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论文编号：	13158
作者编号：	2120202819
上传时间：	2022/6/7 0:39:37
中文题目：	投服中心持股行权对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究
英文题目：	A study on the impact of the CSISC shareholding on the earnings management of listed companies
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	投服中心；持股行权；盈余管理；中小投资者保护
英文关键字：	China Securities Investor Service Center; exercise of shareholder rights; earnings management; protection of minority investor
中文摘要：	中小投资者权利保护机制是我国资本市场发展过程必须面对和解决的一个重要问题和难题。为了保障广大中小投资者的合法利益，中国证券监督管理委员会从中小投资者的实际需求出发，注册成立“中证中小投资者服务中心”，专门致力于维护中小投资者的合法权益。投服中心的成立，标志着我国资本市场正在逐步向成熟化与法制化方向迈进。 本文通过研究2016年持股行权工作展开以来截止至2020年末的所有投服中心持股行权的具体数据，检验了其具体行权行为对上市公司盈余管理水平产生的影响，得出以下结论：投服中心的持股行权行为能够有力地抑制上市公司的盈余管理行为，提高上市公司会计信息披露质量，并且现场行权与非现场行权对于抑制上市公司盈余管理水平的作用效果没有显著差别。进一步研究表明，公司的内部治理情况和外部监督水平以及产权性质会对投服中心持股行权对盈余管理的作用效果产生调节效应，通过使用机构投资者持股、分析师人数、产权性质、审计质量对样本进行分组研究，发现投服中心持股行权对上市公司盈余管理水平的影响在机构投资者持股较低、分析师跟踪人数较少、非国有性质以及审计质量较低的公司中更为显著。可见投服中心可以为公司的治理机制起到补充监督的作用，是我国资本市场在完善投资者保护方面的体系和政策、加强对中小投资者保护方面的有效举措和重大创新。本研究在理论和实证层面解释了投服中心持股行权制度对中小投资者利益保护功能的现实效果，丰富了投服中心持股行权与中小投资者保护领域的实证研究。
英文摘要：	The protection mechanism for the rights of minority investors is an important problem that must be faced and solved in China's capital market. In order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of minority investors, the China Securities Regulatory Commission has established the "China Securities Investor Services Center Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as CSISC)" based on the actual needs of minority investors, specializing in the service of minority investors and the protection of their legitimate rights and interests. By studying the data of the CSISC exercise of the shareholder rights from 2016 to 2020, we examine the impact of the CSISC exercise of the shareholder rights on the earnings management of listed companies, and draws the following conclusions: The CSISC shareholding can effectively inhibit the earnings management behavior of listed companies and improve their accounting information quality. And there is no significant difference between on-site exercise and off-site exercise in restraining the level of earnings management of listed companies. In addition, the company's internal governance and external supervision will have an impact on the exercise effect. With samples grouped by the shareholding of institutional investors, the number of analysts, the nature of property rights and the audit quality, further research shows that the impact of the CSISC shareholding on the earnings management behavior of listed companies is more significant in the companies with low shareholding of institutional investors, few analysts, non-state-owned nature, and lower audit quality. Through the research results, it can be seen that the CSISC plays a supplementary supervision role for the company's governance mechanism, and is an effective measure and major innovation in improving the system and policies of investor protection in China's capital market and strengthening the protection of minority investors. This study explains the practical effect of the exercise of shareholder rights of CSISC for the protection of the interests of minority investors at the theoretical and empirical levels, and enriches the empirical research in the field of shareholding exercise of the CSISC and the protection of minority investors.
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