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论文编号：	13119
作者编号：	2120202854
上传时间：	2022/6/6 19:40:20
中文题目：	分类治理下董事长权力对国有企业绩效的影响研究 ——股权集中度和环境不确定性的调节作用
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Chair’s Power on Performance of State-owned Enterprises Under Classified Governance: Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration and Environmental Uncertainty
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	董事长权力；国有企业绩效；分类治理；股权集中度；环境不确定性
英文关键字：	Chair’s power, State-owned enterprise performance, Classified governance, Equity concentration, Environmental uncertainty
中文摘要：	由于在我国国有企业中存在着独特的“国家-董事长-高管”多重委托代理关系，董事长同时担任着“企业领导者”和“政府官员”的角色，双重身份赋予了董事长更大的权力。当前，学者们在探究企业高层管理人员与企业绩效关系时，多将 CEO 作为研究对象，但在中国情境下，董事长是国有企业中具有最高影响力和权力的管理者。因此，本文将基于权力视角考察董事长权力大小对国有企业绩效的影响，以及股权因素和环境因素会使两者关系如何变化。此外，在国有企业分类治理背景下，本文还将分类讨论董事长权力对不同类型国有企业绩效的差异作用。 本文以 2010-2020 年全部 A 股国有上市公司为研究样本，基于委托代理理论、高阶梯队理论和资源依赖理论，通过多元线性回归分析检验董事长权力与国有企业绩效之间的关系和股权集中度与环境不确定性对主效应的作用，并分别在商业竞争类和特定功能类国有企业样本中验证董事长权力对不同类型国企绩效的差异影响。本文通过实证研究发现，董事长权力与国有企业绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系，但在特定功能类国有企业中董事长权力与国有企业绩效之间并不存在显著的相关关系。另外，股权集中度和环境不确定性均会对董事长权力 与国有企业绩效之间的正相关关系产生负向调节作用。 本文揭示了在中国情境下董事长权力提高能够显著提升国有企业绩效，且董事长权力在不同类型国有企业中对企业绩效的影响并不相同，不仅丰富了公司治理相关研究，而且对于深化国有企业改革和提升公司治理水平也具有重要现实意义。同时，本文也揭示了股权集中度和环境不确定性的调节作用，有利于进一步了解股权因素和环境因素在国有企业深化改革进程中的作用，帮助国有企业实现高质量发展。
英文摘要：	Because of the unique multi-principal-agent relationship of "state-chair-senior management" in Chinese state-owned enterprises, the chair plays the role of “government official” and “enterprise leader” at the same time, and the dual identity endows the chair with greater power. At present, when exploring the relationship between senior managers and enterprise performance, scholars mostly take CEO as the research object. However, in the Chinese context, the chair is the senior manager with the highest influence and power in state-owned enterprises. Therefore, this paper will examine the influence of chair’s power on the performance of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of power, and how the relationship between the two will change due to different equity factors and environmental factors. In addition, under the background of Classified Governance of state-owned enterprises, this paper will also discuss the differential influence of chair’s power on the performance of different types of state-owned enterprises. This paper takes all A-share state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as research samples, based on principal-agent theory, upper echelon theory and resource dependence theory, verifies the relationship between the chair’s power and the performance of state-owned enterprises and the role of ownership concentration and environmental uncertainty on the main effect through multiple linear regression analysis. And this paper verifies the differential influence of chair’s power on the performance of different types of state-owned enterprises in the samples of commercial competition and specific functional state-owned enterprises. Finally, through empirical analysis, this paper finds that chair’s power can significantly improve the performance of state-owned enterprises, but in specific functional state-owned enterprises, the promotion effect of chair’s power on enterprise performance is not significant. In addition, ownership concentration and environmental uncertainty will negatively regulate the positive correlation between chair’s power and the performance of state-owned enterprises. This paper reveals that in the Chinese context, the improvement of chair’s power of state-owned enterprises can significantly improve enterprise performance, and the influence of chair’s power on enterprise performance is different in different types of state-owned enterprises. It not only enriches the research on corporate governance, but also has important practical significance for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and improving the level of corporate governance. At the same time, this paper also reveals the regulatory role of equity concentration and environmental uncertainty, which is conducive to further understand the role of equity factors and environmental factors in the deepening reform process of state-owned enterprises, and help state-owned enterprises achieve high-quality development.
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