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论文编号：	13045
作者编号：	1120180934
上传时间：	2022/3/9 22:27:38
中文题目：	非国有股东董事会权力与国企创新研究
英文题目：	Research on Board Power of Non-State Shareholders and Innovation of State-owned Enterprises
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	混合所有制改革；董事会权力；超额委派董事；非国有董事行业背景；国企创新
英文关键字：	mixed ownership reform; board of directors'' power; over-appointed directors; industry background of non-state directors; SOE innovation
中文摘要：	摘 要 2021年3月5日在第十三届全国人民代表大会第四次会议上，李克强总理在政府报告中明确提出了2021年主要目标任务：“要加快推进国资国企改革建设，做强做优做大国有资本和国有企业”，并指出要“依靠创新推动实体经济高质量发展”、“运用市场化机制激励企业创新”，再次阐明了国有企业混合所有制改革的方向和必要性。自2013年中共十八届三中全会以来，不同所有制资本交叉持股、相互融合成为发展混合所有制经济的重要实现方式，旨在通过不同资本间的深度融合，取长补短、相互促进、共同发展来加速社会主义市场化运行机制的灵活转型，激发国有企业的创新活力，最终实现混合所有制改革“提高竞争力”和“全球竞争力”的目标。尽管部分国有企业通过引入非国有资本取得了一定成效，但是，经营性国有资本基于国家行政权力的制度逻辑，和非国有资本的财产权利逻辑之间仍存在冲突。一方面，在国有企业天然的行政垄断和政府干预下，国有企业所有者缺失、内部人控制、一股独大等社会问题依然严重，导致部分国企出现“混”而不“改”的现象；另一方面，非国有资本参股国企也面临着重重的隐形政治阻碍，且存在对入股国企后难以拥有实质话语权的担忧，这也导致非国有股东参与国企混改的积极性不高。对此，在国资委提出的“尽可能使非公有资本派出董事”的原则指导要求下，赋予非国有股东直接参与国企管理和重大决策的实质性权利，以充分调动非国有股东参与国企混改的积极性，是实现不同所有制资源相互融合，进而提高国有企业创新活力改革目标的重要突破口，对推进混合所有制经济发展至关重要。 董事会作为企业管理的核心组织，是决定企业经营投资策略和重要事物的最高决策机构，董事通过参与董事会了解到更多内部信息，并享有对重大决策与经营管理的实质控制权。这意味着，非国有股东是否取得董事会席位决定了非国有股东在国企中的实际话语权，也是混改国企引入非国有资本能否真正激发国企创新活力的关键。本文探讨了非国有股东董事会权力与国企创新之间的影响关系，并从监督治理和信息传递视角深入解析了非国有股东促进国企创新的作用路径和内在机理，进一步分析了不同市场化水平对二者关系的调节作用。以期对当下混合所有制改革发展现状,提供富有借鉴意义的实证依据和政策措施意见,为实现国有企业通过混合所有制改革增强综合竞争力、释放创新活力的改革发展目标,提供重要理论参考。具体而言，本文基于委托代理理论、资源依赖理论和分权控制理论，以我国2008-2019年竞争性国有上市公司为研究样本，首先，在厘清非国有股东董事会权力的来源的基础上，考察了非国有股东委派董事与国企创新的关系；其次，根据非国有股东董事会权力和股权分配的非对等现象,引入“超额委派董事”这一概念,深入考察了非国有股东超额委派董事和国企创新之间的相互影响关系；最后，基于资源依赖理论和信息加工决策理论，本文探索了非国有董事所在企业的行业背景多元化对国企创新的影响关系。通过实证检验以及充分的稳健性检验后，本文得出以下研究结论。 第一，本文发现混改国企中存在非国有董事、并且非国有董事占比越高，对国企创新的促进作用越显著；并且，当国企董事会中存在超额的非国有性质董事、且超额董事占比愈高,对混合所有制国企创新的正向促进作用就越明显；最后，混改国企中非国有董事所属企业的行业背景不同于混改国企行业背景，以及非国有董事所属企业的行业背景不同于混改国企行业背景的行业数量越多时，越有利于提高企业的资源利用效率和创新决策质量，最终显著促进国企创新。 第二，基于监督治理和信息传递视角，本文深入分析了非国有股东董事会权力影响国企创新的机制路径。研究发现，一方面，非国有股东拥有董事会权力，可以强化其监督治理能效，降低国有企业两类代理成本，缓解由此导致的国企创新效率低下、研发投资不足的现状，提高国有企业重大创新决策的效率和质量，最终促进国企创新发展。另一方面，非国有股东拥有董事会权力还能通过信息传递机制为国有企业提供更多灵活高效的管理理念、具有前瞻性的商业投资信息、先进的技术知识储备等增量信息以提高国企创新。本文基于国有企业的行业集中度以及市场地位来刻画国有企业对信息的需求程度以及获取信息的增量效果，发现当处于竞争性质的行业以及市场地位较低时，国有企业更有动力期望通过引入非国有董事吸收其独特的优质信息资源来提升自身的竞争力，最终促进创新发展。 第三，从市场化水平角度分析了其对非国有股东董事会权力促进国企创新的调节效应。研究发现，法治环境越弱、政府与市场关系越紧密以及非国有经济发展水平越高，非国有股东董事会权力对国有企业创新的正向促进作用越显著，即非国有董事的监督治理和增量信息资源传递能够更加显著地激发国企的创新活力。 根据以上研究结论，本文可能产生的边际贡献主要表现在以下几个方面： 第一，弥补了从股权结构层面探究国企混改影响创新的局限。现有研究主要基于非国有股东参股或异质股东间股权混合度的视角探索国企混改与创新的影响关系（李文贵和余明桂，2015；朱磊等，2019），而本文基于企业核心决策机构——董事会视角，考察了混改对国企创新的影响，为我国国企混改从“混股权”到“改机制”的实质性转变提供了实证证据，丰富了国企混改的研究内容和理论体系。 第二，基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论解释了董事会权力的来源。以往研究国企混改主要基于委托代理理论探讨异质股东间的监督制衡关系，本文则基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论，发现非国有股东董事会权力不仅来源于股东大会授权，还来源于非国有资源对国有资源的优势互补，说明异质股东间存在对立与统一的关系，并通过董事会正向促进国企创新，拓展了董事会权力来源的理论认知视角，丰富了异质股东关系研究的理论基础。 第三，本文从非国有董事所属企业的行业背景出发，进一步印证了非国有股东掌握国企董事会职权,代表了其能够向企业投入相对重要的、较专业的行业信息资源优势，有利于实现异质股东间不同专业知识、不同思维模式、不同市场信息资源的耦合，为国有企业对非国有资本的选择偏好提供了基于行业背景的实证证据。 第四，以往关于混改国企治理结构与经济后果的研究主要停留于二者的关系探讨，缺乏对其作用机制的深入剖析，本文分别从监督治理与信息传递两个视角考察了非国有股东董事会权力对国企创新的作用路径，明晰了二者间的影响机理，有助于为国企混改实践提供更具操作性的参考依据。
英文摘要：	Abstract On March 5, 2021 at the fourth meeting of the 13th National People's Congress, Premier Li Keqiang clearly put forward the main objectives and tasks for 2021 in the government report: "to accelerate the reform and construction of state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises, to strengthen and expand state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises", and pointed out the need to " Rely on innovation to promote the high-quality development of the real economy" and "use market-based mechanisms to stimulate enterprise innovation", which once again clarifies the direction and necessity of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013, cross-shareholding and mutual integration of capital of different ownership systems has become an important way to develop mixed ownership economy, aiming at accelerating the flexible transformation of socialist market-oriented operation mechanism and stimulating the innovative vitality of state-owned enterprises through the deep integration of different capital, complementing each other's strengths, promoting each other and developing together, and finally realizing the mixed ownership reform The goal of "improving competitiveness" and "global competitiveness". Although some SOEs have achieved some success by introducing non-state capital, there is still a conflict between the institutional logic of operating state-owned capital based on the administrative power of the state and the logic of property rights of non-state capital. On the one hand, due to the natural administrative monopoly and government intervention of SOEs, social problems such as lack of owners, insider control, and dominance of one share in SOEs are still serious, leading to the phenomenon of "mixing" but not "reforming" some SOEs; on the other hand, the participation of non-state capital in SOEs also faces heavy invisible political obstacles, and there are concerns that it is difficult to have a substantial voice in SOEs after taking shares, which also leads to the low enthusiasm of non-state shareholders to participate in the mixed reform of SOEs. In this regard, under the guiding principle of "sending directors from non-public capital as far as possible" proposed by SASAC, giving non-state shareholders the substantive right to directly participate in the management and major decision-making of SOEs, so as to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of non-state shareholders to participate in the mixed reform of SOEs, is an important breakthrough to realize the mutual integration of resources of different ownership systems and thus improve the innovative vitality of SOEs, and it is crucial to promote the development of mixed ownership economy. The board of directors, as the core organization of enterprise management, is the highest decision-making body for deciding the business and investment strategies and important matters of the enterprise. Directors learn more internal information through participation in the board of directors and enjoy substantial control over major decisions and business management. This means that whether or not a non-state shareholder obtains a seat on the board determines the actual voice of the non-state shareholder in the SOE and is the key to whether the introduction of non-state capital into a hybrid SOE can truly stimulate the innovative vitality of the SOE. This paper explores the influential relationship between the power of non-state shareholders' board of directors and SOEs' innovation, and analyzes in depth the paths and inner mechanisms of non-state shareholders' role in promoting SOEs' innovation from the perspective of supervisory governance and information transmission, and further analyzes the moderating effect of different levels of marketization on the relationship between the two. This paper provides empirical evidence and policy measures for the current development of mixed ownership reform, and provides important theoretical references for realizing the reform and development goal of SOEs to enhance their comprehensive competitiveness and release their innovation energy through mixed ownership reform. Specifically, based on the principal-agent theory, resource dependence theory and decentralized control theory, this paper takes competitive state-owned listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019 as the research sample, and firstly, on the basis of clarifying the sources of power of the board of directors of non-state shareholders, examines the relationship between the appointed directors of non-state shareholders and the innovation of state-owned enterprises; secondly, based on the non-reciprocal phenomenon of power and equity distribution of the board of directors of non-state shareholders, Based on the concept of "over-appointed directors", we investigate the relationship between over-appointed directors and innovation in SOEs; finally, based on the resource dependence theory and information processing decision theory, we explore the relationship between the diversified industry background of non-state directors and innovation in SOEs. After the empirical tests and sufficient robustness tests, this paper draws the following research conclusions. First, this paper finds that the presence of non-state directors in mixed SOEs and the higher the proportion of non-state directors, the more significant the promotion effect on SOE innovation; moreover, when there are excess non-state directors in the board of directors of SOEs and the higher the proportion of excess directors, the more significant the positive promotion effect on innovation in mixed SOEs; finally, the industry background of non-state directors in mixed SOEs is different from that of mixed SOEs, the higher the number of industries in which the industry background of non-state directors is different from that of the mixed-ownership SOEs, the more it is conducive to improving the efficiency of resource utilization and the quality of innovation decision making, it significantly promotes SOE innovation. Second, based on the supervisory governance and information transmission perspectives, this paper analyzes in depth the mechanism paths through which the power of non-state shareholder boards affects SOEs' innovation. It is found that, on the one hand, non-state shareholders with board power can strengthen their supervisory and governance energy efficiency, reduce the two types of agency costs of SOEs, alleviate the resulting inefficiency of SOE innovation and insufficient investment in R&D, improve the efficiency and quality of SOEs' major innovation decisions, and ultimately promote SOE innovation development. On the other hand, non-state shareholders with board power can also provide SOEs with more incremental information such as flexible and efficient management concepts, forward-looking business investment information, and advanced technological knowledge base to enhance SOE innovation through the information transfer mechanism. Based on the industry concentration and market position of SOEs to portray the degree of SOEs' demand for information and the incremental effect of access to information, this paper finds that when in a competitive industry and with a low market position, SOEs are more motivated to expect the introduction of non-state directors to absorb their unique and high-quality information resources to enhance their competitiveness and ultimately promote innovation development. Third, the moderating effect of the level of marketization on the power of non-state shareholder boards to promote innovation in SOEs is analyzed from the perspective of its level of marketization. It is found that the weaker the rule of law environment, the closer the government-market relationship, and the higher the level of non-state economic development, the more significant the positive promotion effect of non-state shareholder board power on SOEs' innovation, i.e., the supervisory governance and incremental information resource transfer by non-state directors can more significantly stimulate SOEs' innovation dynamics. Based on the above findings, the possible marginal contributions of this paper are mainly in the following aspects. First, it bridges the limitation of exploring the impact of SOEs' hybrid reform on innovation at the level of equity structure. Existing studies mainly explore the relationship between SOEs' hybrid reform and innovation based on the perspective of non-state shareholders' equity participation or equity mix among heterogeneous shareholders (Li, Wengui, and Yu, Minggui, 2015; Zhu, Lei, et al., 2019), while this paper examines the impact of hybrid reform on SOEs' innovation based on the perspective of the board of directors, the core decision-making body of the enterprise. This paper provides empirical evidence for the substantive transformation of SOE hybrid reform from "mixing equity" to "changing mechanism", and enriches the research content and theoretical system of SOE hybrid reform. Second, it explains the source of board power based on the principal-agent theory and resource dependence theory. While the previous studies on SOEs' hybrid reform were mainly based on the principal-agent theory to explore the supervision and check relationship among heterogeneous shareholders, this paper, based on the principal-agent theory and resource dependence theory, finds that the power of the board of directors of non-state shareholders not only comes from the authorization of the general meeting of shareholders, but also from the advantageous complementation of non-state resources to state resources, indicating that there is a relationship of opposition and unity among heterogeneous shareholders, and positively promotes SOEs' innovation through the board of directors. It expands the theoretical cognitive perspective on the sources of board power and enriches the theoretical basis for the study of heterogeneous shareholder relations. Third, this paper further confirms that non-state shareholders' control over the board of directors of SOEs represents their ability to invest relatively important and specialized industry information resources into the enterprises, which is conducive to the coupling of different expertise, different modes of thinking and different market information resources among heterogeneous shareholders, and provides empirical evidence based on industry background for SOEs' preference for non-state capital. Fourth, previous studies on the governance structure and economic consequences of hybrid SOEs mainly focus on the relationship between the two, lacking in-depth analysis of their mechanisms of action. This paper examines the paths of non-state shareholders' board power on SOE innovation from the perspectives of supervisory governance and information transmission, respectively, and clarifies the mechanisms of influence between the two, which helps provide a more operational reference for SOE hybrid reform practice.
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