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论文编号：	13204
作者编号：	2120202801
上传时间：	2022/6/7 14:26:51
中文题目：	财务分析师关注、管理层权力对企业长期投资的影响研究
英文题目：	A Research of the Impact of Financial Analyst Coverage and Management Power on Long-term Investments of Enterprises
指导老师：	林润辉
中文关键字：	财务分析师；企业长期投资；管理层权力；企业性质
英文关键字：	Financial analyst; Long-term investment of enterprises; Management power; Enterprise nature
中文摘要：	长期投资所带来的未来收益是企业实现可持续发展的关键，企业的投资决策需要平衡企业短期目标与长期能力的发展，以建立可持续的竞争优势并保持长期增长。当前中国经济发展模式改革已进入攻坚期和深水期，提升企业的长期投资水平不仅是企业存续发展的要求，也是实现与国家可持续发展战略有效对接的关键。企业的长期投资，学术界一般使用企业固定资产投资和研发支出（R&D）来衡量：因为这两类投资都具有产出不确定、收益滞后实现的特点，无法在短时间内获得收益。 利益相关者理论强调企业内外部的各个相关主体，对于企业战略决策制定及其结果的影响，对于上市公司而言，在战略制定时考虑资本市场中的相关利益主体则更为重要。财务分析师作为资本市场中重要的信息中介，其会选择上市公司进行追踪分析，降低资本市场中存在的信息不对称性，进而在企业管理层制定投资决策时，发挥外部监督作用。追踪某家上市公司的财务分析师人数越多，该公司受到的分析师关注就越大，其投资决策受到的影响也越大。同时在外部财务分析师关注影响企业长期投资决策的过程中，企业内部的管理层权力水平，也会产生显著的调节作用，管理层的权力越大，管理层在制定投资决策时的自主权就越大，越不容易受到财务分析师的外部影响。 本文基于利益相关者理论、委托代理理论和管理层权力理论等公司治理理论，分析了财务分析师关注、管理层权力和企业长期投资之间的关系，并通过使用2011-2020年中国沪深两市全部A股上市公司的数据对其进行了实证检验。研究结果表明：（1）在中国情境下，财务分析师关注可以有效地提升企业的长期投资水平；（2）在财务分析师关注正向影响企业长期投资的过程中，管理层的整体权力水平会产生显著的负向调节作用；（3）进一步将管理层权力拆分成四个维度，对每个维度分别进行分析，结果显示管理层的结构性权力、所有权权力和专家权力均对财务分析师关注与企业长期投资两者的关系起负向调节作用，而声望权力则起正向调节作用；（4）在不同性质的企业中，管理层的整体权力水平产生的调节作用也存在异质性，在非国有企业中管理层的整体权力水平仍起负向调节作用，在国有企业中管理层的整体权力水平则不产生调节作用。 本文的研究辨析了在中国情境下财务分析师关注对于企业长期投资的外部治理机制，为中国企业制定投资决策和资本市场发挥外部监督作用提供了重要的管理启示。同时本文在探索财务分析师关注影响企业长期投资的过程中，深入分析了企业内部管理层权力起到的调节作用，为未来在企业投资领域，开展内外部综合治理的研究提供了借鉴。
英文摘要：	The future income brought by long-term investment is the key to the sustainable development of enterprises. The investment decisions of enterprises need to balance the development of short-term goals and long-term capabilities of enterprises, so as to establish sustainable competitive advantages of enterprises and maintain long-term growth. At present, the reform of China's economic development mode has entered the critical stage. To enhance the long-term investment level of enterprises is not only the requirement of enterprises' survival and development, but also the key to realize the effective docking with the national sustainable development strategy. Long-term investment of enterprises is generally measured by fixed asset investment and R&D expenditure in academic circles, because these kinds of investments are characterized by uncertain output and delayed realization of benefits, and cannot obtain benefits in a short time. The Stakeholder theory emphasizes the various relevant entities inside and outside the enterprise, which has an impact on the formulation of corporate strategic decisions and their results, and for listed companies, it is more important to consider the relevant stakeholders in the capital market when formulating strategies. As an important information intermediary in the capital market, financial analysts will select listed companies for tracking and analysis, reduce the information asymmetry in the capital market, and then play an external supervisory role when the company's management makes investment decisions. The greater the number of financial analysts who track a public company, the greater the coverage of the analysts the company receives and the greater the impact on its investment decisions. At the same time, in the process of external financial analysts paying attention to the long-term investment decisions of the enterprise, the level of management power within the enterprise will also have a significant regulatory effect, the greater the power of the management, the stronger the autonomy of the management in making investment decisions, and the less likely it is to be affected by the external influence of financial analysts. Based on corporate governance theories such as stakeholder theory, principal-agent theory and management power theory, this paper analyzes the relationship between financial analysts' concerns, management power and long-term investment of enterprises, and empirically examines them by using the data of all A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in China from 2011 to 2020. The results show that: (1) In the Chinese context, financial analyst coverage can effectively improve the long-term investment level of enterprises; (2) in the process of financial analysts positively influencing the long-term investment of enterprises, the overall power level of management will have a significant negative regulatory effect; (3) further split management power into four dimensions, and analyze each dimension separately, and the results show that the structural power of management, Ownership power and expert power both play a negative regulatory role in the relationship between financial analysts' concerns and long-term investment in enterprises, while prestige power plays a positive regulatory role; (4) in enterprises of different nature, the overall power level of management also has heterogeneity: in non-state-owned enterprises, the overall power level of management still plays a negative regulatory role, and in state-owned enterprises, the overall power level of management does not have a regulatory role. This paper analyzes the external governance mechanism of financial analysts for long-term investment of enterprises in the Chinese context, and has important management implications for Chinese enterprises to make investment decisions and play an external supervision role in the capital market. At the same time, in the process of exploring the influence of financial analysts on the long-term investment of enterprises, this paper deeply analyzes the regulatory role played by the power of internal management of enterprises, and provides a reference for future research on internal and external comprehensive management in the field of enterprise investment.
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