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论文编号：	13082
作者编号：	2120202817
上传时间：	2022/6/6 16:04:55
中文题目：	董事网络中心位置对企业风险承担的影响研究
英文题目：	A study of the impact of director network location on corporate risk assumption
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	董事网络中心位置；风险承担；分析师跟踪；机构投资者持股
英文关键字：	central location of the director network；risk taking；analyst tracking； institutional investor shareholding
中文摘要：	摘要 风险承担可以追溯到最早期的企业家冒险精神上，而企业管理者们在做出决策时对风险性投资项目的倾向，也在相当程度上体现了其风险承担意愿。它除了受管理层特征、企业内部激励措施、国内外市场环境、股东特性等多种因素的影响外，也会受公司资源获取能力的约束。当前中国的市场机制和法律法规等多种正式制度都尚不健全，公司也无法仅仅通过正式制度获取足够的资源支持，所以由董事会成员兼任而建立的董事网络，作为一种非正式管理制度安排扮演着信息传输与资源交流的重要角色。因此本文对董事网络中心位置对企业风险承担的影响进行了研究。但这里存在的一个潜在问题是董事是否愿意利用自身资源——董事网络去为公司建设服务。因此本文考虑了分析师跟踪以及机构投资者持股对调动董事积极性，充分利用网络优势进行信息资源搜集，进而促进企业风险承担的调节作用。后续进一步探究融资约束、企业性质以及竞争地位差异的影响。 论文选择了二零一零年至二零一七年之间的沪深 A 股非金融类公司为样本。研究结论如下：（1）董事网络中心位置与企业风险承担之间存在显著倒 U 型关 系。（2）分析师跟踪的存在会正向调节董事网络中心位置和企业风险承担的关联。（3）机构投资者持有比率越高，公司对利用高风险项目的投入获取远期利 润的倾向性也就越强。（4）董事网络中心位置能够通过缓解融资约束问题，改 变企业进行风险承担的意愿和水平。（5）在政治资源匮乏和代理问题相较轻微的背景下，非国有企业利用董事网络资源进行风险投资的概率更高。（6）随着董事网络中心位置的优化，高竞争地位企业会更愿意显著调整自身的风险承担水平来满足其资源叠加下的利益收割或是更高位置上的声誉维护。本文的研究对于 我国上市公司完善董事会结构、改善风险承担水平具有一定的借鉴作用。上市公司应充分重视董事网络中心位置带来的信息与资源为企业对风险项目的投资提供支持。
英文摘要：	Abstract Risk-taking can be traced back to the earliest entrepreneurial adventurism, and the propensity of business managers to venture-based investment projects when making decisions also reflects their willingness to take risks to a considerable extent.In addition to being affected by a variety of factors such as management characteristics, internal incentives, domestic and foreign market environment, and shareholder characteristics, it will also be constrained by the company's ability to obtain resources. At present, China's market mechanism, laws and regulations and other formal systems are not yet perfect, and the company cannot obtain sufficient resource support through the formal system alone, so the network of directors established by the members of the board of directors plays an important role in information transmission and resource exchange as an informal management system arrangement. Therefore, this paper examines the impact of the central location of the director network on the risk assumption of enterprises. But a potential question here is whether directors are willing to use their resources, the network of directors, to serve the construction of the company. Therefore, this paper considers the role of analyst tracking and institutional investor shareholding in mobilizing the enthusiasm of directors, making full use of network advantages to collect information resources, and then promoting the regulatory role of corporate risk assumption. This is followed by a further exploration of the impact of financing constraints, the nature of firms, and differences in competitive status. The paper selects Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial companies between 2010 and 2017 as the following conclusions: (1) There is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between the central position of the director network and the risk assumption of enterprises. (2) The presence of analyst tracking positively adjusts the correlation between the central position of the director network and the risk assumption of the enterprise. (3) The higher the institutional investor holding ratio, the stronger the company's tendency to use high-risk project investment to obtain forward profits. (4) The central location of the director network can change the willingness and level of risk-taking of enterprises by alleviating financing constraints. (5) In the context of the lack of political resources and the relatively mild problem of agency, the probability of non-state-owned enterprises using the resources of the director network to make venture capital investment is higher. (6) With the optimization of the central position of the director network, enterprises with high competitive position will be more willing to significantly adjust their risk-bearing level to meet the harvesting of benefits under the superposition of their resources or the maintenance of reputation in a higher position. The research in this paper has a certain reference effect on improving the board structure and improving the level of risk bearing of listed companies in China. Listed companies should pay full attention to the information and resources brought by the central location of the director network to support enterprises' investment in risky projects.
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