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论文编号：	13100
作者编号：	2120202837
上传时间：	2022/6/6 16:54:06
中文题目：	控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge on Enterprise Innovation Investment
指导老师：	齐岳
中文关键字：	股权质押；创新投入；企业金融化；股权制衡；数字化水平
英文关键字：	equity pledge; innovation investment; financialization level; equity checks and balances; digitalization level
中文摘要：	与传统融资方式相比，股权质押具有程序简单、速度快、难度低、成本少的突出优势，因而成为资本市场中备受上市企业股东推崇的融资方式。然而，股权质押也隐藏着较大的风险隐患，迫使质押股东承担平仓压力和控制权转移风险，大规模的“爆仓”甚至会对资本市场产生巨大的冲击。由于我国企业股权普遍集中，股权质押的主体多为企业控股股东，其股权质押行为会对企业正常的经营决策产生更为显著的影响，尤其是控股股东股权质押会使企业创新活动面临更为复杂的内外部环境。本文旨在探究控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入的具体影响机制。 基于以上背景，本文选取2012-2019年沪深A股上市企业作为研究对象，深入探究控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入的影响机制。本文首先检验了控股股东股权质押与企业创新投入的基本关系，并引入企业金融化水平作为中介变量，检验是否存在“控股股东股权质押——金融化水平提高——企业创新投入降低”的中介路径；然后从风险态度视角、股权结构视角、数字化建设视角出发，探究风险承担、股权制衡、企业数字化水平对基本作用关系的调节效应；最后本文对控股股东股权质押影响企业创新投入的作用机制进行了异质性检验。 通过文献回顾与实证分析，本文得出以下结论：第一，控股股东股权质押会对企业创新投入产生负面影响，企业创新投入随着质押比例的提高而降低；第二，金融化水平能够发挥部分中介作用，控股股东股权质押可以通过提高企业金融化水平抑制创新投入；第三，相同条件下，风险承担水平和企业数字化水平的提高能够弱化控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入的负面影响；第四，相同条件下，股权制衡度的提高会进一步强化控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入的负面影响，即股权制衡并未发挥对控股股东股权质押行为的治理效应。基于上述研究结论，本文建议监管部门要完善股权质押的监管体系，积极承担起监管质押行为、管控质押风险的外部主体责任，严控资本市场股权质押的存量风险；企业要将股权质押比例和金融化水平控制在合理的区间内，同时进一步提高风险承担水平，完善内部治理结构并加强企业数字化建设。
英文摘要：	Compared with traditional financing methods, equity pledge has the outstanding advantages of simple procedures, fast speed, low difficulty and low cost, so it has become a financing method that is highly respected by shareholders of listed companies in the capital market. However, equity pledge also has hidden risks, forcing the pledged shareholders to bear the pressure of liquidation and the risk of transfer of control rights. Large-scale "blowout" may even have a huge impact on the capital market. As a result of the concentration of corporate equity in China, most of the pledged shareholders are listed companies' controlling shareholders, whose equity pledge has a significant impact on the normal business decisions of the companies. Especially, the controlling shareholders' equity pledge will make the innovation activities of the companies face a more complex internal and external environment. This paper aims to explore the specific impact mechanism of controlling shareholder's equity pledge on corporate innovation investment. Based on the above background, this paper selects the annual data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019, and deeply explores the impact mechanism of controlling shareholder equity pledge on corporate innovation investment. This paper firstly examines the basic relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and corporate innovation investment, and introduces the level of corporate financialization as an intermediary variable to test whether there is an intermediary of "controlling shareholder's equity pledge—improving the level of corporate financialization—decreasing corporate innovation investment" path. Then, from the perspective of risk attitude, equity structure, and digital construction, it explores the moderating effects of risk-taking, equity checks and balances, and the level of enterprise digitalization on the basic role relationship. Finally, heterogeneity test is conducted on the mechanism of controlling shareholder's equity pledge influencing corporate's innovation input. Through literature review and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: Firstly, the controlling shareholder's equity pledge will have a negative impact on the innovation investment of corporate, and the innovation investment of corporate will decrease with the increase of the pledge ratio. Secondly, the level of financialization can play a partial intermediary role, and the controlling shareholder's equity pledge can restrain innovation investment by improving the level of corporate financialization. Thirdly, under the same conditions, the improvement of the level of risk-taking and the level of enterprise digitalization can weaken the negative impact of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge on enterprise innovation investment. Fourthly, under the same conditions, the improvement of the equity check and balance degree will further strengthen the negative impact of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge on the enterprise's innovation investment. It means that the equity check and balance doesn’t exert the governance effect on the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior. Based on the above research conclusions, this paper suggests that the regulatory department should improve the supervision system of equity pledge, actively undertake the external subject responsibility of supervising the pledge behavior and controlling the pledge risk, and strictly control the stock risk of equity pledge in the capital market. Corporate should control the proportion of equity pledge and the level of financialization in a reasonable range. At the same time, Corporate should further improve the level of risk-taking, improve the internal governance structure and strengthen the Corporate digital construction.
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