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论文编号：	12670
作者编号：	1120170902
上传时间：	2021/6/19 12:23:55
中文题目：	收益分配政策与企业创新研究 ——基于国有企业治理逻辑演变视角
英文题目：	Research on Income Distribution Policy and Enterprise Innovation ——Based on the Evolution of State-owned Enterprise Governance Logic
指导老师：	武立东
中文关键字：	收益分配政策；治理逻辑；企业创新；中央企业
英文关键字：	Income Distribution Policy；Governance Logic；Enterprise Innovation；Central Enterprise
中文摘要：	国有企业改革要实现主导逻辑从政府逻辑向市场逻辑演变，进而实现创新驱动的可持续增长。在这个演变过程中，面临诸多理论和现实问题，那么什么样的治理机制能够支持市场逻辑的实现而促进企业创新？本文将通过2007年财政部、国资委制定的《中央企业国有资本收益收取管理暂行办法》（简称收益分配政策），研究其如何影响企业创新，以收益分配政策为切入点，试图揭示制度变革、治理逻辑及国有企业改革之间的内在机制。 已有研究主要探讨了收益分配政策如何影响企业过度投资、在职消费、代理成本及盈余管理等短期行为，或是收益分配政策与企业利润、社会福利等组织和社会结果的关系效应，而没有涉及到收益分配政策与公司长期行为之间的关系，而企业收益分配政策作为央企一项重要的公司治理机制，必然会对公司行为产生影响。由此，本文需要检验收益分配政策与企业长期行为如创新之间的关系，以进一步揭示该政策背后的内在逻辑及影响企业的内在机理。同时，已有文献主要从个体特征、群体特征、股权结构设计及宏观环境等角度研究企业创新的影响因素，但没有文献探讨宏观收益分配政策到企业微观行为的影响路径，本文基于收益分配政策这一研究对象，以“宏观政策-企业微观行为”为研究主线，从“主导逻辑-组织-行动者”三个层面来揭示制度变革对企业创新的影响及如何实现主导逻辑的变化，进而解析国有企业治理复杂性与特殊性的产生根源，并基于制度理论、代理理论、信号理论等多种经典理论，探讨宏观政策的实施引发的企业治理逻辑演变机理，最终提出相应的治理策略及政策实施的一系列影响。 本文旨在分析收益分配政策改革对企业创新行为的影响。尽管国有企业一直是创新的重要主体，然而国有企业特有的政府逻辑可能会引发诸多方面的创新障碍：其一，经营目标行政化严重；其二，其管理层风险承担意愿不足。其三，外部监督机制缺失。如何改变这种局面，促进国企进一步提高创新产出呢？本文指出，收益分配政策的改革能够有效缓解这一政府逻辑下面临的创新障碍，促进国有企业治理逻辑的演变（由政府逻辑向市场逻辑演进）。 同时，董事会胜任力提高了市场逻辑的可获取性和可利用性，使得董事会的注意力焦点集中在企业创新上，进而加强了收益分配政策与企业创新之间的关系。高管技术能力提高了市场逻辑的可利用性和激活能力，使得高管更好地将可获取的资源实际运用于企业实践中而促进收益分配政策与企业创新之间的正向关系。监事会独立性能够提高市场逻辑的激活能力，有助于将可获取和可利用的资源在企业实践中体现出来，进而加强了收益分配政策与企业创新之间的关系。不仅如此，本文还从分析师关注度、外部环境丰富度及外部审计质量等合法性维度探讨了其如何影响收益分配政策与企业创新之间的关系。 随后，本文以收益分配政策为切入点，利用该政策实施的前后三年样本，采用双重差分的实证研究方法评估了收益分配政策的实施对企业创新的作用。研究结果发现，相对于不受该项政策影响的民营企业来说，该政策的实施显著提升了央企的创新水平。本文在解决DID模型适用性、测量误差问题、遗漏变量问题、反向因果问题、其他动机排除等多类稳健性检验后，结果保持一致。由此，结果表明，收益分配政策确实促进了企业创新水平。总的来说，本文的结论主要如下：①相对于不受收益分配政策影响的民营企业来说，中央企业的创新水平在收益分配政策实施后显著提高。②除了外部审计质量，支持注意力焦点改变的组织特征（包括董事会胜任力、高管技术能力及监事会独立性）和合法性压力（包括分析师关注度与环境丰富度）都强化了收益分配政策与企业创新之间的正向关系。③进一步研究还发现，收益分配政策实施引发的治理逻辑变更导致的创新提升主要体现在通过转变经营目标、提高管理层风险承担意愿及强化监督等路径来实现的。此外，收益分配政策还提升了企业升级水平，但对央企参股上市公司的企业创新水平并没有起到促进作用。 本文的创新之处主要体现在以下几点：其一，现有研究探讨了股利收取对企业过度投资、盈余管理、在职消费等代理行为的影响机理，但是有关股利政策设计与企业创新之间关系的研究尚未展开。本文则研究了收益分配政策变革如何促进企业创新的内在机制，是对已有文献的补充与丰富。其二，本文深入探讨了国有企业治理逻辑演变的微观机理。诸多学者都曾提出，关于国有企业的改革主要是为了引发国有企业的政府逻辑向市场逻辑演进，而已有研究并没有探究其治理逻辑演进的微观基础，本文基于制度逻辑的可获取性、可利用性、激活能力等特征推演了收益分配政策与企业创新研究的微观机理。其三，现有关于公司治理与创新关系的研究，分别检验公司治理内部制度安排及外部机制对创新的影响，本研究则从组织层面揭示了促进创新的不同公司治理机制之间的交互效应。在研究设计上，本研究采用双重差分方法解决了公司治理与创新之间关系研究中存在的内生性问题，这些都是对已有研究的丰富与深化。 本研究的局限体现在以下几点：其一，在整体的研究过程中，即使本文试图包括一些可以影响企业创新的协变量，并识别影响国有企业和民营企业比较行为的外生变化，但仍然还有空间来改善本文对国家干预机制的理解。其次，在双重差分检验上，本文借助了收益分配政策这一自然实验，将该政策的实施对象中央企业列为处理组，将不受这一政策影响的民营企业列为对照组，而央企和民企有着较大的差异，尽管现有文献对有关中央企业的研究大都是基于这样的方法处理，但这也是本文研究过程中的局限。第三，在实证检验中，本文选取的是针对央企的2007年收益分配政策，然而，针对央企的政策较多，这些政策是否可能会对本文的研究进行一定的干扰，尽管本研究也通过安慰剂测试、平行趋势检验进行了剔除其他政策的干扰，但关于央企的政策较为繁琐，该问题也作为本文的研究局限。
英文摘要：	The reform of state-owned enterprises should realize the evolution of the dominant logic from government logic to market logic, and then achieve sustainable growth driven by innovation. It is facing many theoretical and practical problems in this evolution process. Thus, what kind of governance mechanism can support the realization of market logic and promote enterprise innovation? This article will use the Interim Measures of Collection and Management of State-owned Capital Gains from Central Enterprises (referred to as the income distribution policy) formulated by the Ministry of Finance and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission in 2007 to study how it affects enterprise innovation and to explore the internal mechanism between the governance logic and the reform of state-owned enterprises. Existing studies have mainly explored how income distribution policy affect the short-term behaviors of corporate such as over-investment, on-the-job consumption, agency costs and earnings management, or the effect of the relationship between income distribution policy and corporate profits, social welfare, other organizational and social outcomes. However, these studies have not involved the relationship between income distribution policies and the company’s long-term behavior. As an important corporate governance mechanism of central SOEs, the corporate income distribution policy will inevitably have an impact on corporate behavior. Therefore, this article will examine the relationship between the income distribution policy and the long-term behavior of the enterprise(for example, innovation) in order to further reveal the internal logic behind the policy and the internal mechanism that affects the enterprise. At the same time, the existing literature mainly focuses on individual characteristics, group characteristics, ownership structure design and macro environment to study the influencing factors of corporate innovation without discussing the influence path of macro income distribution policy to corporate micro behavior. Based on the research object of income distribution policy, this article takes "macro policy-corporate micro-behavior" as the main line to reveal the impact of institutional changes on corporate innovation and how to achieve changes in dominant logic from the three levels of "dominant logic-organization-actor", and then analyze the roots of the complexity and particularity of state-owned enterprise governance. Furthermore, it discusses the evolution mechanism of corporate governance logic triggered by the implementation of macro policies according to various classic theories such as system theory, agency theory, signal theory. Finally, it proposes corresponding governance strategies and a series of effects of policy implementation. This article aims to analyze the impact of income distribution policy reform on corporate innovation behavior. Although state-owned enterprises have always been an important subject of innovation, the unique government logic of state-owned enterprises may cause innovation obstacles in many aspects. Firstly, the administrative of business objectives is serious. Secondly, the management's willingness to take risks is insufficient. Thirdly, the lack of external supervision mechanism. How to change this situation and promote state-owned enterprises to further increase their innovation output? This article points out that the reform of income distribution policy can effectively alleviate this obstacle to innovation faced by government logic, and promote the evolution of state-owned enterprise governance logic (from government logic to market logic). At the same time, the competence of the board of directors has improved the accessibility and availability of market logic, which make the board of directors’ focus on corporate innovation to strengthen the relationship between income distribution policies and corporate innovation. The technical capabilities of executives have improved the availability and activation of market logic, which enable them to better use the available resources in corporate practice and promote the positive relationship between income distribution policies and corporate innovation. The independence of the board of supervisors can improve the activation ability of market logic, which help to reflect the available and available resources in corporate practice, and strengthen the relationship between income distribution policies and corporate innovation. Moreover, this article also explores how it affects the relationship between income distribution policies and corporate innovation from the legality dimensions of analyst attention, the richness of the external environment, and the quality of external audits. Subsequently, taking the income distribution policy as the starting point, this paper uses the three-year samples before and after the implementation of the policy and uses the empirical research method of differences-in-differences to evaluate the effect of the implementation of the income distribution policy on enterprise innovation. The results of this study find that the implementation of this policy has significantly improved the innovation of central government-owned enterprises compared with private enterprises that are not affected by this policy. The results remain consistent after solving the applicability DID model, measurement errors, missing variables, reverse causality and excluding other motivational. As a result, the results show that the income distribution policy has indeed promoted the innovation of central government-owned enterprises. In general, the main conclusions of this paper are as follows: ①Compared with private enterprises that are not affected by the income distribution policy, the innovation of central government-owned enterprises has increased significantly after the implementation of the income distribution policy. ②In addition to the quality of external audits, organizational characteristics that support changes in focus of attention (including the competence of the board of directors, the technical capabilities of senior management, and the independence of the board of supervisors) and legal pressure (including analyst attention and environmental enrichment) have strengthened the positive relationship between the income distribution policy and corporate innovation. ③Further research also finds that the improvement of innovation caused by the change of governance logic (because of the implementation of the income distribution policy) is mainly embodied in the ways of changing business objectives, increasing the willingness of management to take risks and strengthening supervision. In addition, the income distribution policy has also promoted the level of corporate upgrading, but it has not played a role in promoting the level of corporate innovation of listed companies with State-owned joint-stock companies. The innovations of this paper are mainly reflected in the following points. First, the existing research has explored the mechanism of the influence of dividend collection on corporate over-investment, earnings management, on-the-job consumption and other agency behaviors, but the relationship between dividend policy design and corporate innovation has not yet followed by current research. This paper studies the internal mechanism of how the income distribution policy reform promotes enterprise innovation, which is a supplement and enrichment to the existing literature. Second, this paper deeply explores the micro-mechanism of the evolution of state-owned enterprise governance logic. Many scholars have proposed that the reform of state-owned enterprises is mainly to trigger the evolution of state-owned enterprises’ government logic to market logic. However, existing studies have not explored the micro-foundation of the evolution of their governance logic. This paper is based on the characteristics of accessibility, availability and activation ability of institutional logic, deduced the micro mechanism of income distribution policy and enterprise innovation research. Third, the existing research on the relationship between corporate governance and innovation examines the impact of internal institutional arrangements and external mechanisms of corporate governance. This paper reveals the interaction effects between different corporate governance mechanisms that promote innovation from the organizational level. In terms of research design, this paper uses the differences-in-differences method to solve the endogenous problems in the research on the relationship between corporate governance and innovation. These are the enrichment and deepening of existing research. The limitations of this paper are embodied in the following points. Firstly, even though this article attempts to include some covariates that can affect corporate innovation and to identify exogenous changes that affect the comparative behavior of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the overall research process, it is still necessary to improve the understanding of state intervention mechanisms. Secondly, this paper uses the natural experiment of the income distribution policy by differences-in-differences test, and lists the central government-owned enterprises as the processing group for the implementation of the policy and the private enterprises that are not affected by this policy as the control group. But there is a big difference between central government-owned enterprises and private enterprises. Although the existing literature on central government-owned enterprises is mostly based on this method, it is also the limitation of the research process of this paper. Thirdly, this paper selects the 2007 income distribution policy for central government-owned enterprises in the empirical test. However, there are many policies for central government-owned enterprises that may interfere with this paper. This paper uses placebo test and parallel trend testing to eliminate interference from other policies, but the policy on central government-owned enterprises is more cumbersome. This issue is also the research limitation of this paper.
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