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论文编号：	12426
作者编号：	2120192795
上传时间：	2021/6/10 21:07:53
中文题目：	考虑产品召回风险的供应链中可追溯投资决策与需求侧策略分析
英文题目：	Traceability Investment Decisions and Demand-side Strategy in Supply Chains with Product Recall Risks
指导老师：	方磊
中文关键字：	可追溯；产品召回；质量努力；需求侧策略
英文关键字：	traceability; product recalls; quality improvement; demand-side strategy
中文摘要：	作为一种获取竞争优势的策略，“全球采购”正为越来越多的企业所采用。然而，更加复杂的采购网络使得确保安全、合规的产品供应越发困难，置企业于潜在的质量与安全风险中。当产品被曝出质量安全问题时，企业通常会立即宣布召回所有产品。从企业的角度看，产品召回不仅会招致相当的直接经济损失，如全额退款、召回费用，同时也对下游企业的品牌声誉造成严重影响，对一些中小企业甚至会导致破产（如日本高田集团）。为降低召回风险，一些行业巨头（如沃尔玛）纷纷涉足可追溯技术（如区块链），以确保产品安全且高质量地供应。 为探究下游企业如何选择是否进行可追溯投资、下游的投资决策如何影响上游企业的质量努力，以及一种需求侧策略对企业决策的影响，本文建立了由一个处于领导地位的下游制造商与一个上游供应商组成的两级供应链中，双方的Stackelberg博弈模型，运用逆向归纳法求得双方博弈均衡，综合运用数学分析，文章得出一些结论与管理启示。 本文主要有两点创新：一是，考虑消费者对产品的可追溯偏好以及召回事件给下游企业带来的品牌声誉损失，更符合实证研究的有关结论与业界实践；二是，首次将需求侧策略引入存在产品召回风险的供应链中下游的可追溯投资与上游的质量努力决策，拓宽了需求侧策略在供应链管理中的应用研究。 本文得到以下主要结论：（一）制造商在投资与不投资之间，应当总是进行可追溯投资。（二）一定条件下，作为领导者的制造商采取需求侧策略后，能在减少自身可追溯资金投入的同时撬动上游更多质量提升努力的资金投入，促使供应链提供质量水平更高的产品。（三）高价值品牌制造商不宜仅采用可追溯策略与需求侧策略。（四）供应商应当总是不采取需求侧策略，供应链关于需求侧策略的最优组合为（制造商采取、供应商不采取）。该策略组合下，制造商与供应商的利润，以及消费者剩余均实现了增长，即看似“利它（消费者）”的需求侧策略确实“利它（消费者）利己也利他（供应商）”。
英文摘要：	As a strategy to gain competitive advantages, global sourcing is becoming a necessary tool for many companies. However, it also presents challenges to companies. More complex souring networks make it harder to ensure a safe and compliant supply, therefore putting firms at risk to potential product safety and quality issues. When facing such crises, a common remedy among companies is to recall all the involved products immediately. These crises would not only result in indirect economic losses (e.g. recall costs, refund) but damage the brand reputation of these concerned companies, which may even lead to bankruptcy for small and medium-sized businesses (e.g. Japan’s Takata Corp.). To strengthen supply chain transparency and eliminate product recall risks, several leading companies have tapped into the growing use of traceability (e.g. blockchain) for their products. In this study, we construct stylized game-theoretical models in a two-echelon supply chain with a downstream manufacturer (leader) and an upstream supplier (follower). The objective of this study is to investigate should the manufacturer invests in traceability? And how his decision interacts with the quality improvement of the upstream supplier? Will their equilibriums be changed in the appearance of a demand-side strategy? Using the backward induction method, we find the equilibrium solutions to the model. Finally, several results are presented after some necessary mathematical analysis. There are two main innovations in our model. First, we take both consumers’ preference towards product traceability and reputation damage of the downstream firm resulted from product recall issues into account, which the prior literature has not yet considered. Besides, our model first studies the adoption of a demand-side strategy in the context of product recalls. In this study, we find several significant results. First, our analysis confirms that the downstream manufacturer should always invest in traceability. Second, surprisingly, we find that by adopting the demand-side strategy, the manufacturer can motivate the upstream supplier to exert more quality efforts without expending extra costs of traceability investment, thus ensuring a more reliable and high-quality supply of products. Third, our study reveals that it is not wise for a valuable brand to only invest in traceability or adopt the demand-side strategy. Finally, this study shows that the demand-side strategy should always and only be adopted by the leader of supply chains. And the utilization of this strategy does create shared value for both consumers and supply chain members as it seems to.
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