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论文编号：	13349
作者编号：	2120202873
上传时间：	2022/6/12 22:29:04
中文题目：	我国保险公司监督机制对风险承担影响的研究
英文题目：	A Study on the Influence of Supervision Mechanism on Risk-Taking of Insurance Companies in China
指导老师：	郝臣
中文关键字：	保险公司治理;监督机制;风险承担
英文关键字：	Insurance Companies Governance; Supervision Mechanism; Risk-taking
中文摘要：	在保险公司治理机制中，除了决策机制和激励约束机制之外，其他治理机制均可归为广义的监督机制。由于保险公司决策机制、激励约束机制的相关数据较难获取，保险机构监督机制的相关数据则相对容易获取，因此保险机构监督机制是研究保险机构治理机制的重要突破口。而风险承担本质上是一种对投资项目的决策行为，通过承担适当的风险能够获取相应的收益，从而提高公司的竞争优势。对于保险公司而言，其具有风险集中性、产品合约特殊性和资本结构高杠杆等方面的特殊性，因此其风险管控至关重要。因此，从风险承担这一视角探究保险公司监督机制对其风险承担的影响尤为必要。保险公司不同的利益相关者的诉求不同，也决定了其风险偏好的不同，并且通过委托代理问题影响到风险承担水平。基于此，本文从利益相关者理论出发，通过构建保险公司监督机制指数这一指标，探究保险公司监督机制对其风险承担的影响。论文选取2016-2019年中国保险公司共454个观测值作为研究样本，通过对保险公司内外部监督机制要素进行梳理，选取20个代表维度构建保险公司外部监督机制指数、内部监督机制指数和监督机制总指数。采用保险公司过去三年ROA的标准差作为其代理变量来代表其总体风险水平，并基于其特点对杠杆风险、承保风险和投资风险三个具体风险进行实证分析。经过实证分析，本文发现：保险公司的内部监督机制对其风险承担未产生显著影响，保险公司的外部监督机制和监督机制有效抑制了其风险承担水平。此外，本文通过使用层次分析和专家调查问卷相结合的方法，对保险公司监督机制指数进行了不同方法的构建，证实了结果的稳健性。综合来看，我国保险公司外部监督机制和监督机制能够有效抑制保险公司的风险承担水平，但是内部监督机制对风险承担的影响并不显著，具有无效性。保险公司监督机制对于具体的风险类型也会产生不同影响。上述结论要求我国保险公司进一步完善其监督机制，提高其有效性，从而发挥对保险公司风险承担的调节作用。
英文摘要：	In insurance companies governance mechanism, except decision-making mechanism and incentive and constraint mechanism, other governance mechanism can be classified as broad supervision mechanism. Since it is difficult to obtain the data related to the decision-making mechanism and incentive and constraint mechanism of insurance companies, while it is relatively easy to obtain the data related to the supervision mechanism of insurance institutions, the supervision mechanism of insurance institutions is an important breakthrough to study the governance mechanism of insurance institutions. In essence, risk taking is a decision-making behavior for investment projects. By taking appropriate risks, the companies can obtain corresponding benefits and thus improve its competitive advantage. For the insurance companies, it has the particularity of risk concentration, product contract particularity and high capital structure leverage, so its risk control is very important. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the impact of the insurance companies supervision mechanism on its risk taking from the perspective of risk taking. The different demands of different stakeholders of insurance companies also determine their different risk preferences, and affect the level of risk taking through principal-agent issues. Based on this, starting from the stakeholder theory, this paper explores the influence of insurance companies supervision mechanism on its risk taking by constructing the index of insurance companies supervision mechanism. A total of 454 observational values of Chinese insurance companies from 2016 to 2019 were selected as research samples. By sorting out the internal and external supervision mechanism elements of insurance companies, 20 representative dimensions were selected to construct the external supervision mechanism index, internal supervision mechanism index and total supervision mechanism index of insurance companies. The standard deviation of ROA in the past three years is used as the proxy variable to represent the overall risk level of insurance companies, and the empirical analysis of leverage risk, underwriting risk and investment risk is carried out based on the characteristics. Through empirical analysis, this paper finds that the internal supervision mechanism of insurance companies has no significant impact on their risk taking, and the external supervision mechanism and supervision mechanism of insurance companies effectively control the risk taking. In addition, different methods are used to construct the index of supervision mechanism of insurance companies by using hierarchical analysis and expert questionnaire, which confirms the robustness of the results. In summary, the external supervision mechanism and supervision mechanism of insurance companies in China can effectively restrain the level of risk taking of insurance companies, but the internal supervision mechanism has no significant impact on risk taking and is ineffective. Insurance company supervision mechanism will also have different effects on specific risk types. The above conclusions require Chinese insurance companies to further improve their supervision mechanism and improve its effectiveness, so as to play a regulatory role in insurance companies' risk taking.
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