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论文编号：	12638
作者编号：	1120180962
上传时间：	2021/6/17 16:12:06
中文题目：	剩余控制权、大股东侵占与中小股东抵制的行为和神经实验研究
英文题目：	A Behavioral and Neuroscientific Experimental Study of Residual Control Right on Major Shareholders’ Encroachment and Minority Shareholders’ Boycott
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	剩余控制权；大股东侵占；中小股东抵制；信念；社会规范
英文关键字：	residual control right; major shareholder’s encroachment behavior; minority shareholder’s boycott behavior; belief; social norm
中文摘要：	自从现代企业制度建立后，如何优化企业的控制权结构，一直是学界和业界高度关注的热点问题。企业的控制权包括特定控制权和剩余控制权，分别是指契约中明确规定和没有明确规定的资产决策权。与特定控制权相比，剩余控制权具有更大的灵活性，可以更好地应对企业发展过程中所面临的不确定性；但是由于企业决策的合理性难以得到证实，剩余控制权也提供了大股东侵占企业剩余的行动空间。大股东侵占行为不仅损害了中小股东的利益，而且也有可能激起中小股东的抵制行为，通过股东冲突产生新的代理成本。尽管不完全契约理论和交易成本理论已经探索了剩余控制权配置对企业效率的影响，然而较少有学者关注剩余控制权如何影响股东冲突。因此，探索剩余控制权对大股东侵占和中小股东抵制行为的影响机制，明确剩余控制权变化时大小股东之间的行为交互及福利后果，揭示大股东侵占和中小股东抵制行为背后的心理和神经机制，成为企业能否科学配置控制权的关键。 本文利用实验经济学的方法，将社会偏好和不完全理性引入到产权治理领域的研究中，探析剩余控制权如何影响具有社会偏好和不完全理性行为主体的决策行为。本文首先设计了企业收益分配博弈这一研究范式，考察剩余控制权的变化对大小股东博弈过程及福利后果的影响。在此基础上，本文进一步揭示了剩余控制权是否通过社会规范评价或信念的变迁影响大小股东的决策行为。此外，针对大股东的侵占行为为何会激发中小股东的抵制行为，以及中小股东的抵制行为为何会遏制大股东的侵占行为这些问题，本文通过神经科学技术探析了股东侵占和抵制行为的内在神经机制，为理解大小股东的侵占与抵制行为提供了神经动态证据。本文的主要研究结果如下： 首先，本文发现剩余控制权能够显著的改变大股东的分配决策和中小股东的抵制决策，增加股东冲突的可能性，引起更高的代理成本。当大股东拥有更大的剩余控制权时，大股东的分配金额会显著降低，中小股东的接受底线也会显著降低。同时，大股东对中小股东接受底线的预期以及中小股东对大股东分配金额的预期也会随之降低。进一步的分析表明，信念和社会规范是大股东侵占和中小股东抵制决策的重要影响因素。 其次，本文证实了剩余控制权可以通过改变大股东和中小股东的信念影响他们的决策行为，但是不能通过改变大股东和中小股东的社会规范评价而影响他们的决策行为。实验结果表明，大股东对中小股东接受底线的预期正向影响了大股东的分配金额；而中小股东对大股东分配金额的预期也正向影响了中小股东的接受底线。此外，剩余控制权的差异不会影响大股东和中小股东对于社会规范的评价。社会规范的评价只受到评价对象和评价者身份的共同影响。 最后，本文揭示了大股东和中小股东冲突背后的认知神经机制。神经数据的分析结果揭示了中小股东的抵制能力对其心理活动和相应的神经机制的影响，表明这种力量引发中小股东对不公平分配方案的愤怒反应，而不是对公平规范判断的认知反应。最重要的是，本研究强调了抵制能力对两名股东之间神经同步性的显著负面影响。这一结果证明了中小股东的抵制能力会削弱大股东对于社会规范的关注，即中小股东的抵制作为一种潜在的惩罚措施，挤出了大股东对社会规范的遵从。 本文可能有如下创新之处：第一，率先将社会偏好理论和心理博弈论引入到第二类委托代理问题和不完全契约的研究中，从社会规范遵从和不完全理性的视角考察了大股东侵占行为和中小股东抵制行为的内在机制，明确了不完全契约理论中剩余控制权与代理成本之间的关系。第二，率先在大股东获取剩余控制权私有收益的情景中，考察中小股东抵制行为对大股东侵占行为的遏制作用，补充了现有研究对剩余控制权私有收益的理论解释。第三，率先从行为层面揭示了剩余控制权对股东决策行为的影响路径，剩余控制权通过信念的变化提高了大股东的侵占意愿，降低了中小股东的抵制意愿，打开了股东冲突驱动机制的黑箱。第四，率先结合事件相关电位和经颅直流电刺激技术，考察大股东侵占和中小股东抵制行为背后的神经加工机制，为他们的行为动机提供了神经证据，开拓了神经公司治理的研究范围。
英文摘要：	Since the establishment of modern enterprise system, optimization of the control right structure has always been a hot issue of high attention. The control right includes specific control right and residual control right. Specific control right refers to the asset decision right clearly stipulated in the contract. Residual control right refers to the asset decision right that is not explicitly stipulated in the contract. Compared with specific control rights,residual control rights have greater flexibility and can better cope with the uncertainty faced by enterprises in the process of development. However, because the rationality of enterprise decision is difficult to be proved, residual control rights also allow the major shareholders to occupy the remaining of the enterprise. The encroachment of major shareholders not only damages the interests of minority shareholders, but also may arouse the resistance of minority shareholders, resulting in shareholders’ conflicts and new agency costs. Although incomplete contract theory and transaction cost theory have explored the influence of residual control allocation on firm efficiency, few scholars have paid attention to how residual control affects shareholder conflicts. Therefore, it becomes the key points to arrange the control right structure by exploring the mechanism that the residual control right impacts the encroachment of major shareholders and the resistance of minority shareholders, clarifying the interactions between shareholders and the welfare consequences when the residual control right changes, and revealing the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the encroachment of major shareholders and the resistance of minority shareholders. Using the methods of experimental economics, this paper introduces social preference and incomplete rationality into the research of property rights governance, and explores how residual control rights affect the decision-making behaviors of subjects with social preference and incomplete rationality. This paper first designs a research paradigm of income distribution to investigate the influence of the residual control rights on the game process and welfare consequences of shareholders. On this basis, this paper further reveals whether residual control rights affect the decision-making behavior of large and small shareholders through the social norm evaluation or the belief. In addition, to explore why the encroachment behavior of major shareholders inspires the boycott of minority shareholders, and why the resistance behavior of minority shareholders curbs the encroachment behavior of large shareholders, this paper uncovers the neural mechanism underlying the shareholders’ encroachment and boycott. The main research results of this paper are as follows： First, this paper finds that residual control right can significantly change the distribution decisions of major shareholders and the boycott decisions of minority shareholders, increase the possibility of shareholder conflicts, and lead to higher agency costs. When the major shareholder has a large residual control right, the distribution amount of the major shareholder will be significantly reduced, and the acceptance threshold of the minority shareholders will also be significantly reduced. At the same time, the expectation of major shareholders on the acceptance threshold and the expectation of minority shareholders on the amount of distribution of major shareholders will be reduced accordingly. Further analysis shows that beliefs and social norms are important influencing factors of major shareholders' embezzlement and minority shareholders' boycott decisions. Secondly, it is proved that residual control right can affect the decision-making behavior of major shareholders and minority shareholders by changing their beliefs, but it cannot affect their decision-making behavior by changing their social normative evaluation. The experimental results show that the expectation of major shareholders on the acceptance threshold of minority shareholders has a positive impact on the distribution number of major shareholders. And the expectation of minority shareholders on the amount of distribution of major shareholders also positively affects the acceptance threshold of minority shareholders. In addition, the residual control right does not affect the evaluation of major shareholders and minority shareholders on social norms. The evaluation of social norms is only affected by the identity of the evaluator. Finally, this paper reveals the cognitive neural mechanism behind the conflict between large and small shareholders. The results of event-related potentials reveal the influence of the resistance ability of minority shareholders on their psychological activities and corresponding neural mechanisms, indicating that this power triggers the angry reaction of minority shareholders to unfair distribution schemes, rather than the cognitive reaction to the judgment of fairness and norms. Most importantly, this study highlights the significant negative impact of resistance on neurosynchrony between two shareholders. This result proves that the resistance of minority shareholders will weaken the major shareholders' attention to social norms, that is, as a potential punitive measure, the resistance of minority shareholders will squeeze out the major shareholders' compliance with social norms. This article may have the following innovation. First, take the lead in applying the theory of social preferences and mental game theory in the second principal-agent problem and the study of incomplete contract. From the perspective of social norms and incomplete rationality, this paper examines the mechanism of major shareholders’ encroachment and the minority shareholders’ boycott. Second, in the situation where major shareholders obtain private income using residual control right, this paper firstly investigates the restraining effect of minority shareholders' boycott behavior on major shareholders' encroachment, which complements the theoretical explanation on private income from residual control rights. Thirdly, this paper firstly reveals the influence path of residual control right on shareholders' decision-making behaviors. Through the change of beliefs, residual control right can improve the major shareholders' intention of embezzlement, reduce the minority shareholders' resistance intention. Fourthly, this paper takes the lead in combining event-related potentials and transcranial direct current stimulation technology to investigate the neural processing mechanism behind the encroachment of major shareholders and the boycott behavior of minority shareholders, providing neural evidence for their behavioral motivation，and expands the research scope of neurocorporate governance.
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