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论文编号：	13112
作者编号：	2120202884
上传时间：	2022/6/6 17:48:15
中文题目：	CEO自恋与企业违规关系研究
英文题目：	CEO自恋与企业违规关系研究
指导老师：	张国萍
中文关键字：	CEO自恋；企业违规；董事会监督；CEO权力
英文关键字：	CEO narcissism; Enterprise violation; Supervision of the board of directors; CEO power
中文摘要：	改革开放40年以来，资本市场从无到有、从小到大，逐渐规范化、法制化。然而，上市公司违规现象依旧是现实难题，违规行为屡禁不止、违规次数逐年攀升、违规形式花样迭出。企业违规行为不仅损害投资者的合法权益、挫伤投资积极性，同时也扰乱市场秩序、影响我国资本市场的健康良序发展。这不仅对于企业自身长续经营无益，同时也会加剧整个行业的行业乱象。因此，探寻企业违规行为产生的原因，并最大限度地降低违规行为发生的概率，保护各参与主体的权益，成为理论界和实务界的关注重点。 CEO是公司高管团队的核心，是企业经营决策的发起者和引领者，因此CEO作为管理主体，其个人特征很可能对企业违规行为产生影响。近年来，“自恋”作为一种特殊的心理特征，受到学者的广泛关注，然而少有文献探究CEO自恋与企业违规之间的关系。本文从高层梯队理论、委托代理理论、舞弊三角理论等理论视角出发，研究了三方面问题：CEO自恋与企业违规之间关系，董事会监督、CEO权力对二者关系的调节作用，同时进一步对CEO性别、产权性质进行分组检验CEO自恋与企业违规的关系。研究发现：（1）CEO自恋增加了企业的违规行为，在替换企业违规衡量方式的稳健性检验中结果仍然成立；（2）CEO性别差异对CEO自恋与企业违规关系具有显著影响；（3）与国有企业相比，CEO自恋对非国有企业违规行为的影响更为显著；（4）董事会监督强度负向调节CEO自恋与企业违规之间的关系；（5）CEO权力强度正向调节CEO自恋与企业违规之间的关系。最后，本文依据研究结果提出了相应的政策建议。 本文创新点如下：一方面，本文研究中国情境下CEO自恋对企业违规的影响，验证了CEO自恋对企业违规行为的正向影响，补充了CEO自恋经济后果的研究，并且丰富了企业违规影响因素的研究；另一方面，在研究中以董事会监督、CEO权力作为调节变量，验证了董事会监督在CEO自恋与企业违规之间的负向调节作用，以及CEO权力在CEO自恋与企业违规之间的正向调节作用，弥补了理论空白。
英文摘要：	Since the 40 years of reform and opening up, the capital market has gradually become standardized and legalized from scratch and from small to large. However, the violation phenomenon of listed companies is still a real problem, with repeated violations, the number of violations increasing year by year, and various forms of violations. Enterprise violations not only damage the legitimate rights and interests of investors and dampen investment enthusiasm, but also disrupt the market order and affect the healthy and orderly development of China's capital market. This will not only be of no benefit to the long-term operation of the enterprise itself, but also aggravate the industry chaos of the whole industry. Therefore, exploring the causes of enterprise violations, minimizing the probability of violations and protecting the rights and interests of all participants have become the focus of theoretical and practical circles. CEO is the core of the company's senior management team and the initiator and leader of enterprise business decisions. Therefore, as the main body of management, CEO's personal characteristics are likely to have an impact on enterprise violations. In recent years, "narcissism", as a special psychological feature, has attracted extensive attention from scholars. However, there is little literature to explore the relationship between CEO narcissism and enterprise violations. From the perspective of high-level echelon theory, principal-agent theory and fraud triangle theory, this paper studies three aspects: the relationship between CEO narcissism and enterprise violations, and the regulatory role of board supervision and CEO power on the relationship between them. At the same time, it further groups CEO gender and property rights to test the relationship between CEO narcissism and enterprise violations. (1) the results of the study on the establishment of CEO violations still increase: (1) the results of the study on the establishment of CEO violations; (2) CEO gender differences have a significant impact on the relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate violations; (3) Compared with state-owned enterprises, CEO narcissism has a more significant impact on non-state-owned enterprises' violations; (4) The supervision intensity of the board of directors negatively regulates the relationship between CEO narcissism and enterprise violations; (5) CEO power intensity positively regulates the relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate violations. Finally, based on the research results, this paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions. The innovations of this paper are as follows: on the one hand, this paper studies the impact of CEO narcissism on enterprise violations in the Chinese context, verifies the positive impact of CEO narcissism on enterprise violations, supplements the research on the economic consequences of CEO narcissism, and enriches the research on the influencing factors of enterprise violations; On the other hand, taking board supervision and CEO power as regulatory variables, this paper verifies the negative regulatory role of board supervision between CEO narcissism and corporate violations, and the positive regulatory role of CEO power between CEO narcissism and corporate violations, which makes up for the theoretical gap.
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