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论文编号：	12428
作者编号：	1120160822
上传时间：	2021/6/10 22:33:25
中文题目：	政府引导基金对企业创新的影响研究——基于风险投资机构异质性视角
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Government-guided Funds on Enterprise Innovation—Based on the Heterogeneity of Venture Capital Institutions
指导老师：	黄福广
中文关键字：	政府引导基金；企业创新；风险投资机构；资源禀赋；新三板
英文关键字：	Government-guided funds; enterprise innovation; venture capital institutions; resource endowment; New Third Board
中文摘要：	政府引导基金是由政府设立并按照市场化方式运作的政策性基金，主要是为了引导社会资金进入创业投资领域，进而支持创新创业活动。现阶段政府引导基金以参股运作模式的间接投资为主，通过委托外部风险投资机构进行管理，重在市场化运作。市场化运作能够避免政府直接参与投资产生的政治关联问题，但容易导致激励不足。因此在实践中，政府引导基金能否解决市场失灵、促进企业创新依然存在较大争议。 本文从风险投资机构异质性视角研究政府引导基金对企业创新的影响，将政府引导基金、风险投资机构和被投资企业三者统一纳入分析，在理论上完善了政府引导基金的研究框架，在实践上有利于从政府引导基金的设立根本上加深其对企业行为影响的认识。以2013年至2019年新三板上市企业为研究样本，采用清科数据库等公开数据为主，并结合部分手工整理，回归后得出的主要结论如下。 第一，使用倾向匹配得分法（PSM）将有政府引导基金投资的企业与无政府引导基金投资的企业进行匹配，检验政府引导基金对企业创新的影响。结果发现与没有政府引导基金投资的企业相比，有政府引导基金投资的企业研发投入和创新产出都有显著性提高。进一步分样本回归发现，政府引导基金对大规模企业、非国有企业和新三板创新层企业的研发投入和创新产出的促进作用更大。通过Heckman两阶段回归控制内生性问题，以及替换因变量的测量等稳健性检验后，政府引导基金对企业创新的促进作用依然存在。 第二，将风险投资机构异质性从三个角度进行展开，分别是风险投资机构是否为国有风险投资机构、风险投资机构声誉高低以及风险投资机构是否从事专业化投资，具体分析风险投资机构受政府引导基金委托后对企业创新的影响效果。从风险投资机构是否为国有风险投资机构角度进行分析，检验发现政府引导基金通过委托国有风险投资机构进行管理抑制了企业创新。进一步分析发现，当国有风险投资机构投资国有企业时，反而能促进企业创新，原因是政府引导基金、国有风险投资机构与国有企业同属于政府背景，减少了代理冲突。替换企业创新变量的测量、将样本进行洁净化处理等稳健性检验后，该结论依然成立。 第三，从风险投资机构声誉高低角度进行分析，检验发现政府引导基金通过委托高声誉风险投资机构进行管理能促进企业创新，支持了“认证效应”假说。进一步分析其作用机制发现高声誉风险投资机构通过缓解企业融资约束进而促进企业创新。替换风险投资机构声誉变量的测量、企业创新变量的测量等稳健性检验后，该结论依然成立。 第四，从风险投资机构是否从事专业化角度进行分析，检验发现政府引导基金通过委托从事企业早期阶段专业化的风险投资机构并未促进企业创新。但是当风险投资机构与被投资企业所在地区相同时，早期阶段专业化的风险投资机构能够促进企业创新投入，说明风险投资机构早期阶段专业化作用的发挥需要借助于“本地偏好”的投资策略。同时，当从事早期阶段专业化的风险投资机构投资企业早期阶段时，能促进企业创新投入，体现了策略匹配的重要性。替换企业早期阶段等变量测量后该结论依然稳健。 本文的创新之处主要体现在以下三方面：第一，从政府引导基金的视角验证了政府市场化手段的积极作用。本文的研究对象政府引导基金是将政府的“有形之手”与市场的“无形之手”相结合，深化了政府与市场关系的认识，为政府如何有效参与市场提供了实证证据。第二，从风险投资机构异质性视角揭示了政府引导基金促进企业创新的内在机制。现有研究主要集中在政府引导基金对风险投资机构行为的影响以及政府引导基金对企业创新行为的影响两方面，本文将政府引导基金、风险投资机构和被投资企业三者统一纳入分析，完善了政府引导基金的研究框架。第三，从资源禀赋论角度解释了风险投资机构参与政府引导基金管理对企业创新行为的影响。考虑资源禀赋，既符合风险投资机构特点，也能更全面地分析政府引导基金委托不同类型的风险投资机构对企业创新行为的差异性影响。 本文的研究结论为如何提高我国政府引导基金的投资效果有重要启示。首先，政府应该持续设立引导基金，充分发挥市场机制的优势，以间接投资方式促进被投资企业创新。其次，当被投资企业是国有企业时，政府引导基金可以委托国有风险投资机构进行管理，减少代理成本。再次，政府引导基金可以委托高声誉风险投资机构进行管理，借助高声誉风险投资机构的认证作用更好地缓解企业融资约束，进而促进企业创新。最后，政府引导基金可以委托从事早期阶段专业化的风险投资机构，并且投资本地企业和企业早期阶段，发挥风险投资机构的专业化优势，提高企业创新。
英文摘要：	Government-guided fund is a policy fund set up by the government and operated in a market-oriented way, mainly to guide social funds into the field of venture capital, and then support innovation and entrepreneurship activities.At the present stage, the government-guided funds are mainly indirect investment in the operation mode of equity participation, and they are managed by external venture capital institutions, focusing on market-oriented operation. Market oriented operation can avoid the political connection problems caused by the government's direct participation, but it is easy to lead to insufficient incentives. Therefore, in practice, whether the government -guided funds can solve the market failure and promote enterprise innovation is still controversial. This paper studies the impact of government-guided funds on enterprise innovation from the perspective of heterogeneity of venture capital institutions. It brings government-guided funds, venture capital institutions and invested enterprises into one analysis. It improves the research framework of government-guided funds in theory and helps to deepen the understanding of its impact on enterprise behavior from the establishment of government-guided funds in practice. Taking the listed companies on the New Third Board from 2013 to 2019 as the research sample, using the public data such as Qingke database, combined with some manual sorting, the main conclusions after regression are as follows. First, we use the propensity score matching method to test the impact of government-guided funds on enterprise innovation. The results show that the R&D input and innovation output of the enterprises with government-guided funds are significantly higher than those without government-guided funds. Further regression shows that government-guided funds have a greater role in promoting R&D input and innovation output of large-scale enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises and innovation level enterprises in the New Third Board. After controlling the endogenous problem through Heckman two-stage regression and measuring the substitution dependent variable, the promotion effect of government-guided funds on enterprise innovation still exists. Second, this paper analyzes the heterogeneity of venture capital institutions from three aspects: whether the venture capital institutions are state-owned venture capital institutions, whether the reputation of venture capital institutions is high or low, and whether the venture capital institutions are engaged in professional investment. From the perspective of whether the venture capital institutions are state-owned venture capital institutions, it is found that the government-guided funds inhibit enterprise innovation by entrusting state-owned venture capital institutions to manage. Further analysis shows that when state-owned venture capital institutions invest in state-owned enterprises, they can promote enterprise innovation, because government-guided funds, state-owned venture capital institutions and state-owned enterprises belong to the same government background, which reduces agency conflicts. After replacing the measurement of enterprise innovation variables and cleaning the samples, the conclusion is still valid. Thirdly, from the perspective of the reputation of venture capital institutions, it is found that government-guided funds can promote enterprise innovation by entrusting high reputation venture capital institutions for management, which supports the "certification effect" hypothesis. Further analysis of its mechanism shows that high reputation venture capital institutions can promote enterprise innovation by easing the financing constraints. After replacing the measurement of reputation variables of venture capital institutions and the measurement of enterprise innovation variables, the conclusion is still valid. Fourth, from the perspective of whether the venture capital institutions are engaged in early stage specialization, it is found that the government-guided funds do not promote enterprise innovation by entrusting venture capital institutions engaged in early stage specialization. However, when the venture capital institutions and the invested enterprises are located in the same region, the specialized venture capital institutions in the early stage can promote the innovation investment of enterprises, which indicates that the professional role of venture capital institutions in the early stage needs the help of "local preference" investment strategy. At the same time, when the venture capital institutions engaged in early stage specialization invest in the early stage of enterprises, they can promote enterprise innovation investment, which reflects the importance of strategy matching. This conclusion is still robust after replacing the measurement of variables such as the early stage of the enterprise. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following three aspects: first, from the perspective of government-guided funds, the positive role of government marketization is verified. The research object of this paper is the government-guided funds, which combine the "visible hand" of the government with the "invisible hand" of the market, deepens the understanding of the relationship between the government and the market, and provides empirical evidence for the government to effectively participate in the market.Second, from the perspective of heterogeneity of venture capital institutions, it reveals the internal mechanism of government-guided funds to promote enterprise innovation. The existing research mainly focuses on the impact of government-guided funds on venture capital institutions' behavior and the impact of government-guided funds on enterprise innovation behavior. This paper puts government-guided funds, venture capital institutions and invested enterprises into one analysis, and improves the research framework of government-guided funds. Thirdly, from the perspective of resource endowment theory, it explains the impact of venture capital institutions' participation in government-guided funds management on enterprise innovation behavior. Considering the resource endowment, it is not only in line with the characteristics of venture capital institutions, but also can more comprehensively analyze the impact of different types of venture capital institutions entrusted by government-guided funds on enterprise innovation behavior. The conclusions of this paper have important enlightenment on how to improve the investment effect of government-guided funds. First of all, the government should continue to set up guided funds, give full play to the advantages of market mechanism, and promote the innovation of invested enterprises by indirect investment. Secondly, when the invested enterprise is a state-owned enterprise, the government-guided funds can entrust the state-owned venture capital institutions to manage and reduce the agency cost. Thirdly, the government-guided funds can entrust high reputation venture capital institutions to manage, with the help of high reputation venture capital institutions' certification role to better ease the financing constraints of enterprises, and then promote enterprise innovation. Finally, the government-guided funds can entrust venture capital institutions engaged in early stage specialization, and invest in local enterprises and early stage enterprises, so as to give full play to the professional advantages of venture capital institutions and improve enterprise innovation.
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