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论文编号：	1289
作者编号：	2120071945
上传时间：	2009/6/15 21:55:23
中文题目：	我国上市公司高管报酬与盈余管理
英文题目：	The Study on the Relationship
指导老师：	谷卫
中文关键字：	高管报酬;盈余管理;控制权博弈分
英文关键字：	Top Manager Compensation;Earni
中文摘要：	由于投资者与管理者之间的委托代理关系，为激励管理者努力工作，现代企业普遍实行以会计盈余为基础的管理者薪酬激励计划，这一定程度上导致了高管人为地提高会计盈余以增加其报酬的盈余管理行为。近年来的研究还发现，高管掌握了一定的公司控制权，使得他们能够影响甚至决定自己的薪酬水平，这势必对既定薪酬契约下的盈余管理这种间接获利行为产生影响，进一步导致激励机制的弱化。 本文选取2007年我国A股上市公司数据，考察了高管报酬与盈余管理之间的相关关系，以及基于博弈分析视角下的公司控制权对这种关系的影响。研究发现我国上市公司一定程度上存在着公司高管为增加其报酬而进行盈余管理的现象；研究进一步发现高管控制权越强，高管报酬与盈余管理之间的关系越弱，这表明了随着高管控制权的增强，公司高管更倾向于直接调整报酬契约来提高其薪酬水平，反而相对减弱了报酬动机的盈余管理行为。研究还表明大股东控制可能导致更严重的代理问题。 通过对研究结论的深入分析，结合我国的实际情况，本文最后提出了相关建议：一方面应大力完善我国会计准则，加强对上市公司盈余管理的监管，强化上市公司内部监督机制，优化上市公司股权结构；另一方面，应建立有效的民事诉讼制度，降低股东监督成本，加大对公司高管和控股股东违规行为的惩罚力度，保护股东特别是中小股东的合法权益。
英文摘要：	Owing to the principal-agent relationship between investors and managers, in order to motivate managers to work hard, modern enterprises are widespread implementing accounting earnings-based incentive pay plans, to some extent leading man-made increase in accounting earnings to improve the managers’compensation. In recent years, some study also found that company executives have a certain degree of control, making them be able to influence and even determine their own pay levels. This inevitably have an impact on earnings management behavior of managers. This paper select 2007 A-share listed company data, study the relationship between top managers compensation and earnings management, and study the impact of control base on game analysis on this relationship. The study find that the listed companies in China, to some extent, exit the phenomenon that the company executives manage earnings to increase the level of their compensation, and the more the manager’s power, the lower the level of earning management. This shows that with enhancement of executive control, company executives more inclined to directly adjust the contract to increase the level of their remuneration. On the contrary, this relatively weakens earning management on remuneration. The study also finds that companies with large shareholders have more serious agency problem. By analyzing research findings, combining with the actual situation in China, the paper put forward relevant recommendations. On the one hand, our country should make the accounting guidelines more perfect, strengthen the supervision of earnings management, and should improve the internal supervision system of listed companies; On the other hand, our country should lower the cost of shareholder supervision, punish severely irregularities of the company's executives and controlling shareholders, protect shareholders’, especially small and medium-sized shareholders’ legitimate rights and interests.
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