
| 中文关键字: | 民营上市公司 公司治理 控制权与现金流权分离 中小股东利益保护 | |
| 英文关键字: | Private Listed Companies | |
| 中文摘要: | 随着中国市场经济的不断发展和相关体制的不断健全,民营经济在中国经济中的贡献已经不容忽视。同国有上市公司相比,民营上市公司的历史包袱更少,产权更加清晰;同上市之前相比,民营上市公司的治理结构更加完善,治理机制更加健全。但是,民营上市公司在公司治理方面还存在很多问题,有些方面表现得较国有上市公司更为严重,尤其是控股股东侵害中小股东利益方面的问题,在近几年上市公司“造系运动”中表现的尤为突出。民营上市公司控股股东通过“造系运动”疯狂掠夺了中小股东的利益,同时也对中国资本市场的健康发展产生了消极影响,在这个背景下,各种不同角度的对民营上市公司治理问题,对中小股东利益保护的研究成为学术界近来的热点。 大股东侵害小股东利益,从境外来看是导致亚洲金融危机的肇因,也是加重危机的推动力量,从境内来看也是中国民营上市公司“造系运动”的本质,如此严重的问题引发了对股东之间委托代理问题的研讨,也促使了学术界从股权结构的角度考察民营企业公司治理问题。基于这一研究现状和研究趋势,本研究结合产权理论、委托代理理论等理论基础以及相关研究综述,深入分析了大股东侵害小股东利益在上市公司股权结构上的致害之源,即控制权与现金流权高度分离的两种主要表现形式以及在中国民营上市公司中的现状;阐述了控股股东在上市公司股权结构问题的基础上具体侵害中小股东利益的机理、方式与其严重后果;同时根据以上所分析总结的股权结构治理问题的现状,提出民营上市公司中小股东利益保护、治理机制完善的内外部对策,主要是独立董事制度与监事会制度在发挥治理作用方面的对策与建议。 随着中国市场经济的不断发展,民营上市公司数量和规模的不断壮大,同时对包括中小股东在内的利害相关者的保护也在不断加强,对民营上市公司治理水平的要求也将不断提高。在公司治理框架下的民营上市公司股权结构问题也越来越受到关注。本研究力求对民营上市公司股权结构治理问题进行深入分析探讨,从而提出对有效解决该问题的具有一定创新性和可操作性的对策建议,不断提升民营上市公司的企业价值。 | |
| 英文摘要: | With the developing of market economy and the perfecting of related system, the contribution of Chinese private economy to Chinese economy cannot be ignored. Compared with state-owned listed companies, private listed companies bear fewer historical burden and have more clearly property right, and what’s more, private listed companies have more sound governance structure and more robust mechanism. Whereas there are many corporate governantial problems in the private listed companies and some are even more serious than in the state-owned listed companies especially the problem of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on small and medium-sized shareholders’ benefit in the listed companies’ profit-making system building movement these years in Chinese capital market. The controlling shareholders in private listed companies drive the profit-making system building movement with the result of encroaching small and medium-sized shareholders’ benefit and bringing negative influence to the health of Chinese capital market development. In this background the governantial problems private listed companies from different angles and the research of protecting small and medium-sized shareholders’ benefit have become hot topic of academe recently. Controlling shareholders’ expropriation on small and medium-sized shareholders’ benefit was one of the leading causes of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, and also was the nature of the profit-making system building movement in Chinese capital market. Such serious issue leads to a hot discussion of the principal-agent problem and urges the academe’s research on governantial problems of private enterprise from the ownership structure angle. Base on the status and trend of the research, my research penetrate into the virulence source controlling shareholders’ expropriation on small and medium-sized shareholders’ benefit in the listed companies’ ownership structure, i.e. the dominating forms of highly deviation of control right and cash-flow right and their status quo in Chinese private listed companies, combined with some basic theories such as property right theory, principal-agent theory and related research summarization. My research expatriates on the specific mechanism, modes and severe results of the controlling shareholders’ expropriation on small and medium-sized shareholders’ benefit base on the problem of ownership structure of private listed companies, and at the same time my research proposes a series of countermeasures and advices of the protecting small and medium-sized shareholders’ right and perfecting of governantial mechanism from both inside and outside angles especially the governantial role of the independent director system and the supervisor board system. As Chinese capital market continues to develop, and the amount and size of private listed companies constantly growing, meanwhile the protection of stakeholders including small and medium-sized shareholders is having been continuously strengthened, the governantial quality of private listed companies is also required to be improved ceaselessly. Thereupon the ownership structure issue of private listed companies in corporate governance frame has gradually been concerned by the mainstream academe. My research is trying to propose some innovative and workable countermeasures and advices to solve that problem effectively and to maximize corporate value of private listed companies by in-depth analysis and discussion of the ownership structure issue. | |
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