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论文编号：	13101
作者编号：	2120202838
上传时间：	2022/6/6 16:55:48
中文题目：	董事会群体断裂带、公司绩效与CEO强制变更
英文题目：	Board Faultlines,Firm Performance and CEO Forced Change
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	董事会群体断裂带；公司绩效；CEO强制变更
英文关键字：	Board Faultline; Firm performance; CEO forced change
中文摘要：	董事会是公司治理的重要支撑和制衡机制，董事会做出变更CEO的决策是董事会履行公司治理职责的基本要素，反映了董事会的履职尽责效果。董事会是在团队层面履行其职能，董事会成员自身的多种属性之间会相互作用，形成子群体之间的断裂带，董事会群体断裂带会对董事会达成变更CEO的共识和决策、履职尽责的效果产生影响。 本文以董事会群体断裂带为研究视角，选取2011-2020年A股上市公司为样本，采用OLS线性回归和Logistic回归方法，分析上市公司CEO强制变更是否以及如何受到董事会群体断裂带的影响，以及公司绩效在而二者之间发挥的中介效应。研究结果表明：董事会群体断裂带的存在增强了上市公司CEO强制变更的可能性；公司绩效在二者之间发挥着中介效应。具体而言，整体的董事会群体断裂带会对公司绩效产生消极影响，从而增强了CEO强制变更的可能性。进一步研究表明，CEO强制变更的概率是不同类型的董事会群体断裂带综合作用的结果。董事会浅层断裂带会降低董事会发挥监督咨询作用的有效性，会对公司绩效产生消极影响，间接提高了CEO强制变更的可能性；董事会深层断裂带与CEO强制变更的可能性正相关，公司绩效并未在二者之间发挥中介效应，董事会深层断裂带的存在降低了董事履行监督职责时所感受到的社会风险，有利于提高董事会对CEO的监督有效性，提高CEO强制变更的可能性。 本文以董事会成员多种属性聚合分类的视角展开研究，分析董事会群体断裂带对董事会整体发挥监督和咨询职能的影响，尤其是对CEO监督和做出强制变更决定的影响。一方面，本文的研究结论能够丰富董事会群体断裂带的相关研究文献，另一方面，也为CEO强制变更的董事会层面的影响因素研究提供了补充和参考。与此同时，本文也为上市公司完善董事会建设、加强对CEO的监督提出了可行性的政策建议。
英文摘要：	The board of directors is an important support and balance mechanism of corporate governance, and the decision of the board of directors to change the CEO is the basic element of the board of directors to perform corporate governance responsibilities, reflecting the effect of the board of directors to fulfill their duties. The board of directors performs its functions at the team level. The various attributes of the board members interact with each other to form a faultline between sub-groups. The faultline of the board of directors will have an impact on the board of directors' consensus and decision to change the CEO, as well as their performance of duties. From the perspective of the faultline of the board of directors, this paper selected a-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020 as samples and adopted OLS linear regression and Logistic regression methods to analyze whether and how the CEO forced change of listed companies is affected by the f faultline of the board of directors, as well as the mediating effect of corporate performance between them. The results show that the existence of the faultline of the board of directors enhances the possibility of forced CEO change in listed companies; Corporate performance plays a mediating effect between them. Specifically, the overall faultline of the board of directors has a negative impact on corporate performance, thus enhancing the possibility of CEO forced change. Further research shows that the probability of CEO forced change is the result of different types of faultline of the board of directors. The shallow faultline of the board of directors will reduce the effectiveness of the board of directors to play a supervisory and consulting role, have a negative impact on corporate performance, and indirectly improve the possibility of CEO forced change; The deep faultline of the board of directors is positively correlated with the possibility of CEO forced change, and corporate performance does not play an intermediary effect between them. The existence of the faultline of the board of directors reduces the social risks felt by directors when they perform their supervisory duties, which is conducive to improving the effectiveness of the board of directors' supervision of the CEO and increase the possibility of CEO forced change. From the perspective of aggregation and classification of various attributes of board members, this paper analyzes the impact of the faultline of the board of directors on the supervisory and advisory functions of the board, especially the impact on the supervision and mandatory change decisions of the CEO. On the one hand, the research conclusion of this paper can enrich the relevant research literature on the faultline of the board of directors, and on the other hand, it can also provide a supplement and reference for the research on the influencing factors of the board level of CEO forced change. At the same time, this paper also puts forward feasible policy suggestions for listed companies to improve the construction of the board of directors and strengthen the supervision of CEO.
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