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论文编号:13187 
作者编号:2120202813 
上传时间:2022/6/7 11:14:39 
中文题目:中小投资者关注与股权融资成本 ——基于“互动易”平台的实证研究 
英文题目:Small and Medium Investors’ Attention and the Cost of Equity ——An Empirical Study Based on SSE’s Easy Interaction Platform 
指导老师:梅丹 
中文关键字:中小投资者关注;股权融资成本;信息不对称;公司治理 
英文关键字:Attention of small and medium investors; Cost of equity capital; Information asymmetry; Corporate governance 
中文摘要:我国资本市场在发展中不断完善,其间上市公司信息披露的要求有所提高,有力地保障了投资者的相关权益。与此同时,监管部门开始向市场主导的监管模式进行转变,并且积极探索监督治理的新方式。另一方面,互联网的迅猛发展也深刻地影响着人们的生活。随着网络技术的不断进步,投资者能够主动地去搜寻、获取信息,上市公司的信息披露行为也从被动式转为了互动式。特别的是,深圳证券交易所于2010年推出了“互动易”平台,既便利了投资者与上市公司的交流沟通,其上面的互动信息也为衡量投资者关注提供了新的视角。 基于此,本文以2010年至2020年深交所上市公司为样本,使用该平台的提问数量来度量中小投资者的关注度,检验其对企业股权融资成本的影响作用以及中介机制,以丰富该领域的研究。研究结果表明:(1)中小投资者的关注度与上市公司股权融资成本显著负相关。(2)通过降低信息不对称、改善公司治理水平,中小投资者关注能够发挥作用,使得上市公司股权融资成本有所下降。(3)在非国有企业中,中小投资者关注降低股权融资成本的作用更显著。(4)产品市场竞争越激烈,中小投资者关注越能够引起企业的重视与回应,发挥治理作用,使得股权融资成本有所下降。 上述结论表明,“互动易”平台的使用能够给投资者和企业带来一定的价值。中小投资者通过提高关注度、提问等方式,能够降低信息不对称,并且成为一股新的治理力量,发挥“散户”积极主义。其次,企业通过积极互动、改善治理也能够实现与投资者的双赢,获取融资优势。综上,本文将中小投资者与企业融资成本相结合,并分析了其中的作用机制,既能够丰富投资者关注的相关研究,也为市场化监管转型提供了经验证据,具有一定的意义。 
英文摘要:China's capital market is constantly improving as it develops. During this period, the requirements for information disclosure of listed companies have been continuously raised, which effectively protects the legitimate rights and interests of investors. At the same time, the regulatory authorities have begun to shift to a market-oriented regulatory model and are actively exploring new methods of supervision and governance. On the other hand, the rapid development of the Internet has also profoundly affected people's lives. With the continuous advancement of network technology, investors can actively search and obtain information, and the information disclosure behavior of listed companies has also changed from passive to interactive. In particular, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange launched the Easy Interaction Platform in 2010, which not only facilitates the communication between investors and listed companies, but also provides a new perspective for measuring investor attention. Based on this, this paper takes the Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as a sample, uses the number of questions asked on the platform to measure the attention of small and medium investors, and further examines its impact on the cost of equity financing and the intermediary mechanism. By using Stata software to perform regression analysis on the data, the results show that: (1) The attention of small and medium investors is significantly negatively correlated with the cost of equity financing of listed companies. (2) By reducing information asymmetry and improving the level of corporate governance, the attention of small and medium-sized investors can play a role in reducing the cost of equity financing for listed companies. (3) Among non-state-owned enterprises, the role of small and medium investors in reducing the cost of equity financing is more significant. (4) The more competitive the product market is, the more significant is the effect of small and medium-sized investors' attention on reducing the cost of equity financing. The above conclusion shows that the use of Easy Interaction Platform can bring certain value to investors and enterprises. Small and medium-sized investors can reduce information asymmetry by increasing their attention and asking questions, and become a new governance force. Secondly, enterprises can achieve win-win with investors and gain financing advantages through active interaction and improved governance. To sum up, this paper combines the small and medium investors with the cost of equity financing, and analyzes the function mechanism. It can not only enrich the research about investor attention, but also provide empirical evidence for the transformation of market-oriented supervision, which is of certain significance. 
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