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论文编号：	1267
作者编号：	2120071919
上传时间：	2009/6/14 22:46:48
中文题目：	股权激励、机构持股与股权代理成
英文题目：	A Research on the Relationship
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	股权激励;机构持股;股权代理成本
英文关键字：	Equity-based incentive;Institu
中文摘要：	伴随着我国建立现代公司制度的进程，由所有权和经营权分离导致的代理问题越来越受到理论界和实务界的关注，如何合理地设计公司治理机制来激励和约束代理人，使其行为符合委托人利益最大化目标，从而降低代理成本也就成了学术界研究的主题之一。西方学者研究表明，管理层股权激励和机构投资者持股能够在一定程度上解决委托代理问题。在政府政策导向下，我国上市公司近年来正积极推出管理层股权激励计划，而机构投资者也在最近几年得到快速发展。在这种情况下，加强对管理层股权激励和机构投资者持股的公司治理作用研究就显得非常重要。 本文以我国仅发行A股的非金融类上市公司为样本，以2005—2007年为研究期间，对管理层股权激励、机构投资者持股在代理成本控制方面的作用进行了实证检验。与以往研究不同，本文增加了管理层股权激励和机构投资者持股对股权代理成本长期抑制作用的检验，而且本文不但考察了二者各自的抑制作用，还对其交互影响进行了检验。 通过实证分析，本文主要得出以下结论：第一，管理层股权激励对两类代理成本都具有显著的抑制作用，并且这种抑制作用具有长期性；第二，机构投资者持股对管理者追求闲暇、过度投资等行为导致的代理成本和大股东与中小股东之间的代理成本具有较好的抑制作用，并且这种抑制作用也具有长期性，但对于管理者在职消费和职务侵占等行为导致的代理成本，机构投资者持股不具有明显的抑制作用。第三，对于第二类股权代理成本，管理层股权激励和机构投资者持股的抑制作用能够相互强化，即随着管理层持股比例提高，机构投资者持股对代理成本的抑制作用增强；随着机构投资者持股比例提高，股权激励对代理成本的抑制作用也相应增强，并且这种交互强化作用具有持续性。但对于第一类股权代理成本，两种治理机制没有表现出显著的交互强化作用。
英文摘要：	Along with the establishment of modern company system in China, the agent problem caused by the separation of ownership and management received more and more attention from theoretical and practical, so how to design reasonable corporate governance mechanisms to stimulate and restrain the agent, make him/her act following the rule of maximum the principle’s interests and reduce the agency cost has become one of the main subjects in theoretical circles. According to the study of western scholars, management incentives and institutional investor holding can solve the principal-agent problem at a certain extent. Under the direction of government policies, China's listed companies are actively introduced the management equity-based incentive plan, while the institutional investors also got rapid development recently; In this case, it is very important to study the management incentives and institutional investor holding’s role in corporate governance. In this paper, we selected all the non-financial listed companies which just issued A shares as samples, 2005-2007 as study period. From the perspective of agency cost, we make an empirical test to examine the corporate governance role played by management equity-based incentive and institutional investor holding. Different from previous studies, we examined the management incentives and institutional investor holding’s current and long-term effects on the equity agency costs. What’s more, we tested management equity-based incentive and institutional investor holding’s interactive effects on equity agency costs. By empirical analysis, we got the following conclusions: First, management shareholding has a positive role in governing the two types equity agency cost, and this positive role can last one year at least. Second, institutional investor holding has better current and long-term governance effect to the agency cost cased by management’s over-investment behavior and the agency cost between the major shareholder and the small & medium-sized shareholders. However，to the agency cost caused by the management’s job consumption and position occupied, institutional investor holding don’t have significant governance effect. Third, in the aspect of second type equity agency costs, management equity-based incentives and institutional investor holding’s governance role can reinforce each other. That is to say, with the increasing of management shareholding, the institutional investor holding’s governance role on agency costs enhanced; while with the increasing of institutional investor holdings, management equity-based incentives’ governance role on agency costs also enhanced. What’s more, this interaction is continuous. However, to the first type equity agency cost, the two governance mechanisms showed no significant interaction.
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