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论文编号：	13191
作者编号：	2120202886
上传时间：	2022/6/7 11:34:53
中文题目：	女性董事对大股东掏空行为的影响——基于产品市场竞争的调节作用
英文题目：	The Influence of Female Directors on the Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders ——Based on Regulation of Product Market Competition
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	大股东掏空；女性董事；产品市场竞争；公司治理
英文关键字：	Hollowing out of Major Shareholders; Female Directors; Product Market Competition; Corporate Governance
中文摘要：	与西方相比，起步较晚的中国资本市场股权过于集中，大股东掏空上市公司事件时有发生，其后果是中小投资者合法利益受损的同时，上市公司内外部治理有效性遭受信任危机。因此，如何有效制衡大股东，解决其与中小股东之间的利益冲突已然是上市公司治理不得不面对的难题。 其中，作为公司内部拥有最高权力的监督者，董事会在大股东掏空抑制方面作用突出。尤其是近年来，随着经济的发展和时代的进步，社会逐渐摒弃“男尊女卑”的落后观念正确看待女性价值，越来越多的职业女性凭借自身过硬的专业素养和优异的职业技能成功进入公司董事会，其在大股东行为的监督和公司治理水平改善中的作用日益引发关注。并且，作为一种新型公司治理外部机制，激烈的产品市场竞争往往能借助信息假说、破产清算和声誉机制等对大股东掏空行为起到制约作用。即身处竞争激烈的产品市场，中国上市公司面临的外部环境相对公开、透明，通过与竞争对手的比较，自身也承受着愈来愈大的经营风险和财务杠杆风险，面临破产清算的压力也与日俱增，导致大股东为了维护自身声誉难以有动机掏空公司，而女性董事为了避免失去在资本市场拥有的薪酬谈判筹码也会更加勤勉尽职，更好监督并抑制大股东违法违规行为的发生。 基于此，本文以A股上市公司为研究对象，选取2016-2020年的数据作为样本，以外部产品市场竞争作为调节变量，运用多元线性回归模型实证了女性董事与大股东掏空行为之间的关系。研究得出：1）中国上市公司女性董事的比例、年龄和专业背景可以显著抑制大股东掏空行为，而教育背景却没有起到积极抑制作用；2）产品市场竞争对女性董事与大股东掏空行为之间具有显著调节作用，即有了激烈产品市场竞争的比较，女性董事比例、年龄和专业背景对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用被显著增强；3）相比非国有企业，国有企业中产品市场竞争能显著增强女性董事对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用；4）相比女性非独立董事，产品市场竞争能显著增强女性独立董事对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用。 该研究有利于丰富我国关于第二代委托代理问题和女性参与公司治理方面的研究，并为企业合理配置董事会成员减少大股东掏空行为提供借鉴，从而促进我国资本市场的良序健康发展。
英文摘要：	Compared with the west, the equity of China's capital market, which started late, is too concentrated, and the tunneling of listed companies by major shareholders occurs from time to time. The consequence is that the legitimate interests of small and medium-sized investors are damaged, and the effectiveness of internal and external governance of listed companies is subject to a crisis of trust. Therefore, how to effectively check and balance major shareholders and solve the interest conflict between them and minority shareholders has become a difficult problem that listed companies have to face. Among them, as the supervisor with the highest power within the company, the board of directors plays a prominent role in the suppression of tunneling by major shareholders. Especially in recent years, with the development of economy and the progress of the times, the society has gradually abandoned the backward concept of "men are superior to women" and treated women's values correctly. More and more professional women have successfully entered the board of directors of the company with their excellent professional quality and excellent professional skills. Their role in the supervision of the behavior of major shareholders and the improvement of corporate governance has attracted more and more attention. Moreover, as a new external mechanism of corporate governance, fierce product market competition can often restrict the tunneling behavior of major shareholders with the help of information hypothesis, bankruptcy liquidation and reputation mechanism. That is, in the highly competitive product market, the external environment faced by Chinese listed companies is relatively open and transparent. Compared with their competitors, they also bear more and more business risks and financial leverage risks, and face increasing pressure of bankruptcy and liquidation, which makes it difficult for major shareholders to empty the company in order to maintain their reputation, In order to avoid losing the salary bargaining chips in the capital market, female directors will also be more diligent and dutiful, better supervise and curb the occurrence of violations by major shareholders. Based on this, this paper takes A-share listed companies as the research object, selects the data from 2016 to 2020 as the sample, takes the external product market competition as the regulating variable, and uses the multiple linear regression model to demonstrate the relationship between female directors and the tunneling behavior of major shareholders. The results show that: 1) the proportion, age and professional background of female directors in Chinese listed companies can significantly inhibit the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, but the educational background does not play a positive role; 2) Product market competition has a significant regulatory effect on the tunneling behavior between female directors and major shareholders, that is, with the comparison of fierce product market competition, the inhibitory effect of female directors' proportion, age and professional background on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders has been significantly enhanced; 3) Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, product market competition in state-owned enterprises can significantly enhance the inhibitory effect of female directors on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders; 4) Compared with female non independent directors, product market competition can significantly enhance the inhibitory effect of female independent directors on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders。 This study is conducive to enrich China's research on the second generation principal-agent problem and women's participation in corporate governance, and provide reference for enterprises to reasonably allocate board members and reduce the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, so as to promote the orderly and healthy development of China's capital market.
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