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论文编号：	13108
作者编号：	2120202808
上传时间：	2022/6/6 17:15:39
中文题目：	跨区域医联体背景下“互联网+医疗”平台的合作运营与收入分配机制研究
英文题目：	Research on the cooperative operation and income distribution mechanism of the Internet plus medical platform under the background of trans regional Medical Association
指导老师：	梁峰
中文关键字：	互联网+医疗；运营机制；收入分配机制；遗传算法；Shapely值法
英文关键字：	Internet plus medicine; operation mechanism; Income distribution mechanism; genetic algorithm; Shapely value method
中文摘要：	为缓解优质医疗资源分布不均匀、利用不充分等问题，我国逐步开展了医疗联合体的建设工作，“互联网+医疗”平台的搭建和推广是深化医疗体制改革、完善我国特色医疗卫生制度的重要举措，对推动“新医改”背景下的医疗资源下沉具有重要意义。参与平台的多方主体通过协同配合，共同为患者提供满意的就医体验，可以满足患者问诊、就医、康复护理等对健康生活向往的系列诉求。 本文研究的是“互联网+医疗”平台的合作运营机制和收入分配机制。针对合作运营机制，平台运营商分别为二级医院和三级医院提供按年付费和按患者访问次数付费两种付费方式和相应的付费价格。建立“互联网+医疗”平台各参与方的收益模型，基于最优化理论利用整数规划法求得二级医院和三级医院的参与策略，将医院参与策略带入平台运营商收益模型中，在满足二级和三级医院参与度阈值的基础上，以平台运营商收益最大值为目标，使用遗传算法制定平台运营商定价策略。分析请求其他医院协助概率、收入分成系数和定价策略对二级医院和三级医院的参与度、参与方式、平均收益和平台收益的影响。针对收入分配机制，在平台正常运营的背景下，原本固定系数的收入分配方案无法满足其中医疗帮扶联盟的公益目的，构建基于修正Shapely值的收入分配方案，将成本、风险、受益群体范围和地区发达程度纳入收入分配的影响因素，利用算例讨论并证明基于修正Shapely值收入分配方案的合理性和公益性。 研究结果显示：在“互联网+医疗”平台的运营过程中，平台运营商建立的合作运营机制能够代替政府机构资金补贴，实现平台自身可持续运营，推动优质医疗资源下沉。二级医院和三级医院均更倾向于使用按年付费的参与方式。基于修正的Shapely值的收入分配方案中，参与的各级医院在收支平衡的基础上，将资金向付出成本较多的、承担较大风险的、能使更多患者受益的和建立在欠发达地区的医院倾斜，可以满足平台中医疗帮扶联盟资源和资金双下沉的公益目的。
英文摘要：	In order to alleviate the problems of uneven distribution and inadequate utilization of high-quality medical care, China has gradually carried out the construction of medical consortia, and the construction and promotion of the "Internet plus medical" platform is an important measure to deepen the reform of the medical system and improve the medical and health system with Chinese characteristics, and it is important to promote the "new medical reform It is important to promote the sinking of medical resources in the context of "new medical reform". By cooperating with multiple parties involved in the platform, they can provide patients with a satisfactory medical experience, which can meet the series of demands for a healthy life such as consultation, medical treatment and rehabilitation care. In this paper, we study the cooperative operation mechanism and revenue distribution mechanism of the "Internet plus medical" platform. For the cooperative operation mechanism, the platform operator provides two types of payment methods and corresponding payment prices for secondary and tertiary hospitals, namely, annual payment and per patient visit payment. The revenue model of each participant in the "Internet plus medicine" platform is established, and the participation strategies of secondary and tertiary hospitals are obtained based on the optimization theory using integer programming method, and the hospitals' participation strategies are brought into the revenue model of the platform operator. On the basis of meeting the participation thresholds of secondary and tertiary hospitals, the pricing strategy of the platform operator is developed using genetic algorithm. The impact of requesting other hospitals' assistance probability, revenue sharing coefficient and pricing strategy on the participation degree, participation mode, average revenue and platform revenue of secondary and tertiary hospitals is analyzed. To address the revenue allocation mechanism, the original revenue allocation scheme with fixed coefficients cannot meet the public benefit purpose of the medical assistance alliance among them in the context of normal platform operation, construct a revenue allocation scheme based on modified Shapely values, incorporate cost, risk, scope of beneficiary groups and regional development into the influencing factors of revenue allocation, and use arithmetic examples to discuss and prove that the revenue allocation scheme based on modified Shapely values The rationality and public benefit of the modified Shapely value-based income distribution scheme are discussed and demonstrated using examples. The results of the study show that in the operation of the "Internet plus medical" platform, the cooperative operation mechanism established by the platform operator can replace the financial subsidies of government agencies, achieve sustainable operation of the platform itself, and promote the sinking of high-quality medical resources. Both secondary and tertiary hospitals prefer to use the annual payment participation method. In the income distribution scheme based on the modified Shapely value, the participating hospitals at all levels, on the basis of balanced income and expenditure, tilt the funds toward hospitals that pay more costs, bear greater risks, benefit more patients, and are established in less developed areas, which can satisfy the public welfare purpose of double sinking of resources and funds for special medical alliances in the platform.
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