联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	12654
作者编号：	2120192822
上传时间：	2021/6/18 15:01:25
中文题目：	年度报告问询函对我国上市公司盈余管理的影响研究
英文题目：	The Research on the Impact of Annual Report-Inquiry Letter on Earnings Management of Listed Companies in China
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	年报告问询函；应计盈余管理；真实盈余管理
英文关键字：	Annual Report Inquiry Letter; Accrual Earnings Management; Real Earnings Management
中文摘要：	无论是在有如国外发展较为成熟的资本市场中抑或是在以我国为首的新兴资本市场中，监管机构通常会认为公司的盈余管理行为会对相关投资者造成不利影响。而在我国逐步推进问询监管的大趋势背景下，本文基于信息不对称理论、成本收益原则与前景理论，聚焦于我国正在推行的交易所监管问询制度是否会对公司的盈余管理行为产生显著影响。在以我国上海证券交易所与深圳证券交易所针对A股主板上市公司2014-2018年年度报告所发出的问询函作为研究样对象进行了系列回归后发现，样本公司通常在收到问询函之后应计盈余管理水平降低，但同时真实盈余管理的水平却也会相应升高，进而导致盈余管理总量并不会有显著变化。 本文还就年度报告问询函所涉及的问题数量与问题类别进行了系列横截面检验，发现当问询函件中所涉及问题数量越多和涉及到会计类型的问题时，反映监管越严格，真实盈余管理水平的升高也会被抑制。之后，文章又发现了公司治理水平与机构投资者持股对上述盈余管理转化过程的调节作用。最后，文章还继续拓展到研究样本在收到问询函的前后对盈余管理水平与上市公司的短期业绩之间关系的作用效果上，研究发现在收函的情况下应计盈余管理与短期经营业绩呈正相关关系。 以上研究结果表明，我国近几年在实践中逐步推行的监管问询制度对盈余管理的约束效果主要体现在应计盈余管理部分，但这种监管会促使上市公司出于成本收益考虑而更为依赖于真实盈余管理作为其在实践中调节盈余的主要手段，考虑到信息不对称问题的普遍存在问题，问询监管并不会对盈余管理总量产生显著约束效果。文章不仅仅丰富了我国问询监管制度对上市公司的内部经济后果的相关研究，还从一个全新的角度对盈余管理行为影响因素的相关研究成果进行了进一步探究。
英文摘要：	Whether in the foreign capital market or in the emerging capital market led by China, regulators usually think that the earnings management behavior of the company will cause adverse effects on the relevant investors. Under the trend of gradually promoting inquiry supervision in China, based on the information asymmetry theory, cost-benefit principle and prospect theory, this paper focuses on whether the inquiry system of supervision in China would have significant impact on the earnings management behavior of companies. After a series of regression based on the inquiry letters of 2014-2018 annual reports of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, it is found that the accrual earnings management of the companies will decrease, but the real earnings management will also increase, which will lead to the total amount of earnings management will not change significantly. The paper also conducts a series of cross-sectional tests on the number and types of questions involved in the annual report inquiry letter. It is found that when the number of questions involved in the inquiry letter is more and accounting type questions are involved, the stricter the supervision is, the higher the real earnings management will be resduced. After that, the paper finds the moderating effect of corporate governance and institutional investors' Shareholding on the above earnings management transformation process. Finally, the paper also extends to the effect of the relationship between earnings management and short-term performance of listed companies before and after receiving the letter. The study finds that there is a positive correlation between accrual earnings management and short-term performance in the case of receiving the letter. The above research results show that the constraint effect of the regulatory inquiry system gradually implemented in China in recent years on earnings management is mainly reflected in the accrued earnings management part, but this regulation would make the listed companies more dependent on real earnings management as the main means of regulating earnings in practice, considering the cost-benefit principle and asymmetric information theory. Because of the problem, inquiry regulation would not have significant effect on the total amount of earnings management. The Research not only enriches the relevant research on the internal outcomes of China's inquiry supervision system, but also further explores the relevant research results on the influencing factors of earnings management behavior from a new perspective.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)