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论文编号:12486 
作者编号:2120192867 
上传时间:2021/6/13 11:05:41 
中文题目:董事会战略介入影响公司内部资本市场的机制研究—基于CEO权力的调节作用 
英文题目:A Study on the Mechanism of the Strategic Involvement of the Board of Directors to Affect the Internal Capital Market of the Company—Based on the Moderating Effect of CEO Power 
指导老师:周建 
中文关键字:董事会战略介入;CEO权力;内部资本市场活跃度;公司绩效;倒U形 
英文关键字:Strategic involvement of the board of directors; CEO power; Internal capital market activity; Corporate performance; Inverted U-shape 
中文摘要:面对资本市场上要求董事会运作过程透明化和规范化的强烈呼声,管理学、金融学,社会学和实验经济学等理论陆续被引入到董事会的战略介入研究领域,用于考察董事会成员在公司资源配置决策中的认知行为、交互作用和博弈过程,应用和发展多学科理论成为发展趋势。 其中,内部资本市场的活跃程度是判断公司资源配置能力的显著标志,而包括董事会和CEO在内的公司战略负责人是公司资源配置的直接决策者。因此,本文试图在董事会战略介入反映公司动态能力的基础上,从公司内部资本配置的角度回答“董事会如何影响公司资源配置?”的研究问题。上述研究问题需要从三方面展开:首先,作为战略决策主导者的董事会通过战略介入如何影响公司内部资本市场的活跃度;其次,作为高管执行团队首脑的CEO在董事会战略介入公司内部资本市场的过程中扮演何种角色;最后,公司内部资本市场的活跃度如何贡献于公司绩效? 通过研究2015-2019年沪深A股上市公司样本数据,本文发现,董事会战略介入程度与公司内部资本市场活跃度呈倒U形曲线关系,即随着战略介入程度的增加,这一关系最初是积极的,但逐渐变为消极的;CEO权力平滑了上述倒U形关系,即CEO权力可以至少部分替代董事会战略介入;而公司内部资本市场活跃度与公司绩效之间并未表现出倒U形关系。 与现有研究相比,本文主要具有以下两方面的创新:一方面是对董事会战略介入的测度方式进行更新,并以内部资本配置为例,阐明中国情境下董事会战略介入影响公司资源配置的一条路径,有助于规范公司内部资本市场运作,为公司治理结构的优化和动态能力的提升提供参考;另一方面是为受公司财务杠杆所约束,公司内部资本市场较之外部资本市场更为僵化的问题提供解决思路,本文认为在董事会战略介入的情境下,赋予CEO更充分的自由裁量权,对于激活公司内部资本市场的活力具有重要意义。  
英文摘要:In the face of strong calls for transparency and standardization of the board’s running process from the capital market, theories of management, finance, sociology, and experimental economics have been introduced into the strategic involvement research of the board of directors to examine their cognitive behavior and game process in resource allocation decision-making. Thus, the application and development of multidisciplinary theory have become a trend. The activity of the internal capital market is a significant indicator to test the ability of a company to allocate its resources, and the company’s strategic leaders, including the board of directors and CEO, are the direct decision-makers in this area. Therefore, based on the link between the strategic involvement of the board of directors and the company's dynamic capabilities, this article attempts to answer the research question "How does the board affect the company's resource allocation?" from the perspective of internal capital allocation. The above research question can be specified from three aspects: first, how does the board of directors, as the leader of strategic decision-making, affect the activity of the company’s internal capital market through strategic involvement; second, what role does CEO play in the process of board’s involvement in the company’s internal capital market; finally, how does the activity of the company's internal capital market contribute to the company's performance? Taking 2015-2019 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the sample, this paper finds that the board's strategic involvement and the company's internal capital market activity are in an inverted U-curve relationship, that is, as the strategic involvement increases, the relationship is initially positive, but gradually becomes negative; CEO power smoothes the above inverted U-shaped relationship, that is, CEO power can at least partially replace the strategic involvement of the board, and there is no empirical evidence on inverted U-shaped relationship between the activity of internal capital market and company's performance. Compared with existing research, this article has two following innovations: On the one hand, it updates the measuring method of the strategic involvement of the board of directors and uses internal capital allocation as an example to clarify a path through which the board affects the company's resource allocation in the Chinese context. It helps to regulate the internal capital market, optimize the governance structure and improve the firm’s dynamic capabilities; on the other hand, considering that the company’s internal capital market is more rigid than the external capital market due to the constraints of the company’s financial leverage, this article believes that giving the CEO more discretion is of great significance for activating the vitality of the internal capital market. 
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