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论文编号：	13432
作者编号：	2320190684
上传时间：	2022/6/16 9:28:32
中文题目：	上市公司大股东资金占用成因和防范对策研究——以舍得酒业为例
英文题目：	Research on the causes and countermeasures for prevention of capital occupation of major shareholders in listed companies : Taking SheDe Spirits Company as an example
指导老师：	古志辉
中文关键字：	舍得酒业；资金占用；公司治理；关联交易
英文关键字：	SHEDE Spirits；Fund Occupation；Corporate Governance；Related Party Transactions
中文摘要：	中国自1990年设立股市，经过了30余年的快速发展。上市公司数量、股民数量与股市总市值屡创新高，但上市公司大股东资金占用问题屡禁不止，成了中国资本市场的沉疴顽疾。这不但损害了投资者的利益、影响了上市公司的发展，更是给中国股市的信心造成了重创。公司治理中大股东与中小股东的利益冲突问题越来越受到中小股东、监管单位以及资本市场等各个领域的重视。 对于中国资本市场，上市公司股权结构最突出的特点就是股权高度集中和一股独大。大股东通过金字塔结构间接控制上市公司，带来的最显著问题就是大股东出于控制权私利的动机，利用股权和管理权优势，侵占上市公司利益。在大股东实施资金占用行为的同时，中小股东无从知晓，最终成为真正的受害者。因此，研究大股东隧道行为，对于保护上市公司中小股东的权益很有必要。 本文依托国内外学者对上市公司大股东支持以及隧道行为相关的理论为基础，对相关动因、方式和产生的影响进行了分析，对怎样控制隧道行为进行了总结。通过案例分析法，聚焦舍得酒业被天洋控股资金占用这一典型案例，对其最大的股东天洋控股所进行的隧道行为进行了分析。舍得酒业资金占用案例是一个很典型的资金占用案例，几乎囊括了资本市场较常用的资金占用方式。天洋控股为了一己私利，将舍得酒业当作“提款机”，不断进行资金占用行为，给舍得酒业的发展带来了负面的影响，阻碍了其健康发展，损害了地方政府和中小股东的合法权益。 为了使后续上市公司避免出现类似舍得酒业这样的情况，在资本市场上规范运营，健康发展，本文从三方面提出相关的治理对策和建议：一是政策层面强化对上市公司的治理，二是加强上市公司内部的股东制衡和监督，三是强化上市公司严格的内部控制机制。 本文立足于通过系统分析案例、梳理案例，探寻大股东隧道行为的实施路径，从微观上发现关联性，这就给现代企业在进行企业治理的时候，提供了新的对大股东进行研究的视角。
英文摘要：	China's stock market has developed rapidly for more than 30 years since it was established in 1990. The number of listed companies, shareholders and the total market value of the stock market have repeatedly reached new highs, but the occupation of funds by major shareholders of listed companies has been banned repeatedly, which has become a persistent disease in China's capital market. This has not only damaged the interests of investors and affected the development of listed companies, but also caused a heavy blow to the confidence of China's stock market. The conflict of interest between major shareholders and minority shareholders in corporate governance has attracted more and more attention from minority shareholders, regulatory units, capital market and other fields. For China's capital market, the most prominent characteristics of the equity structure of listed companies are the high concentration of equity and the dominance of one share. The most significant problem caused by the indirect control of listed companies by major shareholders through the pyramid structure is that the major shareholders take advantage of the advantages of equity and management to encroach on the interests of listed companies out of the motivation of private interests of control. While the major shareholders occupy funds, the minority shareholders have no way to know, and finally become the real victims. Therefore, it is necessary to study the tunneling behavior of major shareholders to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders of listed companies. Based on the theories of domestic and foreign scholars on the support of major shareholders of listed companies and tunnel behavior, this master’s thesis analyzes the relevant motivation, methods and impact, and summarizes how to control tunnel behavior. Through the case analysis method, this thesis focuses on the typical case that Shede Spirits is occupied by Tianyang holdings, and analyzes the tunneling behavior of its largest shareholder Tianyang holdings. The fund occupation case of Shede Spirits is a very typical fund occupation case, which almost includes the commonly used fund occupation methods in the capital market. For its own self-interest, Tianyang holdings regards Shede Spirits as an "ATM" and continues to occupy funds, which has had a negative impact on the development of Shede Spirits, hindered its healthy development and damaged the legitimate rights and interests of local governments and minority shareholders. In order to make the subsequent listed companies avoid the situation similar to Shede Spirits, standardize the operation and develop healthily in the capital market, this thesis puts forward relevant governance countermeasures and suggestions from three aspects: first, strengthen the governance of listed companies at the policy level, second, strengthen the checks and balances and supervision of shareholders within listed companies, and third, strengthen the strict internal control mechanism of listed companies. Based on the systematic analysis of cases and combing cases, this thesis explores the implementation path of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, and finds the relevance from the micro level, which provides a new perspective for the study of major shareholders for modern enterprises in corporate governance.
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