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论文编号：	13086
作者编号：	1120170876
上传时间：	2022/6/6 16:15:10
中文题目：	业绩补偿承诺协议、并购交易与资源配置效率
英文题目：	Performance Compensation Commitment, M&A Deals and Resource Allocation Efficiency
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	业绩补偿承诺；市场反应；溢价率； 并购绩效； 盈余管理； 高管减持
英文关键字：	Performance Compensation Commitment; Market Reaction; Premium Rate; M&A Performance; Earnings Management; Executive Share Selling
中文摘要：	并购重组作为上市公司的一项重要投资决策，是企业优化资源配置、实现战略升级的有效途径。由于资本市场存在的信息不对称问题，往往使标的公司获得显著收益，而收购方公司的并购绩效不佳，股东财富遭受损失。为充分保障中小投资者的利益，我国证监会尝试在并购重组活动中引入业绩补偿承诺协议，通过对标的公司未来的经营业绩作出承诺，如果没有完成约定的业绩，需要对收购方公司进行赔偿，降低了收购方公司股东的风险，旨在抑制以往没有业绩支撑的泡沫化交易。与国外资本市场的Earnout协议相比，虽然业绩补偿承诺协议在支付方式、金融本质等方面存在明显区别，但作为我国并购重组活动的新兴契约方式，在理论上同样具有降低信息不对称和激励标的公司的作用。然而资本市场业绩不达标时常发生，随意修改补偿协议、逃避补偿责任等层出不穷的业绩承诺丑闻，不仅拖累上市公司的业绩和市场形象，而且引起市场对其效果的质疑。 基于上述研究背景，作为一种深刻改变我国上市公司并购重组博弈过程的新兴契约方式，业绩补偿承诺的设计初衷和实际情况存在较大差距，本文依据并购进展的时间维度，以业绩补偿承诺期为基准，层层推进，从四个层面系统分析该协议对资源配置效率的影响，检验业绩补偿承诺对投资者保护的真实效果。第一，从收购方获得的收益层面，分析业绩补偿承诺的市场反应。第二，从目标公司获得的收益层面，分析业绩补偿承诺对溢价率的影响。第三，投资者保护的最终落脚点在于企业的并购绩效，通过检验并购绩效的好坏来判断该协议的投资者保护效果，并分析其中隐藏的机会主义动机。收购方公司的管理层，因为进行并购重组，有动机进行盈余管理，以确保并购后的公司业绩上升，便于维持股价和进行市值管理，塑造其英明决策的市场形象。第四，高管持股的变动很大程度上反映了其对公司未来业绩的预期，作为公司内部人，高管拥有公司整体运营情况的内部信息，业绩补偿承诺提供了一个检验高管对未来业绩是否具有信心的证据，以此来分析高管减持的机会主义动机。 基于信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、信号理论等理论基础，本文以2008-2018年我国A股上市公司发生并购重组的事件作为研究样本，采用规范分析和实证分析结合的研究方法，探讨业绩补偿承诺协议在我国资本市场发挥的作用及其对投资者保护的效果，并得到以下研究结论： 第一，从收购方公司获得的市场反应来看，提供业绩补偿承诺的短期市场反应更高。业绩补偿承诺就标的公司未来的经营情况，向市场传递明确的盈利预测信息，降低交易双方的信息不对称程度和投资者的信息搜集成本。结合业绩补偿承诺协议的具体条款，发现双向业绩补偿方式并没有带来显著的超额回报，但是逐年补偿方式和包含股份补偿方式下，市场反应更积极。 第二，站在标的公司获得的并购溢价角度来看，业绩补偿承诺推高了标的公司的估值，收购方需要支付更高的并购溢价。我国上市公司热衷于进行跨行业的多元化并购，区分并购类型后发现，多元化并购正向调节了业绩补偿承诺和溢价率之间的关系，越是多元化并购，提供业绩补偿承诺的溢价率越高。结合业绩补偿承诺协议的具体条款，发现采用双向业绩补偿方式的溢价率更高，逐年补偿方式和包含股份补偿方式对并购溢价率没有显著的差异影响。 第三，补偿期刚结束，上市公司的经营业绩和公司价值就出现明显下降，说明为了实现业绩承诺，双方公司有动机维持一个较高的业绩，但是一旦渡过补偿期，业绩立即下降，机会主义特征明显。从收购方公司的盈余管理动机来看，签订了业绩补偿承诺的收购方公司，其并购后的向上盈余管理越多。显而易见，提供业绩补偿承诺的并购活动中，出于维持高股价和市值管理需要，加之面临的业绩压力和投资决策压力，在掌握更多内部信息的情况下，收购方公司的管理层有动机也有能力进行盈余管理，尽可能规避合并报表的业绩下滑，以避免因决策错误遭受来自股东的压力与惩罚，证实了我国业绩补偿承诺协议成为上市公司进行盈余管理的工具。随后讨论签订业绩补偿承诺的并购事件，发现标的公司的盈利预测完成情况越理想，完成比例越高，均与收购方公司向上的盈余管理程度正相关，反映出标的公司承诺的业绩在实现过程中，会诱发收购方公司管理层对合并报表进行盈余管理，存在明显的机会主义行为。此外，逐年补偿方式下需要对标的公司每年的盈利预测都进行考核，比累计一次性补偿方式的实现难度更大，与盈余管理的正相关关系更明显，而是否双向业绩补偿、是否包含股份补偿方式与盈余管理均不显著。 第四，签订业绩补偿承诺的收购方公司高管进行了更多的减持，表明业绩补偿承诺容易诱发高管谋取私利的动机，利用“利好”消息高位卖出股票获利。同时说明高管认为股价被高估的程度更大，对公司未来没有展示出信心。随后讨论签订业绩补偿承诺的并购事件，资本市场最为关心的是标的公司在补偿承诺期内的盈利预测实现情况。研究发现标的公司的实际完成情况越理想，传递出经营情况良好的信号，有利于提升收购方管理层的信心，降低其减持的可能性。而业绩补偿承诺的具体条款对高管减持并没有产生显著的差异影响，侧面反映出影响高管减持的重要因素之一还是并购后上市公司的股价，标的公司盈利预测的完成情况直接影响并购绩效和收购方公司的股价，两者密不可分。 以上研究结论表明，业绩补偿承诺的并购方式虽然承诺了业绩，但没有向投资者承诺信心和价值，最终的并购绩效不尽如人意，收购方公司及其管理层存在较为明显的机会主义动机，严重损害中小投资者的利益。和现有研究相比，本文潜在的边际贡献和研究意义在于三个方面： 第一，本文通过四个层面系统分析我国独特的业绩补偿承诺协议对资源配置效率的影响，为检验该协议的投资者保护效果提供了新的研究视角。不仅补充了业绩补偿承诺的短期经济后果中尚有的研究空间，而且与现有研究最大的区别在于，本文依据业绩补偿承诺期为基准，发现该协议对长期并购绩效的负面影响，结合盈余管理和高管减持的机会主义动机，拓展了业绩补偿承诺的长期经济后果研究，从更完整的时间维度理解业绩补偿承诺协议，证实这种新兴的并购契约在保护投资者利益方面存在的不足。 第二，虽然与国外资本市场的Earnout协议在很多方面存在较大区别，但是作为我国独特的并购契约方式，国内研究较少涉及业绩补偿承诺协议具体条款内容带来的差异影响。本文通过手工搜集是否双向补偿、是否分年度补偿以及是否包含股份赔偿这三个方面的条款，打开该机制运行的“黑箱”，厘清不同协议条款带来的差异影响，加深对该契约内容的理解。 第三，现有研究大多立足于并购完成日当年的影响，较少讨论业绩补偿承诺期间及补偿期结束的后续影响，缺乏关键的业绩兑现期的研究。而讨论业绩补偿承诺协议的实际运行效果，就应该将补偿承诺期间纳入研究范围。作为理性经济人，收购方公司及其管理层会根据标的公司未来的实际盈利预测完成情况采取不同的行动策略。本文通过手工搜集业绩实现情况，结合补偿期结束后的业绩下滑，找到补偿期内的机会主义动机，为我国资本市场的盈余管理动机和高管减持研究，提供新的实证研究角度和经验证据，研究结论对抑制并购重组活动的代理问题和完善业绩补偿承诺机制具有重要的理论启示和现实意义。
英文摘要：	As an important investment decision of listed companies, M&A is helpful to improve resource scheme and achieve strategic upgrading. Information asymmetry brings the fact that target companies often get significant abnormal returns, while the acquirers can not obtain the same returns, and shareholders’ wealth suffer losses. To protect the interests of the small and medium-sized investors, the China Securities Regulatory Commission tried to introduce performance compensation commitment agreements in merger and acquisition activities by making commitments to the future performance of the target company. If the target company does not complete the committed performance, the acquirer company may receive compensation, which reduces the risks of shareholders of the acquirer company and will be helpful to restrain the bubble transaction without performance support in the past. Compared with Earnout agreement in foreign capital market, performance compensation commitment agreement has obvious differences in payment mode and financial nature, but as an emerging contract method of M&A activities in China, it could theoretically reduce information asymmetry and motivate target companies. However, the fact that the committed performance does not meet the standard often occurs. The endless performance commitment scandals, such as modifying the compensation agreements at will and evading the compensation responsibilities, not only hurt the performance and market images of listed companies, but also cause the market to doubt its real effects. Based on the research background, as an emerging contract that profoundly changes the M&A process of listed companies in China, there is a big gap between the original design intention and the actual situation of performance compensation commitment. Based on the performance compensation commitment period, this paper systematically analyzes the impacts of the performance compensation commitment agreement on the efficiency of resource allocation from four points according to the time dimension of M&A progress in order to test the real effects of investor protection. First, this paper test the market reaction of performance compensation commitment from the perspective of the gain of the acquirer company. Second, this paper test the premium from the perspective of the gain of the target company. Third, the key point of investor protection in M&A lies in the performance, and of course the opportunistic motivation hidden in performance compensation commitment can be analyzed by examining M&A performance, which is helpful to understand the real effects of investor protection. Managers of the acquirers have motivations to carry out earnings managements in order to improve the combined firms’ performance, as well as maintain the stock prices and implement market value managements, which is beneficial to shape the market images of their wise decisions. Fourth, the changes of executives’ holdings largely reflect their expectations of the companies’ future performance. As insiders, executives have internal information about the companies’ overall operations. Performance compensation commitment also provides evidence to test whether executives have confidences in future performance, so as to analyze the opportunistic motivations of executives from selling shares. In terms of the asymmetric information theory, principal agent theory, signal theory and so on, this paper examines the merger and acquisitions of China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018, and discusses the impacts of performance compensation commitment through normative analysis and empirical analysis in order to test its effects on investor protection. The following conclusions are obtained: Firstly, from the perspective of the market reaction obtained by the acquiring company, the short-term market reaction for those providing performance compensation commitment is higher than that of the deals without performance compensation commitment. Performance compensation commitment delivers clear profit forecast information to the market about the future operation of the target company, which reduces information asymmetry of both parties and the information collection costs of investors. Combined with the specific terms of the performance compensation commitment agreement, this paper finds that the two-way performance compensation commitment does not bring significant abnormal returns, but the market reaction is more positive under the annual compensation method and including stock compensation method. Secondly, from the premium obtained by the target company, performance compensation commitment agreement increases the valuation of the target company, and the acquirer needs to pay a higher M&A premium. China’s listed companies are keen on diversified M&A. Further analysis finds that diversified M&A positively moderates the relationship between performance compensation commitment and premium after differentiating the types of M&A. Under diversified M&A, the premium rate is higher for those providing performance compensation commitment. Combined with the specific terms of the performance compensation commitment agreement, the premium rate of the two-way performance compensation method is higher, and there is no significant difference whether in the annual compensation method or including stock compensation method. Thirdly, the analysis shows that the performance and the value of the listed company decline obviously right after the compensation period, indicating that the acquirer and the target company have the motivation to maintain a high performance in order to realize the performance compensation commitment. However, once the compensation period is over, the performance immediately declines, showing obvious opportunism. From the perspective of earnings management motivations of acquiring companies, those who signing the agreements make more upward earnings managements after the deals. Obviously, in the M&A activities with performance compensation commitments, managers of the acquirer companies have the motivations and abilities to carry out earnings managements in order to maintain the high stock prices and market value managements, as well as relieve the performance pressure and investment decision-making pressure, especially under the condition that they have more internal information. Earnings managements can avoid the performance decline of consolidated statements as much as possible, so as to relieve the pressure and punishment from shareholders due to their bad investment decisions, which confirms that performance compensation commitment agreements have proved to be the new manner for acquirers’ earnings managements. Further, this paper discusses the M&A events that have the performance compensation commitments and finds that the better actual completions and the higher proportions of completions are positively correlated with acquirers’ earnings managements, which reflect that in the process of realizing the promised performance of the target companies, the acquirers are induced to conduct earnings managements of the consolidated statements, and there are opportunistic behaviors. In addition, the annual compensation method needs to assess the forecast of the target company every year, which is more difficult to achieve than the accumulative one-time compensation method, and the positive correlation with earnings management is more obvious. Whether the two-way performance compensation method or including stock compensation method has no significant differences in earnings management. Fourthly, the executives of the acquirers who sign the performance compensation commitment carry out more selling arbitrages, indicating that the performance compensation commitment becomes a tool for executives to seek personal gains and they can sell stocks to make profits by taking advantage of “good” news when the price is high. It also suggests that executives believe the stock is more overvalued and do not show confidences in the companies’ future. What the capital market cares most is the realization of the earnings forecast of the target company in the performance compensation commitment period. Further, this paper discusses the M&A events that have the performance compensation commitments and finds that the better actual completions can convey the signal that the operation condition is satisfactory, which is beneficial to enhance the confidences of the acquirers’ managers and reduce the possibility of reducing their holdings. However, the specific terms of performance compensation commitments have no significant differences on executives’ stock reductions, which reflects that one of the most important factors affecting executives’ reductions is the stock price of the listed companies after M&A. The completions of the earnings forecasts of the target companies directly affect the M&A performance and the stock price of the acquirers, which is inseparable. The above research conclusions show that the performance compensation commitment of M&A promises performance, but it does not promise confidences and value to investors, and the final M&A performance is not satisfactory. The acquirers’ managers have obvious opportunistic motivations, which seriously damage the interests of small and medium-sized investors. Compared to previous studies, the possible marginal contributions and research significances of this paper lie in the following three aspects: Firstly, this paper systematically analyzes the impacts of China’s unique performance compensation commitment agreement on resource allocation efficiency through four aspects, which provides a new research perspective to test the effects of investor protection. It not only complements the remaining research space in the short-term economic consequences of performance compensation commitment, but also finds the negative impacts of the agreement on long-term M&A performance based on the performance compensation commitment period. Combined with the opportunistic motivations of earnings managements and executives’ reductions, this paper expands the research on the long-term economic consequences of performance compensation commitment, which will be helpful to understand the performance compensation commitment from a more complete time dimension, and confirm the shortcomings of this emerging M&A contract in protecting the interests of investors. Secondly, although the performance compensation commitment agreement is quite different from Earnout agreement in foreign capital market in many aspects, as the unique merger and acquisition contract in China, domestic researches rarely discuss the different impacts of specific terms and contents of performance compensation commitment agreement. The study unfolds the “black box” of the operation of this mechanism by manually collecting the data that whether the clause is the two-way compensation, annual compensation or including stock compensation, and this will help us comprehend the different influences brought by these clauses, making it easier to understand the contents of this contract. Thirdly, most of the existing studies are focus on the impacts of the completion date of M&A, they rarely discussed the impacts of performance compensation commitment period and the subsequent impacts after the period, so the research about the key performance compensation commitment period is urgently needed. To discuss the actual effects of performance compensation commitment agreement, the compensation commitment period should be included in the research scope. As the rational economic men, the acquirers and their managers take different action strategies according to the actual completions of the targets’ future earnings forecasts. Combined with the performance decline after the end of the compensation period, this paper finds the opportunistic motivations during the compensation period by manually collecting the performance realization data, and provides a new empirical research perspective and empirical evidence for the research on earnings management motivations and executive reductions in China’s capital market. The conclusions have important theoretical inspirations and practical significances to restrain the agency problems of M&A activities and improve the performance compensation commitment mechanisms.
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