联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	12462
作者编号：	2120192849
上传时间：	2021/6/11 19:40:54
中文题目：	股权激励对企业创新绩效的影响研究 ——基于研发投入和分析师跟踪的中介效应
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Stock Incentives on Enterprise Innovation Performance ——Intermediary effect based on R&D investment and analyst coverage
指导老师：	王永进
中文关键字：	股权激励；创新绩效；研发投入；分析师跟踪
英文关键字：	equity incentives, innovation performance, R&D investment, analyst coverage
中文摘要：	在我国政府大力倡导和中美贸易摩擦不断催化的背景下，创新活动在经济增长过程中占据越来越重要的地位。企业作为创新活动的重要主体，其创新能力和创新绩效受到全社会的高度关注。企业高管作为企业的领导者，是创新活动的决策者和实施者。由于研发活动存在风险高、周期长和专业性强的特点，高管出于自身利益的考虑，创新积极性不高。合理的激励机制是提高高管创新积极性，从而提高创新绩效的重要措施。在对高管实施激励的同时，对内需确保创新研发资源的投入，为创新活动提供重要资源支撑；对外需加强与资本市场的互动，分析师作为企业与资本市场的沟通桥梁，可发挥其信息中介和外部监督功能，对企业创新活动也产生了一定的影响。 本文通过对委托代理、信息不对称、激励和创新相关理论的回顾，对企业创新投入与产出、股权激励和分析师行为方面文献的梳理，经理论分析提出股权激励促进企业创新绩效的假设，并讨论研发投入和分析师跟踪在其中的中介作用。构建中介效应模型，选取A股上市企业2007-2019年的数据为样本，利用逐步回归系数检验法、sobel和bootstrap方法进行中介效应检验，并运用倾向性得分匹配法（PSM）和替换主要变量衡量指标的方式进行稳健性测试。 研究结论指出，对高管实施股权激励有利于企业创新绩效的提高，研发资金投入和分析师跟踪在其中起到了部分中介作用。具体来说，对高管实施股权激励缓解了管理层与股东的利益冲突，提高管理层的冒险动机，激励高管的创新动力，促使其加大对创新研发的投入，从而提高企业创新绩效；此外，对高管实施股权激励吸引了更多分析师的跟踪，分析师发挥其信息中介和外部监督功能，缓解信息不对称，提高信息透明度，增加市场对企业创新活动的价值认可，这既能缓解创新活动面临的融资约束问题，又能加强对企业管理层的监督，从而促进创新绩效的提高。本文的研究为企业提高创新能力和政府部门完善相关法规和加强监管活动提供一定参考。
英文摘要：	In the situation of the vigorous advocacy of the Chinese government and the continuous catalysis of Sino-US trade frictions, innovative activities are playing an increasingly important role in the process of economic growth. As an important subject of innovation activities, enterprises, their innovation ability and innovation performance are highly concerned by the whole society. As corporate leaders, corporate executives are the decision-makers and implementers of innovative activities. Due to the characteristics of high risk, long cycle and strong professionalism in R&D activities, executives are not motivated to innovate because of their own interests. A reasonable incentive mechanism is an important measure to improve the enthusiasm of senior management for innovation, thereby improving innovation performance. While implementing incentives for executives, companies should ensure the investment of innovative R&D resources for domestic needs to provide important resource support for innovative activities; externally, it is necessary to strengthen interaction with the capital market. Behaving as a communication bridge between enterprises and the capital market, analysts can play the roles of information intermediary and external supervision, and have a certain impact on the innovation activities of enterprises. Based on the reviews of principal-agent, information asymmetry, incentive and innovation related theories, and the reviews of the literature on enterprise innovation input and output, equity incentives and analyst behavior, this thesis puts forward the hypothesis that equity incentives promote enterprise innovation performance through theoretical analysis. This thesis also discusses the intermediary roles of R&D investment and analyst coverage. To draw our conclusion, this thesis builds an intermediary effect model, selects the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as a sample, uses the stepwise regression coefficient test, sobel and bootstrap methods to test the intermediary effect, and then uses the propensity score matching method (PSM) and the method of replacing the main variables to test the robustness. This thesis points out that the implementation of equity incentives for executives promotes the improvement of corporate innovation performance, in which R&D investment and analyst coverage play a partial intermediary role. Specifically, the implementation of equity incentives for senior executives eases the conflict of interest between management and shareholders, improves management’s risk-taking motivation, encourages senior management’s innovation motivation, and increases investment in innovative research and development, thereby improving corporate innovation performance; in addition, the implementation of equity incentives for executives has attracted more analysts to follow. Analysts play their roles of information intermediary and external supervision to alleviate information asymmetry, improve information transparency, and increase market recognition of the value of corporate innovation activities, which can alleviate the financing constraints faced by innovation activities and can also strengthen the supervision of enterprise management, thereby promoting the improvement of innovation performance. The research in this thesis provides a certain reference for enterprises to improve their innovation capabilities and government departments to improve relevant laws and regulations and regulatory activities.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)