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论文编号：	1260
作者编号：	2120071920
上传时间：	2009/6/12 23:19:36
中文题目：	上市公司关联交易和大股东掏空、
英文题目：	Connection Transaction and Con
指导老师：	程新生 教授
中文关键字：	关联交易 掏空 支持>
英文关键字：	Connection transaction Tunne
中文摘要：	在我国目前的股权结构背景下，大股东能以其特殊的控股地位左右上市公司经营政策，使其按股东利益最大化的目标进行各项关联交易。而“掏空”和“支持”通常是上市公司大股东实现多期利益最大化的方向不同的两种行为。当投资者保护机制缺失时，控制权和所有权分离是大股东掏空上市公司资源和利润的制度根源和内在原因。而另一方面，关联交易被很多上市公司大股东作为盈余管理的工具，通过一些公允的或非公允的关联交易使上市公司成为绩优股，避免退市甚至是实现战略转型，完善了业务流程。 为了完整地解释中国上市公司大股东的关联交易行为，本文将“掏空”与“支持”两种行为结合起来，采用规范研究和案例研究相结合的方法。 在理论分析中，从分析关联交易与大股东“掏空”、“支持”行为产生的根源和原因入手，陈述了目前我国上市公司股权结构现状，并列明了不同情形下的关联交易发生的主要手段。在案例研究部分，分别透过两个典型案例对“掏空”和“支持”行为的背景、手段展开分析：当资本市场上缺乏对中小股东利益加以保护的机制，大股东控制更倾向于导致掏空上市公司，侵占中小股东的利益行为的利益输送现象；若是在企业正常活动中，关联交易这一中性行为是会为企业降低交易费用，获得竞争优势，甚至能使上市公司优化产业结构、优化财务结构等，为上市公司带来持续的竞争优势。 不可否认，关联交易是现代企业制度发展的必然结果，是不可避免的，降低交易成本和提高企业效率均体现了关联交易积极的一面。但关联交易主体之间存在控制与被控制、影响与被影响的关系，以及关联交易定价灵活、监管困难等因素，客观上使关联交易沦为大股东侵吞上市公司资产、掠夺中小投资者的主要形式。因此，本文的最后，从法制、公司治理、市场监管等角度给出了规范上市公司关联交易的对策建议。
英文摘要：	Under the situation of the shareholding structure, the major shareholder use its special status to operate the company policies, aimed as maximize the interests of shareholders and do related party transactions. And "tunneling" and "propping" is usually the major shareholder to achieve the interests of multi-phase to maximize the direction of two different acts. When lack of investor protection mechanism, the control and ownership separation is the internal reasons and system problems that hollow out the resources and profits. On the other hand, a lot of related transactions have been taken as the tools to manage the earnings by the major shareholders, through a number of fair trade or unfair to make the association become a blue chip listed companies to avoid or withdraw from the market to achieve a strategic transformation and improve the business processes. In order to fully explain the majority shareholder of China's listed companies trade association, the paper will combine "tunneling" and "propping" two types of behavior, the use of norms and case studies, a combination of methods. In the theoretical analysis, from the analysis of related party transactions with major shareholders, "tunneling", "propping" the root causes of behavior and the reasons of the current ownership structure in China, to understand the different circumstances of the related party transactions occurred . A case study of two typical cases of "tunneling" and "propping" of the background to analyze the means: lack of capital markets to protect the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders of the mechanism, the control of major shareholders likely to lead to "tunneling" the listed companies, encroach the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders; if the normal activities of the enterprise, the associated party transactions will lower transaction costs for enterprises and obtain competitive advantage, and even optimize the industrial structure and optimize the financial structure of listed companies to bring sustained competitive advantage. It is undeniable that the associated transaction is the development of modern enterprise system, the result is inevitable, and to reduce transaction costs and improve business effectively reflected the positive side. However, between the associated party transactions, the relationship is: control and be controlled, influence and be affected, as well as flexible pricing, regulatory and other factors difficult, so objectively speaking, become major predatory form that the major shareholder embezzles the assets of small and medium-sized investors. Therefore, this article summarizes the measures of listed companies from the law, corporate governance, and market regulation norms.
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