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论文编号：	12542
作者编号：	1120150814
上传时间：	2021/6/15 15:02:02
中文题目：	股权质押、非财务信息披露与股价波动
英文题目：	Stock Pledge, Nonfinancial Information Disclosure and Price Volatility
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	股权质押；股价波动；内部控制；董事会治理；产权性质；非财务信息披露
英文关键字：	Stock Pledge；Price Volatility；Internal Control；Board Governance；Nature of Property； Non-financial Information Disclosure
中文摘要：	股权质押融资作为一种财务运作手段，在资本市场上非常普遍，它缓解了上市公司融资难的问题，但股权质押也是一把“双刃剑”，近年来中国A股市场低迷，股价下跌，也加大了股权质押后爆仓的风险和损失。充分而及时的信息披露可以提高资本市场的定价效率，是价值估值的核心，能够有效保护市场参与者，尤其是保护广大投资者。大量的经验证据表明充分财务信息披露可以有助于降低股价波动风险、提高企业公司价值。但财务信息的披露受到各种条件的制约，包括会计确认和计量、会计估计和会计政策选择与变更等因素，而且传统的财务信息披露提供的信息有限，已经无法满足投资者日益增长的多元信息需求。而非财务信息可以及时传达与公司有关的信息，能够提高财务报告的有用性。本文以有关公司未来发展前景的非财务信息披露为切入点，研究不同企业异质性下的控股股东股权质押的股价波动，并进一步探讨不同的非财务信息披露能否实现稳定股价、降低股价波动的目的，将股权质押防范控制权转移风险的研究拓展至非财务信息披露领域。 本文共分为六章。第一章是绪论，主要介绍了本文的研究背景、研究现状、研究问题、研究意义、研究思路、框架、方法和技术路线图，进而提出了本文可能存在的创新点。第二章是文献综述，从股权质押、股价波动和非财务信息披露的动机、经济后果三个方面对已有文献进行了系统性梳理和总结，进而挖掘出本文的研究动机。第三章，对股权质押与股价波动进行了各种实证分析检验。第四章，从企业异质性，具体包括内部控制、董事会治理与产权性质三个角度对股权质押与股价波动关系的调节作用进行深入分析。第五章，对股权质押、非财务信息披露与股价波动进行实证分析和稳健性检验，探讨了不同的非财务信息披露发挥的作用。第六章，对本文的研究发现进行了归纳总结，并在此基础上提出了一些政策上的建议，希望能够对相关的监管部门和上市公司及广大的投资者有一定的启示意义，并进一步指出了论文的不足和未来可能的研究方向。 本文通过大量理论分析和实证研究，主要得到以下五个结论，并具有一定的稳健性： 一是，股权质押降低了股价波动。通过对2012-2018年我国A股上市公司的控股股东股权质押与股价波动进行了研究，在控制了公司规模、公司寿命、偿债能力、成长能力、运营能力、两职合一、独立董事比例、是否有合格境外机构投资者、股权制衡度、股票换手率、账面市值比、行业、年度等变量后发现，控股股东进行股权质押后，股价波动变小，但长期超额收益和长期业绩都变差，一定程度上可以说明控股股东通过股权质押获取融资，为了防止股价下跌至平仓线被质权人强制平仓，最终丧失控制权，控股股东会采取相关行动维护股价的稳定。 二是，较好的内部控制水平能够正向调节控股股东股权质押与股价波动的关系。内部控制可以有效的约束管理层的信息操纵行为。高质量的内部控制可以约束管理层对好消息的操纵，同时可以减少管理层对坏消息的隐藏，有助于稳定股价。良好的内部控制信息披露可以降低控股股东股权质押公司的股价波动。内部控制要素之一的内部监督信息的披露能让投资者切实了解企业内部监督的举措与力度，既有助于降低信息不对称，又能让投资者相信企业出现错误或舞弊的概率较小，因此内部监督信息的披露也可以降低控股股东股权质押公司的股价波动。 三是，较高的董事会治理水平能够正向调节控股股东股权质押与股价波动的关系。董事会是公司治理机制的核心，既承担着股东大会的受托责任，又承担着对高管的委托责任。董事会的监督职能可以防范管理层的道德风险，减少逆向选择行为，降低信息不对称程度，有助于降低控股股东股权质押公司的股价波动。董事会同时具有咨询职能，可以充分利用董事会成员的专长和经验，为公司决策提供建议和支持，董事会成员的人力资本和社会资本能够增加公司从外界获取资源的机会，并对企业战略进行科学的审核，保证战略的有效性，能够降低控股股东股权质押公司的股价波动。 四是，相比于国有企业，非国有企业控股股东股权质押后股价波动更小。国有企业具备政治优势和国有资本竞争优势，更容易获取银行的信贷融资、政府救助和财政补贴，并能获得企业并购、税收见面等多方面的优惠政策。并且国有企业主要领导由国资委和党委委派，更看重政治省钱，因此掏空动机较弱，同时即使当股价下跌至“平仓线”时，国有企业可以通过各种救助方式进行补仓，一般不会被强制平仓，因此相比于国有控股公司和国有参股公司，非国有企业有更强烈的动机去降低控股股东股权质押公司的股价波动。 五是，非财务信息披露在股权质押与股价波动之间存在正向调节效应。控股股东股权质押后为降低控制权转移风险，会努力的稳定股价、降低股价波动，而与公司未来发展前景有关的非财务信息披露可以实现该目的，提高非财务信息披露水平，可以降低股价波动。但并非所有的信息披露都是有效的，非财务信息披露综合水平的提高可以降低股价波动，提高非财务信息披露及时性不能降低股价波动。 本文研究对于防范大股东股权质押而引发的大规模金融市场系统性风险和完善股权质押的相关信息披露具有一定的现实意义，并为完善我国上市公司信息披露制度体系和提高资本市场透明度提供一定的理论支持。
英文摘要：	As a means of financial operation, equity pledge financing is very common in the capital market, which alleviates the financing difficulties of listed companies. However, equity pledge is also A "double-edged sword". In recent years, China's A-share market is depressed and the stock price drops, which also increases the risk and loss of the stock position after equity pledge. Full and timely information disclosure can improve the pricing efficiency of the capital market and is the core of value valuation. It can effectively protect market participants, especially the majority of investors. A large number of empirical evidence shows that full financial information disclosure can help reduce the risk of stock price fluctuation and improve the value of enterprises. However, the disclosure of financial information is restricted by various conditions, including accounting recognition and measurement, accounting estimation and accounting policy selection and change and other factors, and the traditional financial information disclosure provides limited information, has been unable to meet the growing diversified information needs of investors. Non-financial information can timely convey information related to the company, which can improve the usefulness of financial reports. Based on the company's future development prospects of non-financial information disclosure as the breakthrough point, study the controlling shareholder of different enterprise heterogeneity of equity pledge short-term market reaction, and further explore different non-financial information disclosure can realize stable price, reduce share price volatility, the purpose of the research of transferring equity pledge control to prevent risks to the financial information disclosure. This paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which mainly introduces the research background, research status, research problems, research significance, research ideas, framework, methods and technology roadmap of this paper, and then puts forward the possible innovation points of this paper. The second chapter is a literature review, which systematically sorts out and summarizes the existing literature from three aspects: equity pledge, stock price fluctuation, motivation of non-financial information disclosure and economic consequences, and then excavates the research motivation of this paper. The third chapter carries on each kind of empirical analysis test to the stock pledge and the Stock Price Fluctuation. The Fourth Chapter, from the Enterprise Heterogeneity, including the internal control, the board of direct governance and the nature of property rights three aspects of the relationship between the stock pledge and the regulation of stock price volatility.The fifrth chapter conducts empirical analysis and robustness test on equity pledge, non-financial information disclosure and market reaction, and discusses the role played by different non-financial information disclosure. The sixth chapter summarizes the research findings of this paper, and puts forward some policy suggestions on the basis of this, hoping to have some enlightenment significance to the relevant regulatory authorities, listed companies and the majority of investors, and further points out the shortcomings of this paper and the possible future research direction. Through a large number of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper mainly draws the following five conclusions, which are robust to a certain extent: Firstly, equity pledges reduce stock price volatility. Through the 2012-2018 a-share listed companies in our country's controlling shareholder equity pledge and the market reaction was studied, in controlling the size of the company, company life, debt paying ability, growth ability, operation ability, the joining together of two position, the proportion of independent directors, whether to have qualified foreign institutional investors, equity balance degree, book value ratio, stock turnover rate, industry, such as the annual variable and found that after controlling shareholders equity, smaller share price volatility, but long-term excess returns and long-term performance, to A certain extent that controlling shareholders through stock pledge for financing, In order to prevent the stock price from falling to the balance line and being forced to liquidate by the Pledgee and eventually losing control, the controlling shareholder will take relevant actions to maintain the stability of the stock price. Secondly, better internal controls can positively regulate the relationship between shareholders'equity pledge and price volatility.. Internal control can effectively constrain management's information manipulation behavior. High quality internal control can restrain the management to manipulate the good news and reduce the management to hide the bad news at the same time, which is helpful to stabilize the stock price. Good internal control information disclosure can reduce stock price volatility. The disclosure of internal supervision information, one of the elements of internal control, can enable investors to effectively understand the measures and strength of internal supervision of enterprises, which not only helps to reduce information asymmetry, but also enables investors to believe that the probability of mistakes or fraud is small. Therefore, the disclosure of internal supervision information can also reduce stock price fluctuations. Thirdly, higher board governance can positively regulate the relationship between controlling shareholders'equity pledge and Stock price volatility. The board of directors is the core of the corporate governance mechanism, which bears the fiduciary responsibility of the shareholders' meeting and the entrusted responsibility to the executives. The supervisory function of the board of directors can prevent the moral hazard of the management, reduce the adverse selection behavior, reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and help to reduce the fluctuation of stock price. Board has a consultative role at the same time, can make full use of the expertise and experience of board members, provide advice and support to decision making for the company, members of the board of directors of human capital and social capital can increase the chances of companies access to resources from the outside world, and the review of enterprise strategy for science, to ensure the effectiveness of the strategy, can reduce share price volatility. Fourth, share prices of non-state-owned enterprises fluctuate less. State-owned enterprises have political advantages and state-owned capital competitive advantages, easier access to bank credit financing, government assistance and financial subsidies, and can obtain enterprise merger and acquisition, tax meeting and other preferential policies. And the main leadership by the state-owned assets supervision and administration of state-owned enterprises and the party committee appointed, save money more important politics, hollowed motivation is weak, so even when shares fell to "open line" at the same time, state-owned enterprises can undertake cover through all sorts of relief way, generally will not be forced to unwind, so compared with the state-owned holding companies and state-owned share company, non-state-owned enterprises have a greater incentive to reduce share price volatility. Finally, non-financial information disclosure has a positive moderating effect between equity pledge and stock price fluctuation. In order to reduce the risk of control transfer after equity pledge, the controlling shareholder will try to stabilize the stock price and reduce the fluctuation of stock price. The disclosure of non-financial information related to the company's future development prospect can achieve this purpose, improve the level of non-financial information disclosure, and reduce the fluctuation of stock price. However, not all information disclosure is effective. The improvement of the comprehensive level of non-financial information disclosure can reduce stock price fluctuations, while the improvement of the timeliness of non-financial information disclosure cannot reduce stock price fluctuations. The research of this paper has certain practical significance for preventing large-scale financial market systemic risk caused by equity pledge of large shareholders and improving the information disclosure related to equity pledge, and provides certain theoretical support for improving the information disclosure system of listed companies in China and improving the transparency of the capital market.
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