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论文编号：	13189
作者编号：	2120202814
上传时间：	2022/6/7 11:30:39
中文题目：	董事高管责任保险与审计投入研究
英文题目：	Research on Directors'' and Officers'' Liability Insurance and Audit Effort
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	董事高管责任保险；审计投入；产权性质；会计师事务所规模
英文关键字：	directors'' and officers'' liability insurance; audit effort; nature of property right; size of accounting firms
中文摘要：	董事高管责任保险是一种降低董事和高级管理人员执业风险的保险，其发源于西方且目前在发达国家已经有了较高的普及率。近些年，随着我国资本市场的不断发展，董责险的覆盖率与需求也都呈上升趋势。同时，由于董责险具有直接作用于公司管理层的性质，其还可以作为一种治理机制，但学术界对于其实际产生的治理效果始终存在争论，除了分散管理层风险，发挥监督激励作用外，一些研究表明其可能诱发管理层的机会主义行为。此外，从独立第三方如审计人员的角度来研究董责险影响的文献较少，而董责险在被审计单位内部发挥的治理效能会影响审计人员对其重大错报风险的评估结果，从而影响审计决策，所以探讨董责险对审计人员行为的影响是有意义的，同时审计投入作为审计过程的重要因素尚未被探讨，因此，本文研究上市公司投保董责险和会计师事务所审计投入之间的关系，对董责险经济后果及审计投入的研究进行充实。 本文采用理论分析以及实证分析相结合的方法对上述问题进行探讨。首先，对与董责险、审计投入等有关的文献进行梳理，并结合相关理论，建立公司投保董责险对会计师事务所审计投入产生影响的理论框架，同时选择产权性质作为调节变量，理论上分析其对董责险与审计投入关系的影响，据此提出本文的研究假设。其次，选取2007-2020年我国A股上市的非金融类公司为样本，运用实证模型检验董责险对审计投入的影响，以及产权性质发挥的调节效应，研究结果表明，投保董事高管责任保险会显著减少审计投入，主要是由于董责险起到了监督激励效果，削弱了管理层操纵盈余的动机，使得公司的会计信息质量、内部控制质量等都得到改善，审计人员因此感知到较低的重大错报风险，从而降低了审计投入，而国有企业性质会强化董责险与审计投入的负相关关系。本文进一步从会计师事务所的角度出发，研究事务所规模对董责险与审计投入关系的影响，结果发现较小的事务所规模会强化董责险与审计投入的负相关关系。本文的研究结论有助于企业全面认识董责险的治理职能，并正确引入该保险，也有利于审计人员重视董责险，更好地做出审计决策。
英文摘要：	As a means of reducing the practice risk of directors and senior managers, directors' and officers' liability insurance originated in the west and has been widely used in developed capitalist countries. In recent years, with the continuous improvement of China's capital market, the coverage and demand of the insurance are also increasing. At the same time, due to the special nature of the direct effect of the directors' and officers' liability insurance on the management, it can also be used as a mechanism of corporate governance, and in addition to its supervisory role, some studies have shown that it may induce opportunistic behavior in management. In addition, there is little literature on the impact of directors' and officers' liability insurance from the perspective of independent third parties such as auditors, and the effectiveness of the governance of the insurance within the audited entity will affect the result of the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, thus affecting the audit decision. Therefore, it is meaningful to discuss the influence of directors' and officers' liability insurance on auditors' behavior, and the audit effort as an important factor in the audit process has not been discussed, so this paper studies the relationship between the directors' and officers' liability insurance and the audit effort, which enriches the related research on the economic consequences of the insurance and the audit effort. In this paper, the theory and empirical analysis of the method to carry out research on the above issues. First of all, by combing the relevant literature on the directors' and officers' liability insurance and audit effort, and combining the relevant theory, the theoretical analysis framework of the relationship between the insurance and the audit effort of the firm is constructed. At the same time, the nature of property right of is chosen as the regulating variable, and its influence on the relationship between the insurance and audit effort is analyzed theoretically. Secondly, taking the non-financial companies listed on the A-share Market in China from 2007 to 2020 as a sample, this paper empirically tests the influence of directors' and officers' liability insurance on audit effort and the moderating effect of property right nature, and the purchase of insurance can significantly reduce audit effort, mainly because the insurance plays a supervisory and incentive effect and weakens the management's motivation of earnings manipulation, and improve the quality of accounting information and internal control and so on, so that auditors perceived a lower risk of major misstatement, thus reducing the audit effort. In addition, the nature of state-owned enterprises will strengthen the negative correlation between the insurance and audit effort. This paper further studies the effect of firm size on the relationship between directors' and officers' liability insurance and audit effort from the perspective of accounting firms. The results show that the smaller firm size can strengthen the negative correlation between the insurance and audit effort. The conclusion of this paper is helpful for enterprises to fully understand the governance function of the directors' and officers' liability insurance and introduce it correctly. It is also helpful for auditors to attach importance to the insurance and make better audit decisions.
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