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| 论文编号: | 13141 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120202800 | |
| 上传时间: | 2022/6/6 21:19:48 | |
| 中文题目: | 低碳供应链企业信息共享行为研究 | |
| 英文题目: | Research on Information Sharing of Low-carbon Supply Chain Enterprises | |
| 指导老师: | 方磊 | |
| 中文关键字: | 低碳供应链;碳税;碳限额和碳排放权交易;需求波动信息;碳减排 | |
| 英文关键字: | Low-carbon supply chains, carbon taxes, carbon caps and carbon emissions trading, demand fluctuation information, carbon emission reductions | |
| 中文摘要: | 随着全球持续变暖、南极冰川大量融化问题的加剧,国际社会越来越关注通过节能减排制止气候不断恶化的问题。在全球共同推动碳减排的大环境下,中国曾在中美气候变化联合声明中承诺,到2030年二氧化碳排放量达到峰值,并尽力争取在2030年前尽早达到这一数值,我国已试点对碳排放企业进行碳排放监管。与此同时,随着市场竞争越来越激烈,信息为企业所带来的价值也逐渐变大。信息共享作为供应链企业合作的重要机制,在碳减排环境下,起着重要的作用。因此,在低碳经济的政策要求下,企业如何进行信息共享决策安排成为企业面临的难题之一。 本文通过构建制造商-零售商二级供应链模型,对保持风险中立态度的制造商和零售商是否与上下游企业进行信息共享、进行信息共享后的最优决策进行研究。本文以碳限额与碳排放权交易、碳税两种不同的碳监管手段为研究背景,考虑在不同的碳监管手段下,供应链双方是否有动机进行信息共享,主动做出需求信息共享行为的零售商和制造商的最优决策,并进一步深入对比实施信息共享行为的条件,两种不同碳监管手段对企业的影响。在此研究基础上,本文引入了需求波动信息、碳减排系数、碳限额分配指标、消费者低碳产品偏好系数等参数,进一步探究其对于低碳供应链企业信息共享定价和利润的影响。 通过本文的研究表明,以自身利益最大化作为决策依据的零售商在一定条件下的需求信息共享行为能为自身带来更高利益的同时也会帮助上游制造商减少资源浪费、避免产生多余的碳排放从而获得更高的利益。除此之外,对于主动实施碳减排行为的制造商而言,引入了碳减排系数、额外收益、消费者低碳产品偏好对其最优决策的影响具有一定的创新性,并为政府碳监管手段的实施提供借鉴和启示。 | |
| 英文摘要: | With the continuous global warming and the intensification of the problem of a large number of Antarctic glaciers melting, the international community is paying more and more attention to the problem of stopping the deteriorating climate through energy conservation and emission reduction. In the context of the global joint promotion of carbon emission reduction, China has promised in the Sino-US joint statement on climate change to peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and strive to reach this value as soon as possible by 2030, and China has piloted carbon emissions supervision for carbon emitters. At the same time, as market competition becomes more and more intense, the value brought by information to enterprises has gradually become larger. As an important mechanism for supply chain enterprise cooperation, information sharing plays an important role in the carbon emission reduction environment. Therefore, under the policy requirements of the low-carbon economy, how to make information sharing decisions and arrangements for enterprises has become one of the difficulties faced by enterprises. By constructing a manufacturer-retailer secondary supply chain model, this paper studies whether manufacturers and retailers who maintain a risk-neutral attitude share information with upstream and downstream enterprises, and make optimal decisions after information sharing. Taking the two different carbon regulatory measures of carbon quota and carbon emission trading and carbon tax as the research background, this paper considers whether under different carbon regulatory means, whether the two sides of the supply chain have the motivation to share information, take the initiative to make the optimal decisions of retailers who demand information sharing behavior and manufacturers, and further compare the conditions for implementing information sharing behavior, and the impact of two different carbon regulatory measures on enterprises. Based on this research, this paper introduces parameters such as demand fluctuation information, carbon emission reduction coefficient, carbon quota allocation index, and consumer low-carbon product preference coefficient to further explore its impact on the information sharing pricing and profit of low-carbon supply chain enterprises. Through the research in this paper, retailers who use self-interest maximization as the basis for decision-making can bring higher benefits to themselves under certain conditions and help upstream manufacturers reduce waste of resources, avoid excess carbon emissions and obtain higher benefits. In addition, for manufacturers who actively implement carbon emission reduction behaviors, the introduction of carbon emission reduction coefficients, additional benefits, and consumers' low-carbon product preferences has a certain degree of innovation, and provides reference and inspiration for the implementation of government carbon regulatory measures. | |
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