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论文编号：	13144
作者编号：	2120202811
上传时间：	2022/6/6 21:34:03
中文题目：	无实际控制人、代理问题与审计收费研究
英文题目：	Research on No Actual Controller, Agency Problem and Audit Fees
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	无实际控制人，审计收费，代理问题
英文关键字：	No actual controller, Audit fees, Principal-Agent Theory
中文摘要：	由于历史沿革等原因我国资本市场往往表现出“一股独大”的特征，这些大股东也顺势成为上市公司的实际控制人，决定着上市公司的前途命运。现有研究表明，实际控制人的存在能够抑制公司内部管理层的自利行为，确保企业日常经营活动的正常进行，促进企业增收提效。但随着我国资本市场的多元化发展和国有企业“混改”步伐的加快，原本在上市公司中高度集中的股权结构也开始分散化，市场中无实际控制人上市公司的身影也频繁出现。最新数据显示，截至2021年年底，A股市场中报告无实际控制人的上市公司有276家，这也为本文的研究提供了契机。 在上述背景下，本文从两权分离理论、委托代理理论和信息不对称理论出发，以我国沪深A股2007-2019年上市公司为样本来源，利用多元线性回归模型研究上市公司有无实际控制人与审计收费之间的关系，同时考察了第一类代理问题对两者关系的影响。研究结果发现，第一，审计机构对无实际控制人上市公司的审计收费水平显著高于其对有实际控制人上市公司的审计收费水平，在考虑了其他可能影响审计收费水平高低的因素后，该结果依然保持显著；第二，与有实际控制人上市公司相比，第一类代理问题在无实际控制人上市公司中更为严重，同时第一类代理问题在上述关系中也发挥了部分中介作用。为了加强研究结论的可靠性，本文还实施了相应的稳健性分析：一方面改变了被解释变量的构造方式，一方面采用倾向得分匹配（PSM）的方法消除了潜在的样本自选择问题，进一步支撑了本文的研究假设。本文的结论有助于补充现有对无实际控制人和审计收费的研究，同时也为企业如何在不同利益主体间构造有效的权力制衡机制提供了一定的启发。
英文摘要：	Due to historical evolution and other reasons, the capital market in China often shows the characteristic of “one share dominance”. These major shareholders also act as the actual controllers of the listed companies, playing an important role in the company governance. According to the former research, the existence of actual controllers could inhibit the self-interest-oriented behaviors of the managers, keep the company’s operations running smoothly, and contribute to the improvement of the business performance. However, with the diversified development of the capital market and the acceleration of the “mixed ownership reform”, the shareholding structure of list companies has become increasingly decentralized, resulting the number of no actual controller company booms. Statistic data shows that on December 31, 2021, the total number of listed companies without actual controllers in my country's A-share market was 276, which also provided an opportunity for this study. Under the above circumstance, starting from the separation of ownership and management theory, principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper takes the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2007 to 2019 as the sample source, and uses the multiple linear regression model to study whether the listed companies have actual controllers or not would affect the audit fees, while examining the impact of the first type of agency problem on the relationship between the two variables. The results of the study find that, first, the audit institutions charge the listed companies without actual controllers significantly higher than the listed companies with actual controllers. After considering other factors that may affect the amount of audit fees, The result remains significant; second, compared with listed companies with actual controllers, the first type of agency problem is more serious in listed companies without actual controllers, and the first type of agency problem also plays a partial intermediary role. To strengthen the reliability of my paper’s conclusions, I also implement the corresponding robustness analysis. On the one hand, the construction of the explained variable is changed. On the other hand, the propensity score matching (PSM) method is used to eliminate the potential problem of sample self-selection bias. This supports the research hypothesis of this paper. The conclusions of this paper help to supplement the existing research on non-actual controllers and audit fees and provide some inspiration for enterprises which want to construct an effective power check and balance mechanism among different stakeholders.
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