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论文编号：	12581
作者编号：	2120192815
上传时间：	2021/6/16 12:07:23
中文题目：	控股股东股权质押对股票增持的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Controlling Shareholder''''''''s Equity Pledge on Shareholdings Increase
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	控股股东股权质押; 控股股东股票增持;质押风险；控制权转移风险；产权性质
英文关键字：	Equity Pledge of Controlling Shareholders; Shareholdings Increase of Controlling Shareholders；the Transfe Risk of Control Rights；Ownership Type
中文摘要：	股权质押的本质是以股票为质押物的一种“债务融资”，在不分散控制权的情况下能够有效的缓解控股股东的融资约束。但股权质押往往设有“预警线”、“平仓线”等与股票市场价格相关的限制，一旦股价触及限制，出质人若不能及时追加担保或解除质押，被质押股票就会被强制平仓。 控股股东股票增持在很多情况下被其作为向市场传递正向信号的手段，有助于稳定和抬升股价。那么控股股东股权质押后基于化解质押风险，有维持股价的动机。那么在此种情景下控股股东是否更有可能进行增持呢？本文对此展开了一系列的研究。 通过对2014-2018年的沪深A股的上市公司进行实证分析发现：（1）控股股东股权质押（是否质押、质押比例）显著提升了股票增持的可能性。（2）在高控制权转移风险下（股价下跌下跌至预警线附近），基于化解控制权转移风险，控股股东股东增持上市公司股票可能性更高。（3）考虑股权性质的调节效应。相比国有国有上市公司，非国有上市公司控股股东股权质押与股票增持的正相关性更显著；股权质押情境下，在高控制权转移风险下（股价下跌下跌至预警线附近），相比国有上市公司，非国有上市公司控股股东股东增持上市公司股票可能性更高。 （4）控股股东股票增持能够有效化解质押带来的控制权转移风险。（5）在连续股票质押情景下，控股股东进行股票增持的可能性随着质押期限的增加而降低。（6）控股股东会权衡不同化解质押风险策略之间成本收益关系，股票增持可能是是其他行为受限时的策略性行为。 本文实证发现控股股东增持可能是基于化解质押风险的动机，拓展了股票增持动机的研究视角。同时本文也发现增持是有效化解质押风险，规避控制权转移的有效手段。此外本文还具有一定的现实意义，研究结论表明增持有可能是一种机会主义行为，投资者应当理性看待。
英文摘要：	The essence of equity pledge is a kind of "debt financing" in which stocks are pledged, which can effectively alleviate the financing constraints of controlling shareholders. However, equity pledges often have restrictions related to stock market prices such as " warning lines" and "closing lines". Once the stock price reaches the limit, if the pledger fails to add guarantees or release the pledge in time, the pledged stocks will be forced to liquidate. In many cases, controlling shareholder stock holdings are used as a means to send positive signals to the market, helping to stabilize and lift stock prices. Then, after the controlling shareholder's equity pledge is based on the resolution of the pledge risk, there is an incentive to maintain the stock price. So in this scenario, is it more likely that controlling shareholders will increase their holdings? This thesis has launched a series of researches on this. Through an empirical analysis of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018, it is found that: (1) The pledge of controlling shareholders' equity (whether pledged, pledge ratio) is positively correlated with the tendency of listed companies to increase their shareholding. (2) Under the high risk of transfer of control rights (the stock price drops to near the warning line), based on the resolution of the risk of transfer of control rights, it is more likely that controlling shareholders will increase their shareholdings of listed companies. (3) Consider the moderating effect of the nature of equity. Compared with state-owned state-owned listed companies, non-state-owned listed companies’ controlling shareholder equity pledge has a more significant positive correlation with stock holdings; in the equity pledge scenario, under the high risk of transfer of control rights (the stock price drops to near the warning line), compared State-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies' controlling shareholders are more likely to increase their holdings of listed company stocks. (4) The increase in holdings of controlling shareholders' shares can effectively resolve the risk of control transfer caused by pledges. (5) Under the continuous stock pledge scenario, the possibility of controlling shareholders to increase their shareholding decreases as the pledge period increases. (6) The controlling shareholder will weigh the cost-benefit relationship between different strategies to resolve pledge risks, and stock increase may be a strategic behavior when other behaviors are restricted. This thesis empirically finds that controlling shareholders’ increase in holdings may be based on the motivation to resolve the pledge risk, which expands the research perspective on the motivation of stock increase. At the same time, this article also finds that increasing holdings is an effective means to effectively resolve pledge risks and avoid the transfer of control rights. In addition, this article also has certain practical significance. The research conclusion shows that increasing holdings may be an opportunistic behavior, and investors should treat it rationally.
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