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论文编号：	1269
作者编号：	2120071949
上传时间：	2009/6/16 9:15:04
中文题目：	终级控制人性质、债务融资方式与
英文题目：	Ultimate controlling sharehold
指导老师：	梅丹
中文关键字：	终极控制人 债务融资方式 投资支
英文关键字：	Ultimate controlling sharehold
中文摘要：	20世纪90年代以来我国固定资产投资过快的增长速度和国有企业过高的负债水平成为经济领域和学术界关注的热点。投资领域研究关注的热点是宏观投资状况和投资效率，融资领域研究关注的热点是负债水平的影响因素和负债水平与企业收益的关系。这些研究取得了很多有价值的结论，这对于优化我国企业融资结构，提高企业投资效率有着重要的意义。 但是，上述研究大多基于债务融资刚性约束假设，即债务融资可以对企业的投资支出产生刚性约束，但是在中国当前的制度背景下，政府干预等因素会影响债务融资约束的刚性，而不同债务融资方式的约束刚性也因此表现各异。 本文从债务融资的类型着手，分析不同债务融资工具对企业投资支出行为的影响，以及这种影响是否会因为终极控制人的不同而发生变化。实证研究发现：从终极控制人产权性质来看，长期银行借款对上市公司的投资行为并未起到相机治理作用，对国有上市公司更是如此，这与银行的预算软约束有关；公司债券、短期银行借款和商业信用均与上市公司的投资支出呈负相关关系，但敏感系数各异。从终极控制人的行政属性来看，相对于中央控股上市公司，地方控股公司中的短期银行借款和商业信用对公司投资支出的制约作用更弱；而长期银行借款，在中央控股和地方控股上市公司中均与投资支出呈正相关关系，在地方控股公司中对投资支出的促进作用更强。 实证结果表明，我国债权约束机制并没有真正建立，其在一定程度上反而导致了企业的过度投资。在现实中，我们应硬化银行和国有企业之间的信用契约关系，真正发挥银行借款对于企业投资的刚性约束；应大力发展企业债券市场，以及完善社会信用体系，加强对企业信用评级的建设，改善企业信用环境。
英文摘要：	Since the 1990s, many economic scholars have paid much attention to the excessive growth of fixed asset investment and the high level of liability. It is the hot topic on investment that how about the efficiency and the macroeconomic investment. And as for financing, the most concerned issue is what influences the liability level and the relation between liability level and enterprise income. There are numerous valuable conclusions deduced from the researches. It is significantly meaningful to optimize the financing structure of corporations and improve the investment efficiency. However, most of the researches above are based on the assumption that debt financing can restrain the investment expenditure. However there are some factors influencing the rigidity of debt financing on the background of our country. And the restriction rigidity of different debt financing matters behaves different. This dissertation intends to analyze how different debt financing tool influent the capital expenditure. It simultaneously will prove whether the influences may make change because of different ultimate controlling shareholder. We find that as for the property identity of ultimate controlling shareholders, long-term loans do not constrain the investment expenditure especially in the state-owned company, which is related with banks’ soft-budget；Enterprise bonds, short-term loans and business credit are all negatively related with investment expenditure. But the sensitivity coefficient is of difference. As for the administration identity of ultimate controlling shareholders, comprised with companies owned by central government, short-term loans and business credit in companies owned by local government constrain investment expenditures more weakly; but for long-term loans, it behaves positively related with investment expenditures in both companies owned by central government and owned by local government, which is stronger in companies owned by local government. Conclusions show that the leverage constraint mechanism in China is not really built. It caused excess investment to some extent. Consequently, in practice, we should strengthen the credit contract relationship between banks and companies to exert the hard-budget effect of bank loans; Meanwhile, the government need make great efforts on the development of firm’s bond market; Finally, the society credit system should be improved and the construction of credit evaluation be strengthened to improve the credit environment.
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