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论文编号：	12673
作者编号：	2120192847
上传时间：	2021/6/20 13:52:32
中文题目：	内部控制与股价泡沫的关系及其作用机理 ——基于中国主板上市公司的检验
英文题目：	The Relationship between Internal Control and Stock Price Bubbles and Its Mechanism ——The Test of Listed Companies on the Main Board of China
指导老师：	覃家琦
中文关键字：	股价泡沫、内部控制质量、盈余管理、剩余收益模型、线性回归分析
英文关键字：	Stock price bubbles, internal control quality, earnings management, residual income model, linear regression analysis
中文摘要：	本文选取 2004 年至 2019 年中国 A 股上市公司的样本数据，针对我国股票市场的泡沫问题及其与上市公司内部控制之间关系进行了探究。首先，本文对股价泡沫的定义、分类、形成机制等相关文献进行了回顾，并重点阐述了内部控制于股票价格的关系及其影响机制；然后，本文提出内部控制质量对股价泡沫程度可能产生负向影响且盈余管理程度作为传导途径的研究假设，并针对两条假设，设计多元回归模型以及中介效应检验模型。接着，在实证检验部分，本文利用剩余收益模型计算出上市公司在不同期间内的股价泡沫程度，分析了我国证券市场发展过程中的整体股价高估情况，并选用迪博内部控制数据作为内控质量的衡量指标，考察了内部控制质量与股价泡沫的关系，并从管理层出于自身利益考量进行盈余管理信息操纵的视角，采用盈余激进度和盈余平滑度为中介变量，深入分析了内部控制影响股价泡沫的作用机理。 通过理论分析和实证研究，本文发现高质量的内部控制可以显著地抑制股票价格的泡沫程度，其作用路径是通过管理层的盈余管理行为。有效的内部控制可以缓解管理层进行盈余激进处理和盈余平滑处理的行为，很大程度上增强公司披露信息的有效性和真实性，改善投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称程度，从而降低股票价格的泡沫程度。由本文的研究发现可知，管理层的盈余信息处理行为，即英语激进行为和盈余平滑行为很容易导致二级市场的信息不对称，从而导致股价泡沫。有效的内部控制制度能够抑制管理层的盈余管理行为，有利于提升上市公司信息披露的质量，降低管理层操纵盈余信息的程度，有助于降低股价泡沫，促使股票合理估值。
英文摘要：	This paper selects sample data of China's A share listed companies from 2004 to 2019, and explores the relationship between bubbles in China's stock market and internal control of listed companies. First of all, this paper reviews the definition, classification, formation mechanism and other related literature of stock bubbles, and focuses on the relationship between internal control and stock prices and its influencing mechanism. Then, this paper proposes the hypothesis that internal control quality may have a negative impact on stock price bubble level, and the degree of earnings management as a research hypothesis of transmission channels, and designs two multivariate hypotheses. Regression model and mediating effect test model. Then, in the empirical test part, we use the residual income model to calculate the share price bubbles of Listed Companies in different periods, analyze the overall stock price overestimation in the development of China's securities market, and use the data of internal control data as the internal control quality index to examine the relationship between the quality of internal control and stock price bubbles, and from the management itself. From the perspective of earnings management information manipulation, we use earnings surplus and smoothness of earnings as mediator variables to deeply analyze the mechanism of internal control affecting stock price bubbles. Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, we find that high quality internal control can significantly inhibit the bubble level of stock prices, and the path of action is through the management of earnings management. Effective internal control can mitigate the behavior of earnings management and earnings smoothing by management, which greatly enhances the effectiveness and authenticity of information disclosure, and improves the degree of information asymmetry between investors and management, thereby reducing the bubble level of stock prices. From the research findings, we can see that management earnings information processing behavior, that is, English aggressive behavior and earnings smoothing behavior, caneasily lead to asymmetric information in the two level market, resulting in stock price bubbles. Effective internal control system can inhibit the earnings management behavior of management, improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, reduce the degree of information manipulation by managers, and help to reduce stock price bubbles and promote rational valuation of stocks.
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