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论文编号：	13140
作者编号：	2120202878
上传时间：	2022/6/6 21:16:54
中文题目：	信息透明度、减持新规与大股东减持超常收益的研究 ——基于中国A股上市公司的实证检验
英文题目：	Research on Information Transparency, New Shareholding Reduction Rule and the Abnormal Return of Major Shareholders’ Reduction: An Empirical Test Based on Chinese A-Share Listed Companies
指导老师：	黄福广、覃家琦
中文关键字：	大股东减持；超常收益；信息透明度；减持新规
英文关键字：	Major Shareholders’ Reduction; Abnormal Return; Information Transparency; New Shareholding Reduction Rule
中文摘要：	大股东作为公司中的重要角色，减持行为不仅对二级资本市场造成了较大的冲击，同时也可能侵占中小股东和外部投资者的相关利益。对于大股东减持造成的负面影响，我国监管部门也在持续修补完善减持监管政策，证监会于2017年5月发布了非常严格的减持新规，以此来规范大股东减持行为。 在此背景下，本文以A股上市公司中持股超过5%的大股东为研究对象，通过事件研究法，研究大股东减持股票的超常收益。接着将盈余管理程度和分析师预测误差作为信息透明度的代理变量，研究公司信息透明度对大股东减持获取超常收益的影响。之后针对我国减持监管政策的变化，研究减持新规是否会削弱大股东减持获取超常收益的能力，并进一步对大股东的身份进行区分，分析大股东是否兼任高管与大股东是否控股这两种情况下，减持新规对大股东减持获取超常收益的影响程度差异。 研究结果发现，第一，减持交易日前后，股票的累计超常收益率呈现先上升后下降的倒V形状，且减持前10天股票的累计超常收益率显著为正，大股东减持可以获得正的超常收益；第二，公司信息透明度越高，大股东基于信息操纵和信息优势的择时交易难度越大，大股东减持获得的超常收益越小；即盈余管理程度、分析师预测误差和大股东减持前股票的累计超常收益率正相关；第三，减持新规政策实施后，大股东减持获取的超常收益下降；第四，大股东兼任高管或为控股股东时，减持新规对这两类大股东减持获得的超常收益的削弱程度更强。基于以上结论，为了进一步缓解大股东减持乱象，本文提出以下三点建议：第一，完善减持信息披露的监管制度和提高违规减持成本；第二，提高上市公司盈余质量和完善公司治理制度；第三，充分发挥分析师作为信息中介的信息挖掘和信息传递职能。
英文摘要：	As an important role in the company, the reduction of major shareholders not only has a great impact on the secondary capital market, but also probably encroaches on the relevant interests of minority shareholders and external investors. For the negative impact caused by the reduction of major shareholders, China's regulatory authorities are also continuously repairing and improving the regulatory policies for the reduction. In May 2017, the CSRC issued new and stricter regulation on the major shareholders’ reduction, to alleviate the chaos of reducing holdings of major shareholders. Under this background, this paper takes the shareholders holding more than 5% of public companies’ stock as the research samples, and studies the abnormal return of major shareholders' reduction through the event research method. Then, taking the earnings quality and the prediction error of securities analysts as the proxy variables of information transparency, this paper studies the relationship between corporate information transparency and the abnormal returns of major shareholders. Then, in view of changes of the regulatory policies on reducing holdings, this paper studies whether the new regulations on reducing holdings will weaken the abnormal return of major shareholders’ reduction. Further distinguishing the identity of major shareholders, this paper analyzes the difference in the impact of the new regulations on the abnormal return of major shareholders’ reduction under the two circumstances of whether major shareholders concurrently serve as executives and whether major shareholders are controllers. The results show that: first, before and after the trading day of reduction, the cumulative abnormal return of stocks presents an inverted V shape of first rising and then falling, and the cumulative abnormal return in the first 10 days of reduction is significantly positive, so the major shareholders can obtain positive abnormal return by reducing stocks. Second, the higher the information transparency of the company, the more difficult the timing transaction of major shareholders based on information manipulation and information advantages, and the smaller the abnormal return obtained by the reduction of major shareholders; That is, earnings quality and securities analysts' prediction error are positively correlated with the cumulative abnormal return before the reduction of major shareholders. Third, since the new shareholding reduction rule was put into effect, the cumulative abnormal return before the reduction of major shareholders has decreased. Fourth, when major shareholders concurrently serve as executives or controllers, the new rules of reducing holdings have a stronger weakening on these two types of major shareholders' reduction of holdings to obtain abnormal return. Based on the results of empirical analysis, three suggestions are given in order to further alleviate the chaos of major shareholders' reduction: first, strengthen the information disclosure supervision of reduction and increase the punishment for illegal reduction; Second, enhance the quality of public companies’ earning information disclosure and strengthen the restraint mechanism for major shareholders in corporate governance; Third, give full play to the information mining and information transmission functions of securities analysts as information intermediaries.
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