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论文编号：	13159
作者编号：	2120202836
上传时间：	2022/6/7 0:45:16
中文题目：	风险投资、高管薪酬与企业技术创新——基于创业板上市公司的研究
英文题目：	Venture Capital, Executive Compensation and Technological Innovation: A Research Based on Companies Listed on GEM
指导老师：	黄福广教授
中文关键字：	风险投资；高管薪酬；技术创新
英文关键字：	Venture Capital; Executive Compensation; Technological Innovation
中文摘要：	创新是引领社会经济发展的第一动力，也是企业保有持久竞争优势的源泉。企业是技术创新的主体，开展技术创新活动需要阶段性的投入人力、物力、财力等各方资源，而企业往往面临着内部资源不足，外部资源难以获取的双重压力，对企业技术创新造成不利影响。风险投资作为一种新型的融资机制，集资本与专业知识于一体，通过专业化投资为创新型企业注入资金支持与非资本增值服务，并积极监督管理创新过程，为企业技术创新创造良好的内外部环境。 本文通过梳理国内外学者的研究成果，基于委托代理理论、技术创新理论与最优薪酬契约理论，探究风险投资的介入对企业技术创新与高管薪酬契约的影响；从中介效应视角，研究高管薪酬在风险投资对企业技术创新的影响过程中发挥的作用，通过理论分析与逻辑论证提出本文的研究假设，并设计实证模型进行验证。本文选取2009-2020年创业板上市公司为研究样本，经回归分析与稳健性检验，得到以下结论：（1）风险投资能够显著提高企业技术创新投入与产出；风险投资持股比例越高，对技术创新的促进作用越强。（2）风险投资能够显著提高高管薪酬水平，提高薪酬绩效敏感性；风险投资持股比例越高，对高管薪酬的正向影响越强。（3）高管薪酬水平在风险投资对技术创新的影响中发挥部分中介作用。（4）风险投资对高管薪酬和技术创新的影响因企业股权性质而异：风险投资可以显著提高非国有企业技术创新和高管薪酬绩效的敏感性，但对国有企业的技术创新投入和高管薪酬绩效敏感性没有显著影响。
英文摘要：	Innovation is first driving force leading social and economic development, and the source of lasting competitive advantage for enterprises. However, enterprises often face the pressure of insufficient internal resources and difficult access to external resources, which adversely affects technological innovation. As a type of financing mechanism, Venture Capital combines capital and expertise, injects capital and non-capital value-added services for innovative enterprises through specialized investment, and actively supervises and manages the innovation process to create a favorable internal and external environment for enterprise technological innovation. This paper explores the relationship between Venture Capital, executive compensation contract and technological innovation based on Principal-Agent theory, Technology Innovation theory and the Most Compensation Contract theory. This paper proposes the research hypothesis through theoretical analysis and logical arguments, and designs an empirical model for verification. The following conclusions are obtained from the regression analysis and robustness test: (1) Venture Capital can significantly improve the technological innovation input and output of enterprises; the higher the shareholding ratio of Venture Capital, the stronger the promotion effect on technological innovation. (2) Venture Capital can significantly increase the level of executive compensation and improve the sensitivity of compensation performance; the higher the percentage of Venture Capital shareholding, the stronger the positive effect on executive compensation. (3) The level of executive compensation plays a partially mediating role in the effect of Venture Capital on technological innovation; (4) The impact of Venture Capital on executive compensation and technological innovation varies depending on the nature of the firm's equity: Venture Capital can effectively improve the sensitivity of non-state-owned enterprise investment in technological innovation and executive compensation performance, but has no significant impact on state-owned enterprises.
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