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论文编号：	13166
作者编号：	1120180960
上传时间：	2022/6/7 8:56:07
中文题目：	面向混合所有制改革的国有企业董事会多样性研究
英文题目：	The Research on Board Diversity of State-owned Enterprises Based on Mixed Ownership Reform
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	混合所有制改革；董事会多样性；国有企业；资产保值增值；ESG；高质量发展
英文关键字：	mixed ownership reform; board diversity; state-owned enterprises; asset preservation and appreciation; ESG; high-quality development
中文摘要：	我国经济已经迈向高质量发展阶段，国有企业混合所有制改革是影响经济转型升级的关键因素，通过国有企业改革实现国有企业的高质量发展，一直以来都是政府经济工作的重要方面。伴随改革开放40年历程的中国企业，处于制度环境深度变化带来的深化改革的“深水区”。随着混合所有制改革的不断推进，控股股东派驻董事、非控股股东派驻董事、机构投资者派驻董事、独立董事、非股东派驻内部执行董事等多种来源董事并存的多源董事会，逐渐发展成为中国企业董事会构成的常规模式。不同来源的董事由于代表了不同类型利益相关者的利益诉求，使多源董事会划分为由多个具有差异化决策偏好的决策单元组成的集合体，多元化的董事会开始形成。 作为股东与管理层之间的关键制度设计，董事会在企业从战略制定到战略实施的整个过程中承担着咨询建议、资源提供和监督委托代理问题等多重职责，是保障企业战略管理顺利进行的关键，通过向董事会派驻董事，影响董事会的战略制定，成为非国有股东介入国有企业公司治理的主要路径。基于董事会的咨询职能和监督职能，资源依赖理论认为，具有不同属性和特征的董事会能够为企业提供重要的资源，扩展企业网络，为企业带来新的见解，以获取和处理相关信息，改善战略决策质量，并且可以提高企业的价值观和声誉，实现更优的战略目标。代理理论则认为，董事会多样性有助于更好地监督管理层，减少股东与管理层之间的信息不对称性，降低代理成本。 基于前述背景，本文拟解决的科学问题为：新时代中国特色社会主义制度背景下，面向混合所有制改革，在异质性股东客观存在的情况下，国有企业如何开展有效的董事会决策，提高董事会治理效率，进而实现高质量发展？并将科学问题分解为如下四个子问题：在混合所有制改革背景下，（1）影响国有企业董事会多样性的因素包括哪些？（2）国有企业董事会多样性对国有企业资产保值增值及可持续发展（ESG）存在何种影响？（3）国有企业董事会多样性影响国有企业资产保值增值和可持续发展（ESG）的内在机制有哪些？（4）不同情境因素之下，国有企业董事会多样性如何影响国有企业资产保值增值及可持续发展（ESG）？ 为回答前述问题，本文选取2008到2020年在沪深两市上市的国有企业作为研究样本。在前置影响因素方面，本文理论分析混合所有制改革（股权结构视角）、政府放权意愿、地区人口多样性（劳动力供给视角）和业务复杂性（劳动力需求）对国有企业董事会多样性的影响。在经济后果方面，本文基于代理理论和资源依赖理论，分析了混合所有制改革背景之下，董事会多样性对国有企业资产保值增值、环境绩效、社会绩效、超额在职消费和股价崩盘风险的影响及具体的作用路径，并引入了管理层咨询需求和监督需求两个情境因素。 研究结果显示：第一，在混合所有制改革国有企业董事会多样性影响因素方面，混合所有制改革（股权结构）、政府放权意愿和劳动力供给（地区人口多样性）均能够显著提升国有企业董事会多样性水平。第二，在混合所有制改革国有企业董事会多样性治理效应方面，董事会多样性能够提高国有企业资产保值增值，提升国有企业环境绩效和社会绩效，可以有效缓解国有企业超额在职消费和股价崩盘风险。第三，在混合所有制改革国有企业董事会多样性治理效应影响机制方面，董事会多样性通过提升企业创新和内部控制质量促进国有企业资产保值增值，通过提高高管性别多样性和环保意识提升国有企业环境绩效，通过提高高管性别多样性提升国有企业社会绩效水平，通过降低代理成本、提高投资效率和提高风险信息披露水平缓解国有企业股价崩盘风险，这意味着，在混合所有制改革背景之下，董事会多样性在国有企业中发挥着良好的治理作用。第四，在混合所有制改革国有企业董事会多样性治理效应的边界条件方面，管理层咨询需求、监督需求能够强化董事会多样性对国有企业高质量发展的促进作用。前述研究结论在经过内生性控制和稳健性检验之后依然成立。 同已有研究相比，本文的创新之处体现在如下五方面：第一，将国有企业资产保值增值与其在环境（Environment：E）、社会（Social：S）和公司治理（Corporate Governance：G）方面的表现纳入同一研究框架。第二，构建了国有企业董事会多样性指标。第三，深化了对混合所有制改革背景下国有企业董事会多样性影响因素的认识。第四，基于对国有企业董事会多样性的研究，回答了学术界关于董事会治理效应的争论。第五，识别了混合所有制改革背景之下，董事会多样性影响国有企业资产保值增值和ESG的作用路径和边界条件。
英文摘要：	China's economy has moved toward a stage of high-quality development, and the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises is a key factor affecting the transformation and upgrading of the economy. The achievement of high-quality development of state-owned enterprises through the reform of state-owned enterprises has always been an important aspect of the government's economic work. With 40 years of reform and opening up, Chinese enterprises are in the "deep water" of deeper reform brought about by the deep changes in the institutional environment. With the continuous promotion of the mixed ownership reform, a multisource board of directors, with directors appointed by controlling shareholders, directors appointed by noncontrolling shareholders, directors appointed by institutional investors, independent directors and internal executive directors appointed by nonshareholders, has gradually developed into the regular pattern of the composition of directors in Chinese enterprises. As directors from different sources represent the interests of different types of stakeholders, the multisource board is divided into a collection of multiple decision-making units with differentiated decision-making preferences, and a pluralistic board begins to take shape. As the key institutional design between shareholders and management, the board of directors assumes multiple responsibilities, such as advisory advice, resource provision and supervision of proxy issues, throughout the process from strategy formulation to strategy implementation and is the key to ensuring the smooth strategic management of the company. By assigning directors to the board of directors and influencing the board's strategy formulation, it has become the main path for nonstate shareholders to intervene in the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. Based on the advisory and supervisory functions of the board of directors, resource dependency theory argues that a board of directors with diverse attributes and characteristics can provide important resources to the firm, expand the firm's network, bring new insights to the firm to obtain and process relevant information, improve the quality of strategic decisions, and enhance the firm's values and reputation to achieve better strategic goals. Agency theory, on the other hand, suggests that board diversity helps to better monitor management, reduce information asymmetries between shareholders and management, and lower agency costs. Based on the aforementioned background, the scientific question to be addressed in this paper is: In the context of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics in the new era, how can state-owned enterprises carry out effective board decision-making, improve board governance efficiency and thus achieve high-quality development in the context of mixed ownership reform and the objective presence of heterogeneous shareholders? The scientific questions are also broken down into the following four subquestions: In the context of mixed ownership reform, (1) What are the factors that influence the diversity of SOE boards of directors? (2) What is the impact of SOE board diversity on the value added and sustainable development (ESG) of SOE assets? (3) What are the mechanisms underlying the impact of SOE board diversity on the value-added and sustainable development (ESG) of SOEs? (4) How does the diversity of SOE boards affect the value-added and sustainable development of SOEs (ESG) under different situational factors? To answer the aforementioned questions, this paper selects SOEs listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 as the research sample. In terms of antecedent influences, this paper theoretically analyses the impact of mixed ownership reform (equity structure perspective), the government's willingness to decentralise, regional demographic diversity (labour supply perspective) and business complexity (labour demand) on the diversity of SOE boards. In terms of economic consequences, based on agency theory and resource dependency theory, this paper analyses the impact and specific pathways of board diversity on SOEs' asset preservation and appreciation, environmental performance, social performance, excess in-service consumption and share price collapse risk in the context of mixed ownership reform, and introduces two contextual factors, namely management consultation needs and monitoring needs. The results of the study show that, first, in terms of factors influencing board diversity in SOEs under mixed ownership reform, mixed ownership reform (shareholding structure), government willingness to decentralize and labor supply (regional demographic diversity) can significantly increase the level of board diversity in SOEs. Second, in terms of the governance effects of board diversity in SOEs under mixed ownership reform, board diversity can improve the value retention of SOE assets, enhance the environmental and social performance of SOEs, and effectively mitigate the risk of excess in-service consumption and share price collapse in SOEs. Third, in terms of the mechanisms influencing the governance effects of board diversity in SOEs under mixed ownership reform, board diversity promotes value preservation and appreciation of SOEs' assets by improving the quality of corporate innovation and internal control, enhances SOEs' environmental performance by increasing executive gender diversity and environmental awareness, enhances SOEs' social performance level by increasing executive gender diversity, reduces agency costs, and improves investment, mitigating the risk of share price collapse of SOEs by reducing agency costs, improving efficiency and enhancing risk disclosure, implying that board diversity plays a good governance role in SOEs in the context of mixed ownership reform. Fourth, in terms of boundary conditions for the governance effect of board diversity in SOEs under mixed ownership reform, the need for management consultation, the need for supervision can strengthen the role of board diversity in promoting the quality development of SOEs. The findings of the aforementioned study still hold after endogeneity control and robustness tests. Compared with the existing research, the innovation of this paper is embodied in the following five aspects. First, it incorporates the value-added of SOEs' assets and their environmental (E), social (S) and corporate governance (G) aspects into a same research framework. Second, indicators of board diversity in SOEs are constructed. Third, it deepens the understanding of the factors influencing board diversity in SOEs in the context of mixed ownership reform. Fourth, the academic debate on the effects of board governance is answered based on the study of board diversity in SOEs. Fifth, the paths and boundary conditions of the role of board diversity in influencing SOEs' asset preservation and ESG in the context of mixed ownership reform are identified.
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