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论文编号：	1347
作者编号：	022448
上传时间：	2010/3/31 9:13:37
中文题目：	股权分置条件下非流通股东私人收益研究
英文题目：	The Private Benefits of Non-tradable Shareholders Under Dual-class Shares System
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	股权分置 非流通股东私人收益 超级控制权 提案权的界定
英文关键字：	Dual-class Shares System Non-tradable Shareholder’s Private Benefits Super-control Rights Stipulation of Proposing Rights
中文摘要：	现有理论回顾和制度背景分析的基础上，本文针对中国证券市场中存在的非流通股东与流通股东的基本矛盾进行了研究。 本文首次提出了非流通股东私人收益的概念。所谓非流通股东私人收益是指在股权分置条件下，由于存在非流通股东与流通股东之分，而产生的只能由非流通股东享有，而不能为流通股东享有的利益。本文用非流通股东私人收益这个概念来刻画在中国证券市场上存在的非流通股东侵害流通股东利益的现象。 研究表明在股权分置条件下，包括股权分置改革前和股权分置改革中都存在非流通股东私人收益。而非流通股东私人收益产生的根源在于股权分置赋予非流通股东的超级控制权。 本文认为，股权分置改革的制度变迁就是在非流通股东追求私人收益最大化推动下的诱致性制度变迁与强制性制度变迁的结合。 在股权分置条件下，一般来说，获得了非流通股份的控制权就获得了整个上市公司，包括流通股份在内的控制权，因此，非流通股份有控制权放大的效应；同时，由于非流通股份与流通股份之间存在巨大的价格差异，非流通控股股东可以通过使自己掌握的非流通股份占总股份的比例达到一定水平，使得非控股股东在向其控制权挑战的过程中，必须购入价格更高的流通股份，从而大大提高其他股东获得控制权的成本。也就是说，其他股东对非流通控股股东的制衡作用被大大降低了。非流通股份控制权的放大效应和制衡壁垒效应的存在，扩大了非流通股东现金流权与控制权之间的差距，导致了非流通股东的超级控制权私人收益。 研究还表明，在再融资的过程中，非流通控股股东可以同时享有基于控制权放大效应的非流通股东私人收益和基于资产转移的非流通股东私人收益。而非控股非流通股东“搭便车”的行为，也使其能够享有基于资产转移的非流通股东私人收益。 本文认为上市公司“股权融资偏好”产生的原因在于再融资过程中的非流通股东私人收益远远大于非流通股东的融资成本，而不单单是融资成本的高低。因此，只要非流通股东私人收益大于融资成本，就会存在股权融资偏好。在股权分置条件下，与其说存在上市公司“股权融资偏好”，不如说存在非流通股东的“股权融资偏好”。 在股权分置改革中，如果存在投票成本与提案成本的不对称，那么提案权的界定就是至关重要的，当提案成本远小于投票成本，拥有提案权的一方在博弈中将获得更多的利益——提案权界定给非流通股东或者界定给流通股东，能够最终获得通过的股权分置解决方案是有天壤之别的，而最后的利益分配也大相径庭，拥有提案权的一方，即非流通股东将获得更多的利益，而流通股东的利益却无法得到保障.
英文摘要：	Based upon the current theory review and the analysis of institutional background, this dissertation focus on the basic contradiction between non-tradable shareholders and tradable shareholders in China stock market. This dissertation puts forward the concept of non-tradable shareholders’ private benefits in the first place. The non-tradable shareholders’ private benefits refers to the benefits possessed only by the non-tradable shareholders, then not possessed by the tradable shareholders under the dual-class shares system in Chinese stock market. And this concept is used to describe the phenomenon that non-tradable shareholders impair the benefits of tradable shareholders in China stock market. This dissertation puts forward that the dual-class shares system reform is the combination of the causing institution vicissitude and compulsory institution vicissitude pushed by the non-tradable shareholders who want to maximize their own private benefits. This dissertation demonstrates that there exist the non-tradable shareholders private benefits under the dual-class shares system in Chinese stock market including the past and present of dual-class shares system reform. The root of the non-tradable shareholders private benefits lies in the super-control rights which was brought by the dual-class shares system. Under the condition of dual-class shares system, the possession of the control rights of non-tradable shares means the possession of the control rights of the whole listed company including the control rights of tradable shares. Then, there are the control rights magnifying effects of non-tradable shares. Meanwhile, because there exists tremendous price difference between non-tradable shares and tradable shares, non-tradable shareholders may take some kind of tactic to protect their control rights for example: increasing their non-tradable shares, so that the non-controlling shareholders who want to challenge their control rights must buy tradable shares from stock market at higher price. That is to say, other shareholders restriction to controlling shareholders is remarkably decreased. The magnifying effects of control rights and the effects of restriction bulwark enlarge the difference between the cash-flow claiming and the control rights of non-tradable controlling shareholders, result in the super-control rights private benefits of non-tradable controlling shareholders. This dissertation also demonstrates that the non-tradable controlling shareholders can take the private benefits based on the control rights magnifying effects and the assets-shift in the SEO. The non-tradable non-controlling shareholders can take the private benefits based on the assets-shift by their “free riders” behavior in the SEO. This dissertation argue that the reason of “the preference to equity financing” couldn’t be perfectly explain by the financing costs, and the true reason of “the preference to equity financing” lies in the non-tradable shareholders’ private benefits in China stock market. Under the dual-class shares system, there exists “the preference to equity financing” in listed company rather than non-tradable shareholders have the preference to equity financing. If there exists the asymmetry between the voting costs and the proposing costs in the dual-class shares system reform, the stipulation of proposing rights are very important. When the voting costs are less than the proposing costs, the party who possesses the proposing rights will gain more benefits in the game. In other words, the stipulation of proposing rights will influence the results of the dual-class shares system reform scheme, moreover influence the results of benefits allocation. The non-tradable shareholders will gain more benefits in the game because they possess the proposing rights.
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