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论文编号：	13192
作者编号：	1120180959
上传时间：	2022/6/7 11:40:46
中文题目：	控股股东股权质押、投资者关系管理及其经济后果
英文题目：	Controlling Shareholder’s Shares Pledge， Investor Relations Management and Economic Consequences
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	股权质押，控制权转移风险，市值管理，投资者关系管理，互动沟通
英文关键字：	shares pledge; risk of losing control rights; investor relations management; market value management; interactive communication
中文摘要：	控股股东股权质押是控股股东将其持有的股份作为质押标的物的一种债务融资行为。在股权质押期间，如果股价跌至平仓线，控股股东若不能及时采取追加质押物、补仓、提前赎回等措施，质权人有权处置其质押的股票，导致控股股东面临失去控制权的风险。控股股东依靠控制权可以获得较多隐性收益，还可以通过卖壳获得巨额收益，其有强烈的动机维护公司股价，防止控制权发生转移。 相对于外部投资者，公司内部人拥有较多私人信息。我国作为新兴市场国家，市场信息环境相对较差；再加上散户投资者众多，其处理信息的精力和知识有限，导致上市公司与投资者之间的信息不对称较强。在信息不对称的情况下，一方面，发生控股股东股权质押事件时，投资者在无法获得公司确切的经营状况和发展前景的情况下，比较容易过度揣测控股股东的意图，可能将股权质押事件理解成控股股东面临财务困境或者即将实施掏空等损害公司价值和中小股东利益行为的消极信号；另一方面，股权质押期间如果意外地发生其他负面事件，公司若没有事先与投资者建立良好的信任关系，缺乏足够的声誉资本，容易引起投资者情绪恐慌，投资者更可能将负面事件归结为管理者主观故意的行为，从而进行股票抛售。以上两个方面都可能导致股权质押期间发生股价下跌，加大控股股东的控制权转移风险。采取市值管理措施维护股价是缓解控制权转移风险的关键。 投资者关系管理是有助于提升企业信息透明度的市值管理方式，负面事件之后加强投资者关系管理可以发挥“危机公关”效应，负面事件发生之前加强投资者关系管理可以在未来负面事件发生时发挥类“保险效应”。具体来看，一方面，股权质押事件本身可能导致股价下跌，此时加强投资者关系管理可以建立一种事后补救机制，通过与投资者充分地沟通交流使其了解到公司的基本面信息、公司治理状况以及股权质押背后的战略意图等，使投资者的恐慌情绪得到安抚，从而挽救已经发生的股价危机，起到“危机公关”作用。另一方面，控股股东质押股权之后，为了预防未来发生意外的负面事件导致股价暴跌，此时加强投资者关系管理可以为公司积累声誉资本，增加投资者对公司的理解和认同，相当于建立一种事前预防机制，防止未来意外发生的负面事件导致股价暴跌，发挥类“保险效应”。那么，为了缓解控制权转移风险，质押股权的控股股东会加强投资者关系管理吗，该行为将会产生怎样的经济后果？控股股东倾向于选择哪种互动沟通策略？ 基于信息不对称理论、委托代理理论和信号传递理论，本文以2012-2019年中国A股上市公司为研究样本，运用德尔菲专家意见法、层次分析法、规范分析法和实证分析法构建并计算投资者关系互动指数评价指标、构建文章的理论分析模型和实证分析模型，探索控股股东股权质押对投资者关系管理的影响以及具体互动沟通策略的选择，并进一步考察该行为产生的经济后果。得出的具体结论如下： 第一，存在控股股东股权质押时，公司的投资者关系管理水平显著提高，且质押比例越高，投资者关系管理水平也越高。公司股价接近警戒线或平仓线时，控股股东对失去控制权的担忧更强烈，此时控股股东股权质押对投资者关系管理的正向影响更明显，该结果也说明质押股权的控股股东提升投资者关系管理水平是出于缓解控制权转移风险的动机。公司业绩较好时，上市公司更愿意通过投资者关系活动向资本市场传递公司经营良好的积极信号，以将自身与业绩较差的公司区分开来，减少投资者的逆向选择，此时控股股东股权质押对投资者关系管理的正向影响更强；公司治理水平较高时，更加注重保护投资者利益，同时，公司治理完善也是代理冲突较少的积极信号，此类公司倾向于通过提升企业信息透明度向资本市场传递该信号，此时控股股东股权质押对投资者关系管理的正向影响更明显。 第二，控股股东股权质押情境下倾向于选择沟通保障，网络沟通和现场沟通三种策略进行市值管理。网络沟通和现场沟通活动具有见效快的优点，前者还具有成本低的优点；但沟通保障涉及组织建设、人员聘任等方面，其拯救股价危机和积累声誉资本的作用见效相对较慢，更适合质押比例较低的公司。随着控股股东股权质押比例的提高，控股股东对于失去控制权的担忧越来越强烈，其更倾向于采用网络沟通和现场沟通两种沟通策略进行市值管理，以实现快速稳定股价和赢得投资者好感的目的。进一步研究发现，公司有形资产比例较高、散户规模较小时，质押比例较高的控股股东更倾向于选择现场沟通策略。以上结果表明，控股股东在选择沟通策略时会权衡各个沟通策略的成本和收益，力求以较小的沟通成本实现较好的沟通效果。 第三，控股股东股权质押后提升投资者关系管理水平的行为缓解了股价崩盘风险，减小了股价波动风险，降低了资产误定价程度和分析师预测误差。该结果表明，股权质押情境下选择投资关系管理这种市值管理方式不仅可以缓解股价下跌，实现控股股东缓解控制权转移风险的目的，还可以促进资本市场稳定，提高股票定价效率和资本市场信息效率。加强投资者关系管理有助于控股股东和中小投资者、分析师、监管部门等其他利益相关者实现“双赢”，是值得控股股东采用、也值得中小投资者支持、以及监管部门提倡的市值管理方式。 本文主要的研究贡献包括以下四个方面：第一，本文拓展了控股股东股权质押经济后果的相关研究，发现了适用于经营业绩较好、治理状况较好的公司的市值管理方式。第二，本文发现了上市公司提升投资者关系管理水平的另一个情境和动机，即在股权质押的情境下稳定股价进而缓解控制权转移风险。第三，本文发现了股权质押情境下可以兼顾控股股东和其他利益相关者利益的市值管理方式，可以使控股股东和其他利益相关者实现“双赢”。第四，本文丰富了投资者关系管理具体策略选择相关的研究，对控股股东合理分配有限的资源，选择高效的沟通策略具有借鉴意义。
英文摘要：	The controlling shareholder's share pledge is a debt financing behavior in which the controlling shareholder takes its stock as the subject matter of pledge. If stock price falls to the “liquidation line” and controlling shareholder fails to add pledge, call margin, or early redemption, the pledgee has the right to dispose of the pledged shares. As a result, the controlling shareholder will face the risk of losing control. Controlling shareholder can obtain many hidden benefits by virtue of control rights, and acquire huge profits by selling shells. Therefore, it has a strong motivation to maintain stock price and prevent the transfer of control rights. Company insiders have private information that outside investors do not know. As an emerging market, the information environment is relatively poor and there are large number of retail investors whose ability of processing information is limited, resulting in strong information asymmetry between companies and investors. Under information asymmetry condition, on the one hand, it is easier for investors to over-guess the controlling shareholder's intentions when they can’t obtain the company's exact operating conditions and development prospects. Investors may interpret the share pledge event as a negative signal of controlling shareholder facing financial difficulties or implementing tunneling. On the other hand, when other negative events occur unexpectedly during the share pledge period, if the company has not established a good relationship with investors in advance and lacks sufficient reputation capital, it is easy to cause investor panic and they will sell off the stock. Both of two aspects may cause the stock price to drop during the share pledge period, which will aggravate the risk of control transfer. Adopting market value management measures to maintain stock price is the key to mitigating the risk of transfer of control. Investor relations management (IRM) can help improve transparency of corporate information. Strengthening IRM before negative events can produce insurance effect in the future negative events, and this behavior can play the role of crisis management after a negative event. Specifically, on the one hand, the share pledge itself may lead to a drop in the stock price. Strengthening IRM after pledge can establish a post-event remedy mechanism. Sufficient communication can make investors understand the company's fundamental information, the level of governance and the strategic intention behind the share pledge. The communication can calm the panic of investors. As a result, the stock price crisis can be saved. On the other hand, after share pledge, in order to prevent the stock price from plummeting due to unexpected negative events in the future, strengthening IRM before negative events can accumulate reputational capital and increase investors' understanding and recognition of the company. This behavior can establish an ex-ante preventive mechanism to prevent stock prices from dropping. Will the controlling shareholder improve the level of IRM in the context of share pledge? What effect will the behavior of improving IRM have? Which specific IRM strategy do controlling shareholders tend to choose？ Based on signal transmission theory, principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, we take China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019 as a research sample, and use Delphi method, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), normative analysis method and empirical analysis method to construct IRM evaluation indicators, the theoretical analysis model and empirical analysis model. Then we explore the impact of controlling shareholder’s share pledge has on IRM, the choice of specific IRM strategies, and finally examines the consequences of this behavior. The specific conclusions are as follows: First, the existence of controlling shareholder's share pledge and the share pledge ratio have a significant positive impact on IRM. When the stock price is close to the warning line or the liquidation line, the controlling shareholder is more worried about losing control, so the impact of share pledge has on IRM is stronger, which shows that the behavior of improving the level of IRM is motivated by alleviating the risk of losing control rights. Companies with better performance are more willing to improve the level of IRM. Good performance of a company is a positive signal of good operation to distinguish itself from poor companies and reduce the adverse selection of investors. Therefore, the positive impact that share pledge has on IRM is more pronounced in companies with better performance. When having good governance, the company pays more attention to protecting the interests of investors, and good governance is also a positive signal that the company has fewer agency conflicts. Such companies tend to transmit this signal to the capital market by improving the transparency of corporate information. The positive impact of IRM is more obvious in companies with good governance. Second, in the context of share pledge, controlling shareholders tend to choose communication guarantees, online communication activities and on-site communication activities for market value management. Online communication and on-site communication are characterized by quick effect, and the former is also characterized by low cost. However, communication guarantee involves organizational construction, personnel appointment, etc., and it has a slow effect on saving stock price crisis and accumulating reputational capital, which is more suitable for companies with a lower pledge ratio. With the increase of pledge ratio, controlling shareholder’s concern of losing control rights is growing, and it prefers to use online communication and on-site communication for market value management in order to stabilize the stock price and win investors’ goodwill quickly. Further research found that when the proportion of tangible assets is higher and the scale of retail investors is smaller, controlling shareholders tend to choose on-site communication. The above results show that controlling shareholder will weigh the costs and benefits of each communication strategy, and strive to achieve better communication effects with less communication costs. Third, the behavior of improving IRM after the controlling shareholder's share pledge mitigates the risk of stock price crash and stock price volatility, besides, it reduces the degree of asset mispricing and analyst forecast errors. The results show that choosing IRM as a market value management in the context of share pledge not only alleviates the decline of stock prices, but also promotes the stability of capital market，improves stock pricing efficiency and information efficiency of capital market. The results show that strengthening IRM is helpful for controlling shareholders and other stakeholders such as small and medium investors, analysts, and regulatory authorities to achieve "win-win". Therefore, the IRM should be advocated for market value management. The contributions of this research mainly include the following four aspects. First, we expand the relevant research on the economic consequences of controlling shareholders' share pledge, and finds a market value management method suitable for the companies with good performance or good governance. Second, this research finds another situation and motivation for companies to improve IRM, that is to stabilize the stock price and further ease the risk of control transfer in the situation of share pledge. Third, this research finds a market value management method that considers the interests of controlling shareholders and other stakeholders simultaneously in the context of share pledge, enabling controlling shareholders and other stakeholders to achieve "win-win". Fourth, this research enriches the literature on selection of IRM strategies, which has a reference significance for controlling shareholders to rationally allocate limited resources and choose efficient communication strategies.
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