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论文编号：	12456
作者编号：	1120170873
上传时间：	2021/6/11 16:47:11
中文题目：	研发投入波动与信息披露研究
英文题目：	Research on R&D Investment Fluctuation and Information Disclosure
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	研发投入波动；盈余管理；创新信息披露；创新包容
英文关键字：	R&D investment fluctuation; earnings management; innovation information disclosure; Innovation and inclusion
中文摘要：	现有文献认为研发投入波动是管理层“间断平衡双元”，目的是为了适应复杂环境的健康行为。但囿于信息不对称，研发投入波动可能被投资者视为一种危险信号，一方面研发投入急剧增加意味着短期利润巨幅减少；另一方面，研发投入急剧降低意味着未来竞争力不足。本文以上市公司为例，研究公司管理层在研发投入波动过程中，如何对财务报告中的盈余信息和年报中的创新文本信息进行包装来打消投资者的顾虑。研究发现：（1）研发投入正向波动过程中，由于短期业绩压力，管理层会进行向上盈余管理，并且创新文本信息更加彰显创新禀赋和创新成果来增强投资者对短期盈余的信心；（2）研发投入负向波动过程中，管理层会进行向下盈余管理，以便为未来储备利润，并且创新文本信息更加凸显创新进展、聚焦创新目标，从而增强投资者对于未来的盈余信心。 科技创新的研发周期与资本金融的衍生规律不匹配，资本市场重视年度财务指标（急于求成）而科技创新需要较长时间（重在过程），二者的互不匹配是研发投入波动（创新战略变化）后管理层采用信息披露操纵进行业绩包装、印象管理的直接原因。管理层进行信息披露操纵的原因有四：其一，投资者压力。研发投入的急剧变化与业绩的突然“变脸”，投资者可能将研发投入与业绩的波动视为一种危险举动，管理层为打消投资者疑虑进行信息披露管理，相比之下，西方国家成熟投资者（机构投资者）占比较高，他们更关注企业未来价值创造的能力，而非眼下短期盈余。其二，迎合动机。研发投入波动的公司可能吸引分析师、商业媒体和债券评级机构等外界关注，相关分析信息对资本市场冲击巨大，会及时反应在股价之中，并影响投资者抉择，管理层为规避股价波动风险采取信息披露操纵的方式迎合相关机构，中国情景下资本市场主体（投资者、分析师、商业媒体及机构投资者等）提供资本的主要目标是获取短期利润，而非长期价值投资，当出现研发投入波动的情境时，资本市场主体多会逐利避险，管理层为避免股价波动引发资本市场恐慌，采用信息披露管理的方式寻求资本市场主体包容。其三，退市威胁。企业处于研发投入波动阶段意味着创新战略的变革，由于创新活动的高度不确定性，极可能出现研发失败乃至绩效逆差，现阶段严格的退市制度不利于创新活动（尤其是突破式创新）。其四，创新内在特征。创新具有失败率高、周期长的特点，企业不仅需要从内部制度设计上包容创新失败，也需要寻求外部利益相关者的创新包容度，保证创新活动持续、稳健的开展。 本文站在资本市场的角度，对企业研发投入波动之后管理层信息披露操纵提出一个合理的解释。业绩包装（盈余管理、创新信息披露）表面看似是印象管理的一种手段，实则可能是管理层寻求资本市场创新包容的“辛酸”之举，由于科技创新的规律与资本金融的周期互不匹配，研发活动重在过程而资本市场急于求成，管理层难以两全，退而求其次采用信息披露操纵的方式迎合资本市场制度规定，寻求资本市场创新包容。本研究有助于利益相关者理解企业研发投入波动背景下的信息披露操纵动机，也响应了近期资本市场创新包容的制度设计，具有较强的理论与现实意义。 本文进一步检验研发投入波动下的业绩包装所带来的市场反应，发现，企业研发投入正向波动时，向上盈余管理能够带来积极的市场反应，且当管理层配合性的彰显创新禀赋和创新成果时，投资者更加相信短期盈余的真实性，带来更为积极的市场反应。企业研发投入负向波动时，向下盈余管理为未来储备利润导致当期业绩的差强人意，引发了消极的市场反应，但当管理层凸显创新进展、聚焦创新目标时，能够增加投资者对未来的盈余信心，市场反应不再显著为负。 本文共分为六章，第一章是绪论，介绍了本文的研究动机、研究意义、研究方法、研究思路、框架、技术路线图以及本文的创新点。第二章为文献综述，分别从研发投入波动与信息披露两个方面梳理国内外文献，并根据现有文献的不足来进一步阐释本文的研究方向。第三章研究研发投入正向波动下的盈余数字信息和创新信息包装行为。第四章研究研发投入负向波动下的盈余数字信息和创新信息披露包装行为。第五章研究研发投入波动（正向和负向）下的盈余数字信息和创新信息包装所带来的市场反应。第六章根据本文的研究结果，提出相应的政策建议，并进一步指出本文的研究不足和未来的研究方向。
英文摘要：	According to the existing literature, the fluctuation of R & D investment is the "discontinuous balance dual" of management, which aims to adapt to the health behavior of complex environment. However, due to information asymmetry, the fluctuation of R & D investment may be regarded as a dangerous signal by investors. On the one hand, the sharp increase of R & D investment means a huge reduction of short-term profits; on the other hand, the sharp decrease of R & D investment means lack of competitiveness in the future. Taking listed companies as an example, this paper studies how the company's management manages the earnings information in the financial report and the innovative text information in the annual report in the process of R & D investment fluctuation to dispel the concerns of investors. The results show that: (1) in the process of positive fluctuation of R & D investment, due to the short-term performance pressure, the management will conduct upward earnings management, and the innovation text information will highlight the innovation endowment and innovation achievements to enhance investors' confidence in the short-term earnings; (2) in the process of negative fluctuation of R & D investment, the management will conduct downward earnings management to reserve profits for the future, and improve investors' confidence in the short-term earnings And the innovation text information highlights the innovation progress and focuses on the innovation goal, so as to enhance investors' confidence in the future earnings. The R & D cycle of scientific and technological innovation does not match the derivative law of capital finance. The capital market attaches importance to the annual financial indicators (eager for success) while scientific and technological innovation takes a long time (focusing on the process). The mismatch between the two is the direct reason for the management to use information disclosure management for performance packaging and impression management after the fluctuation of R & D investment (innovation strategy change). There are four reasons for the management to manipulate information disclosure: first, the pressure of investors, the rapid change of R & D investment and the sudden "face change" of performance, may regard the fluctuation of R & D investment and performance as a dangerous move, and the management carries out information disclosure management in order to dispel the doubts of investors. In contrast, the mature investors (institutional investors) in western countries account for a relatively high proportion, and they are the main investors Focus more on the ability to create value in the future, rather than short-term earnings. Second, catering motivation; companies with fluctuating R & D investment may attract the attention of analysts, commercial media and bond rating agencies, and the relevant analysis information will have a huge impact on the capital market, which will be reflected in the stock price in time and affect the choice of investors. In order to avoid the risk of stock price fluctuation, the management adopts the way of information disclosure management to cater to the relevant institutions, and the capital market in the Chinese context The main goal of investors, analysts, commercial media and institutional investors to provide capital is to obtain short-term profits, rather than long-term value investment. When R & D investment fluctuates, the main body of capital market will pursue profits and avoid risks. In order to avoid the panic of capital market caused by stock price fluctuation, the management adopts information disclosure management to seek the main body of capital market Rong. Third, the threat of delisting. The fluctuation of R & D investment means the change of innovation strategy. Due to the high uncertainty of innovation activities, R & D failure and even performance deficit are likely to occur. At this stage, the strict delisting system is not conducive to innovation activities (especially breakthrough innovation). Fourth, the internal characteristics of innovation. Innovation has the characteristics of high failure rate and long cycle. Enterprises not only need to tolerate innovation failure from the internal system design, but also need to seek the innovation tolerance of external stakeholders to ensure the continuous and steady development of innovation activities. From the perspective of capital market, this paper puts forward a reasonable explanation for management information disclosure (Management) after the fluctuation of R & D investment. Performance packaging (earnings management, innovation information disclosure) seems to be a means of impression management on the surface, but in fact it may be a "bitter" move for the management to seek the inclusion of innovation in the capital market. Due to the mismatch between the law of scientific and technological innovation and the cycle of capital finance, R & D activities focus on the process, while the capital market is eager for success, it is difficult for the management to achieve both ends, and then to adopt information packaging The way of financial management caters to the regulations of capital market system and seeks the innovation and tolerance of capital market. This study is helpful for stakeholders to understand the motivation of information disclosure management under the background of R & D investment fluctuation, and also responds to the recent institutional design of capital market innovation tolerance, which has strong theoretical and practical significance. This paper further tests the market reaction brought by the performance packaging under the fluctuation of R & D investment, and finds that when the R & D investment is positively fluctuating, upward earnings management can bring positive market reaction, and when the management cooperation highlights the innovation endowment and innovation achievements, investors believe more in the authenticity of short-term earnings and bring more positive market reaction. When R & D investment fluctuates negatively, downward earnings management results in poor current performance for future reserve profit, which leads to negative market reaction. However, when management highlights innovation progress and focuses on innovation goals, it can increase investors' confidence in future earnings, and the market reaction is no longer significantly negative. This paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which introduces the research motivation, research significance, research methods, research ideas, framework, technology roadmap and innovation of this paper. The second chapter is literature review, which combs the domestic and foreign literature from the two aspects of R & D investment fluctuation and information disclosure, and further explains the research direction of this paper according to the shortcomings of the existing literature. The third chapter studies the packaging behavior of earnings digital information and innovation information disclosure under the positive fluctuation of R & D investment. The fourth chapter studies the packaging behavior of earnings digital information and innovation information disclosure under the negative fluctuation of R & D investment. The fifth chapter studies the market reaction of earnings digital information and innovation information packaging under the fluctuation of R & D investment (positive and negative). In the sixth chapter, according to the research results of this paper, the corresponding policy recommendations are put forward, and further points out the research deficiencies and future research directions of this paper.
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